Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit

Class C No. 2

THE SPHOTANIRNAYA

(Chapter XIV of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*)

of

KAUNDA BHATTA

Edited

with Introduction, Translation, and Critical

and Exegetical Notes

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PREFACE

Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa wrote the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* and the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* in the first half of the 17th century. The latter work, as the title itself indicates, is an epitome of the former. Both the works are of the nature of commentaries on the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā*, whose authorship is traditionally attributed to Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, the uncle of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, and this tradition is confirmed by MSS No. 1484-1486 preserved at the Oriental Library, Madras. (See Studies in Indian Literary History, Vol. III, pp. 13-14).

Bhaṭṭoji's *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā* contains 72 verses which embody the essence of the philosophical doctrine propounded by Sanskrit Grammarians. In fact, several of these *kārikās* even represent the views which had been put forth several centuries after the composition of the *Vākyapadīya*.

Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa cannot claim any originality for the semantic concept which he has set forth in the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*. For the most part, he relies on the older authorities. His chief merit lies in the fact that he awakened fresh interest in the study of the *Vākyapadīya* at a time when the philosophy of Sanskrit grammar was being practically neglected and had almost dwindled. Thus, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa may be said to have rejuvenated the philosophical system of grammar. Although he claims that his teaching is based on Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, it appears to me that his work departs from the line of thought associated with those celebrated grammarians.

The *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa* and its abridged version, the *Sāra*, deal with the chief principles of the philosophy of Sanskrit

language and semantics rather than with those of metaphysics. From the time of Bhartṛhari to that of Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, Indian Grammarians have generally claimed to be the followers of Advaita Vedānta, and they have made hardly any innovation in the metaphysics of that system. If at all anything, there is progressive deterioration.

In recent times, keen interest has been evinced in the study of Indian semantics, both by Indian and foreign scholars, and fresh attempts have been made to interpret the ancient Sanskrit works. I, however, thought that while this interest was steadily growing, the highly abstruse texts dealing with the theory of meaning needed to be rendered into English intelligibly. Such rendering itself would help in evaluating the Indian contribution to the system of semantics and its relevance to the modern theories of meaning. It was this feeling which impelled me to undertake the work of translating the last chapter of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, entitled *Sphoṭanirṇaya*. This chapter may be said to constitute an excellent epitome on the Sanskrit Grammarians' theory of language-meaning.

In the Introduction to this translation, I have attempted to present the views of the Grammarians as also of the adherents of other philosophical systems in a historical perspective. It has been my endeavour to set forth the ancient Indian theories through the medium of modern linguistic terminology and idiom, so that the Introduction should evoke interest among Sanskritists as well as non-Sanskritist linguisticians. Of course I have always taken care to see that the modern terms are truly expressive of the original concepts in Sanskrit.

I should like to mention here that in interpreting the ancient Indian theories on meaning, I am benefited immensely by the

previous writings on the subject by such scholars as J. BROUGH, K. A. Subrahmania IYER and K. Kunjunni RAJA.

I should also like to take this opportunity to express my deep sense of gratitude to my *guru,* Prof. Daniel H. H. INGALLS of Harvard University, who has really inspired me to undertake a translation of this text. While at Harvard, he introduced me to the various theories in Western linguistics and philosophy. I am also indebted to Prof. R. N. DANDEKAR, Director of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, for the encouraging interest which he has shown in the progress of this work. His wide experience as scholar and editor has proved highly beneficial to me. I am also grateful to my colleagues in the C.A.S.S., Prof. G. V. DEVASTHALI and Shri M. D. BALASUBRAHMANYAM, who read the original manuscript and offered useful suggestions for its improvement. Lastly, I thank my colleagues, K. P. JOG, J. R. JOSHI, Saroja BHATE, and Saudamini BAHULIKAR for their assistance which is responsible for the present shape of the work.

S. D. JOSHI

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INTRODUCTION

THE *SPHOṬA* THEORY

The theory of the *sphoṭa* is one of the most important theories dealing with the central problem of semantics, general linguistics and philosophy of language. It is claimed that the origin[1] of this theory goes back to Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*[2] which mentions the name of Sphoṭāyana. Nāgeśa mentions in his *Sphoṭavāda*[3] that the grammarian Sphoṭāyana has first propounded the theory of *sphoṭa*. However, we do not know for certain who was the first propounder of the *sphoṭa* doctrine, irrespective of the fact that Pāṇini himself mentions the name of Sphoṭāyana. The specific mention of the name of Sphoṭāyana neither sufficiently indicates that Pāṇini knew anything similar to the *sphoṭa* theory as developed by Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*, nor does it point out that this doctrine originally belonged to the sage

1. Some scholars believe that the indirect reference to the theory of *sphoṭa* is found in the view of Audumbarāyaṇa quoted by Yāska in his *Nirukta* 1.1. Audumbarāyaṇa holds that the classification of words into four categories is impossible, because there is no separate existence of words apart from the sound-units that follow each other in quick succession. The school of Audumbarāyaṇa represents the germs of the *sphoṭa* doctrine which was developed later on by Bhartṛhari. See J. BROUGH, "Audumbarāyaṇa's theory of language", *BSOAS*, XIV, pt. I.

2. VI. i. 123: अवङ् स्फोटायनस्य । See also *Padamañjarī* under Pāṇ VI.i.123: स्फोटायनः स्फोटप्रतिपादनपरो वैयाकरणाचार्यः ।

3. *Sphoṭavāda*, p. 12:

वैयाकरणनागेशः स्फोटायनऋषेर्मतम् ।
परिष्कृत्योक्तवांस्तत्र प्रीयतां जगदीश्वरः ॥

Sphoṭāyana. At best, the word may mean a remote descendant of *Sphoṭa.*[4]

When we come to Patañjali[5] we find the first reference to the theory of *sphoṭa.* The *sphoṭa* theory was fully developed by Bhartṛhari and the later grammarians; but some of the notions underlying this theory are found in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya.* Therefore, I propose here to put together some of the ideas of Patañjali on *dhvani, sphoṭa* and *śabda.*

Patañjali's views on the nature of phonemes:

The search for the ultimate differentiating constituents of language can be traced back to Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya.* In the *Pratyāhārāhnikа*[6] of his *Mahābhāṣya,* Patañjali discusses the function of phonemes. First of all he raises the question whether the phonemes are meaning-bearing units or not. As a prima-facie argument, he puts forth the view that the phonemes are the smallest significant units in the language. Phonemes may be

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4. IV. i. 99: नडादिभ्यः फक् ।

5. *Mbh.*, Vol. 1, p. 181: एवं तर्हि स्फोटः शब्दो ध्वनिः शब्दगुणः ।
ध्वनिः स्फोटश्च शब्दानां ध्वनिस्तु खलु लक्ष्यते ।
अल्पो महांश्च केषांचिदुभयं तत्स्वभावतः ।।
See also *ibid.*, p. 26: अथवोभयतः स्फोटमात्रं निर्दिश्यते । रश्रुतेर्लश्रुतिर्भवतीति ।

6. *Ibid.*, p. 30:
वर्णव्यत्यये चार्थान्तरगमनान्मन्यामहेऽर्थवन्तो वर्णा इति । कूपः सूपः यूप इति । ... वर्णानुपलब्धौ चानर्थगतेर्मन्यामहेऽर्थवन्तो वर्णा इति । वृक्षः ऋक्षः । काण्डीरः आण्डीरः । ... संघातार्थवत्त्वाच्च मन्यामहेऽर्थवन्तो वर्णा इति । यषां संघाता अर्थवन्तोऽवयवा अपि तेषामर्थवन्तः । येषां पुनरवयवा अनर्थकाः समुदाया अपि तेषामनर्थकाः । ...

regarded as meaningful units, because the minimally distinctive words /ku:pə/ 'well', /su:pə/ 'soup', /yu:pə/ 'sacrificial post' convey different information. Since these words are distinguished from one another by their initial single phonemes only, the difference in meaning should correspond to the different phonemes in the initial position of these words. Accordingly, phonemes are meaningful, because a particular meaning is not apprehended in the absence of a particular phoneme. Thus he logically proves that, since the whole unit is meaningful, its parts (phonemes) must be meaningful. The whole derives its character from the constituents which make up the whole. Patañjali furnishes an instance to support this. If a blind person cannot see, a conclave of hundred blind persons too cannot see; if a person is endowed with sight, a collection of such hundred persons would also be endowed with such a faculty. Therefore, since the whole is meaningful, its parts also must be meaningful.

Patañjali's[7] final answer to this question is that the verbal roots, stems, suffixes and particles consisting of a single phoneme are regarded as meaning-bearing units. But if a word consists of more than one phoneme, meaning is not apprehended from each phoneme separately. Patañjali no doubt admits that the words *kūpa*, *sūpa* and *yūpa* are distinguished from one another by their initial single phoneme; nevertheless, the meaning is

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32: अनर्थकास्तु वर्णाः। कुतः प्रतिवर्णमर्थानुपलब्धेः। न हि प्रतिवर्णमर्था उपलभ्यन्ते। ... वर्णव्यत्ययापायोपजनविकारेष्वर्थदर्शनान्मन्यामहेऽनर्थका वर्णा इति। ... संघातान्तराण्येवैतान्येवंजातीयकान्यर्थान्तरेषु वर्तन्ते। कूपः सूपः यूप इति। यदि हि वर्णव्यत्ययकृतमर्थान्तरगमनं स्याद् भूयिष्ठः कूपार्थः सूपे स्यात् ...। इदं खल्वपि भवता वर्णानामर्थवत्तां ब्रुवता साधीयोऽनर्थकत्वं द्योतितम्। यो हि मन्यते यः कूपे कूपार्थः स ककारस्य यः सूपे सूपार्थः स सकारस्य यो यूपे यूपार्थः स यकारस्येत्यूपशब्दस्तस्यानर्थकः स्यात।

neither cognized through the distinctive phonemes /k/ /s/ and /y/ in /ku:pə/ /su:pə/ and /yu:pə/ respectively, nor is it conveyed by the identical segment /u:pə/.

Patañjali maintains that the significance of phonemes lies in differentiating one word from another; but, according to him, the differentiating unit is not necessarily the significant unit. His view is that the isolated phonemes are not directly connected with meaning. As far as the meaning is concerned, the words are indivisible into phonemes. Therefore, Patañjali thinks that it is necessary to postulate a single entity (*saṁghāta*) as the meaning-bearing unit. To put it differently, the word as a whole, unconnected with the isolated phonemes, conveys meaning. The whole has its purposive activity which cannot necessarily be correlated to its parts. The whole[8] should be looked upon as a unit different from its parts, from the standpoint of function or purpose and should not be necessarily considered as belonging to the collection of parts. Patañjali presents an analogy to prove his theory: The parts of a chariot, when disconnected from a structural whole, are incapable of moving, while a chariot as a whole is capable of doing so.

It is interesting to note here that Patañjali keeps the two levels of the language apart. Accordingly, the function of the language at the sound level is to differentiate one significant unit from another. The function of the language at the word level is to signify meaning. The later grammarians identify the significative level of the language with the *sphoṭa* concept. They hold the view that the *sphoṭa* is the single meaning-bearing entity—either word or sentence. Patañjali does not identify

8. *Ibid.*, p. 220: इमे पुनर्वर्णा अत्यन्तायैवानर्थकाः । यथा तर्हि रथाङ्गानि विहृतानि प्रत्येकं व्रजिक्रियां प्रत्यसमर्थानि भवन्ति तत्समुदायश्च रथः समर्थ एवमेषां वर्णानां समुदाया अर्थवन्तोऽवयवा अनर्थका इति ।।

sphoṭa with the meaning-bearing nature of language. When Patañjali says: '*saṁghāta* is one and indivisible', he means to say that it cannot be divided into phonemes as far as the meaning is to be conveyed. In other words, a word undivided into phonemes conveys meaning. When the later grammarians say, 'the word is indivisible', they mean that it cannot be divided into a sequence of either morphemes or phonemes. In their opinion the theory of the *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*: 'indivisible word-*sphoṭa*' abolishes the hierarchy of linguistic units and reduces them to a single indivisible unit.

Patañjali's views on the identification and isolation of morphemes:

The problem of isolation of the morphemes is also discussed by Kātyāyana and Patañjali.[9] In his commentary on the rules I. ii.45 and I.iii.1, Patañjali presents the procedure for the identification and isolation of the morphemes. For this purpose he furnishes the two sets of pairs *pacati* and *paṭhati*, *vṛkṣaḥ* and *vṛkṣau*.

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9. *Ibid.*, p. 219: अर्थवत्ता नोपपद्यते वृक्षशब्दस्य। किं कारणम्। केवलेन अवचनात्। न केवलेन वृक्षशब्देनार्थो गम्यते। केन तर्हि। सप्रत्ययकेन।... सिद्धमेतत्। कथम्। अन्वयाद्व्यतिरेकाच्च। कोऽसावन्वयो व्यतिरेको वा। इह वृक्ष इत्युक्ते कश्चिच्छब्दः श्रूयते। वृक्षशब्दोऽकारान्तः सकारश्च प्रत्ययः। अर्थोऽपि कश्चिद् गम्यते मूलस्कन्धफलपलाशवानेकत्वं च। वृक्षावित्युक्ते कश्चिच्छब्दो हीयते कश्चिदुपजायते कश्चिदन्वयी। सकारो हीयत औकार उपजायते वृक्षशब्दोऽकारान्तोऽन्वयी। अर्थोऽपि कश्चिद्धीयते कश्चिदुपजायते कश्चिदन्वयी। एकत्वं हीयते द्वित्वमुपजायते मूलस्कन्धफलपलाशवानन्वयी। ते मन्यामहे यः शब्दो हीयते तस्यासावर्थो योऽर्थो हीयते यः शब्द उपजायते तस्यासावर्थो योऽर्थ उपजायते यः शब्दोऽन्वयी तस्यासावर्थो योऽर्थोऽन्वयी। See also *ibid.*, p. 255.

	Forms	Meaning
1.	(pacati)	He cooks (softening, agent, singularity).
2.	(paṭhati)	He reads (reading, agent, singularity).
3.	(vṛkṣaḥ)	A tree (an object bearing roots, branches, fruits and leaves; singularity).
4.	(vṛkṣau)	Two trees (an object, bearing roots, branches, fruits and leaves; duality).

In the first pair, the comparison of items 1 and 2 reveals one contrast in expression: /pac-/ : /paṭh-/, and one in meaning: 'softening': 'reading'. In the second pair, the comparison of items 3 and 4 reveals one contrast in expression /-ḥ/ : / -au/, and one in meaning, 'singularity': 'duality'. The first pair constitutes one common phonetic element-*ati,* and common meaning 'doer of action' and 'singularity'. The second pair constitutes the common phonetic element *vṛkṣa-*, with the common meaning 'tree'. Patañjali states the two principles which would determine the isolation and identification of morphemes:

(i) The common meaning should correspond to the common phonetic element, and
(ii) The difference in meaning should correspond to the difference in phonetic element.

The first is called *anvaya* (agreement) and the second is called *vyatireka* (contrast). For the identification of morphemes, he gives the principle of *anvaya* (agreement in phonetic shape and meaning). Further, his statements suggest that the process, by which isolation and identification of morphemes can be accomplished, is the comparison of different forms which are constituted by recurring partials and distinct phonetic elements having a common and different meaning respectively.

In the passage of the *Mahābhāṣya* (Vol. 1, pp. 30-31) which has been already referred to in the earlier section, Patañjali considers phonemes to be the smallest differentiating units, but when they are isolated from the finished word, they have no meaning.

In the passage under discussion he shows that, although the finished word is used for the purposes of communication, it will be possible to assign some meaning to the suffix and stem by the process of contrast and agreement. Thus, while phonemes cannot be correlated directly with the meaning denoted by the finished form, morphemes can be said to have a direct connection with the meaning conveyed by the finished form. This view of Patañjali is analogous to the theory of the *varṇasphoṭa* developed by later grammarians. Since, according to them, the term *sphoṭa* necessarily refers to the significant unit, they tried to interpret the term *varṇasphoṭa* to mean the smallest meaningful units like stems, roots and suffixes. Originally the term stands for the smallest differentiating units rather than meaningful ones. To Patañjali the term *sphoṭa* need not necessarily involve consideration of meaning. He has used the term *sphoṭa* (probably "heard sound") strictly to point out its relation with *dhvani* ("spoken sound"). Another noteworthy point in Patañjali's discussion is that he does not abandon the hierarchy of linguistic units and reduce them to single indivisible units. Subsequently, the upholders of the theories of *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*: 'indivisible word-*sphoṭa*' and *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*: 'indivisible sentence-*sphoṭa*' maintain that the listener is not concerned with the hierarchical structure of language at the time of communication. Patañjali has not said anything similar to this. But his argument has been that the significative unit cannot be dissolved into the smallest constituents of language i.e. phonemes. It deserves to be noted in this connection that, while discussing the meaning-bearing aspect of grammatical units, Patañjali has never used

the term *sphoṭa,* which has become the subject of hair-splitting discussion in the galaxy of later grammarians.

Patañjali's views on the nature of śabda (word):

The introductory chapter of the *Mahābhāṣya* deals with the definition of *śabda.* Patañjali[10] furnishes us with two alternative definitions of the term *śabda.* The first definition tells us that the term *śabda*: 'word' stands for a meaningful segment. According to the second definition, any meaningful or meaningless sound is designated as *śabda.* Patañjali says, when the word *gauḥ* is uttered, the following concepts come before the listener's mind: 'the individual cow having a dewlap, a tail, a hump, hooves and horns, her action, her colour, her form, besides the phonetic shape *g-au-ḥ*'. Accordingly, it becomes difficult to ascertain what exactly is denoted by the term 'word'. Patañjali finally says: 'that is word which, when uttered, brings us the knowledge of the object possessing a dewlap, a tail, a hump, hooves and horns'. He knows the two-sidedness of word. One side represents 'sound' and the other 'content'. When a word is uttered, its sound is heard and its meaning is apprehended. Therefore, he defines word as a 'meaningful sound'.

Then he proceeds to contrast this sense of *śabda* with another sense of *śabda,* which is accepted by a layman. He says that

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10. *Ibid.*, p. 1: अथ गौरियत्र कः शब्दः। किं यत्तत्सास्नालाङ्गूलककुद-खुरविषाण्यर्थरूपं स शब्दः। नेयाह द्रव्यं नाम तत्। ... कस्तर्हि शब्दः। येनोच्चारितेन सास्नालाङ्गूलककुदखुरविषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो भवति स शब्दः। अथवा प्रतीतपदार्थको लोके ध्वनिः शब्द इत्युच्यते। तद्यथा। शब्दं कुरु। शब्दं मा कार्षीः। शब्दकार्यं माणवक इति ध्वनिं कुर्वन्नेवमुच्यते। तस्माद् ध्वनिः शब्दः।

dhvani: 'sound' is a popular[11] term, and sound is designated as *śabda*: 'word.' According to the second definition, any phonetic sequence is considered to be a word which need not necessarily convey any meaning. This definition points out that the name 'word' is given to the articulate sound.

The purpose behind Patañjali's reading the alternative definition lies in the fact that the grammatical rules operate with two kinds of words. Some rules operate with meaningful segments, while the rules of euphonic combination etc. take into account purely the sound elements. Thus, in the modern terminology, the first definition lays emphasis on the morphemic character of a word, whereas the second emphasises the phonetic character of word. According to the commentators[12] of the *Mahābhāṣya*, the first definition refers to the *sphoṭa* word, while in the second definition, the *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* aspects are regarded as non-different. The commentators try to read in Patañjali's statement the theories developed later on the *sphoṭa* word. This makes

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11. The commentators on the *Mahābhāṣya* interpret the word *pratītapadārthaka* in the second definition differently. According to them, the sound, which conveys a sense, is called a word. They maintain that both the definitions refer to the meaning-conveyor sound. But in such interpretation, the contrast between the two alternative definitions is not clearly brought out. Moreover, my interpretation is supported by the comparative study of the word *pratītapadārthaka* which is used thrice by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya*. For details, see S. D. JOSHI, "A definition of a word, an Interpretation", *BDCRI*, Vol. XXV, pp. 65-70.

12. *Pradīpa* on the *Mahābhāṣya* (quoted in the footnote number 10): अथवेति । अन्यत्र ध्वनिस्फोटयोभदःय व्यवस्थापितत्वादिहाभेदेन व्यवहारेऽपि न दोषः, 'द्रव्यादयो न शब्दशब्दवाच्या' इत्यत्र तात्पर्यात् ।

them think that the first definition refers to the meaningful word i.e. *sphoṭa* word. Patañjali has never used the term *sphoṭa*[13] to refer to a single indivisible meaning-bearing unit. The term *sphoṭa* as used by Patañjali always stands for the structure of expression which may or may not have meaning. The idea that the meaning-bearing word is the *sphoṭa* is not implicitly or explicitly stated by Patañjali, although such a concept has occurred to later theorists.

Patañjali[14] makes another important statement about the nature of *śabda*. He says *śabda* is what is perceived by the auditory organs, grasped through intellect, revealed by the sounds pertaining to the region of the sky. By these three phrases, Patañjali gives an adequate description of the process of communication. Firstly, sound is revealed by the articulatory process; secondly, it is received by the listener's ear and finally the auditory perception of the sound is translated into thought. It is a characteristic feature of Indian thinkers, that language, according to them, is primarily to be looked upon as an auditory system. It is used to communicate our thoughts to listeners, and accordingly, the perception of sounds by the listener's ear plays a very important role in the process of communication. By the term *buddhinirgrāhyaḥ*: 'grasped by the intellect', Patañjali indicates that word is a mental or psychical entity. The phrase *prayogeṇa abhijvalitaḥ*: 'revealed by the sounds' refers to the *sphoṭa* aspect of word. The term *śrotropalabdhiḥ*: 'perceived auditorily' stands for the sound which passes from the speaker to the listener. Patañjali points out that *śabda*, in its *sphoṭa* aspect, represents the auditory image of sound revealed by the

13. K. KUNJUNNI RAJA, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 103.
14. *Mbh.* Vol. 1, p. 18: श्रोत्रोपलब्धिर्बुद्धिनिर्ग्राह्यः प्रयोगेणाभिज्वलितः आकाशदेशः शब्द एकः च पुनराकाशम ।

articulatory movements. Thus, he has used the term *śabda* in different contexts to represent different aspects of words. The first definition emphasises the significative aspect of word, the second the articulatory aspect and the third statement speaks of the word as the sound-image auditorily perceived. The term *śabda* stands as a common name for these three aspects.

Patañjali's views on the succession of phonemes:

It has been already pointed out that Patañjali postulates a single entity (*saṁghāta*) as the meaning-bearing unit. He contends that the word as a whole, unconnected with the isolation of phonemes, conveys meaning. That is to say, the whole denotes a meaning without reference to its parts (phonemes). This view appears to run on parallel lines with the view maintained by the later grammarians who assume that the *sphoṭa* word is an indivisible meaning-bearing unit. They express the view that the meaning apprehended from a word cannot be derived from individual phonemes taken singly, because in that case remaining phonemes would be meaningless. It cannot be derived either from a combination of phonemes because one cannot account for the simultaneity of phonemes which are liable to destruction as soon as they are uttered. The later grammarians say that there cannot be the combination of what is non-existent with what is existent. Thus, the *sphoṭavādin* maintains that the sequence of phonemes is an impossibility. Since the unitary perception of word cannot be explained with reference to the sequence of phonemes, they postulate a single indivisible entity *sphoṭa* as a meaning-conveyer word. However, Patañjali's reason for accepting the whole as a single entity does not stem forth from the unaccountability of the sequence of phonemes.

Patañjali[15] on the rule 1.4.109 argues that the vocal organs do not produce the phonemes simultaneously. The simultaneity of phonemes is impossible on account of their transient character. Accordingly, there cannot be a single moment which may comprise of all the phonemes uttered together. As a solution of this problem, Patañjali says, the unity of words exists only in our mind. In this conceptual word we have the notion of succession of phonemes. The sequence of phonemes is to be understood as a mental one. In other words, although phonemes cannot be uttered together at a single moment, their conceptual simultaneity can exist in the mind of the speaker and the listener. In short, Patañjali does not find any difficulty in maintaining the notion of sequence of phonemes which, as a whole, conveys meaning. The simultaneous cognition of phonemes that exists in the mind explains the unitary notion of word which conveys meaning. But this quality of meaning-bearing nature belongs to the whole, and cannot necessarily be correlated with its parts separately. To put it differently, the conceptual sequence of phonemes can be viewed in its entirety as a single unit which he calls by the term *saṁghāta*. Consequently, Patañjali admits the three propositions: (i) *saṁghāta* is divisible into phonemes structurally, (ii) the sequence of phonemes can exist in our

15. *Ibid.*, p. 356: पौर्वापर्यमकालव्यपेतं संहिता चेत्पूर्वापराभावात्संहितासंज्ञा न प्राप्नोति । न हि वर्णानां पौर्वापर्यमस्ति । किं कारणम् । .. एकैक-वर्णवर्तिनी वाक् । न द्वौ युगपदुच्चारयति । गौरिति यावद् गकारे वाग्वर्तते नौकारे न विसर्जनीये । यावदौकारे न गकारे न विसर्जनीये । यावद् विसर्जनीये न गकारे नौकारे । उच्चरितप्रध्वंसित्वात् । उच्चरितप्रध्वंसिनः खल्वपि वर्णाः । उच्चरितः प्रध्वस्तः । अथापरः प्रयुज्यते न वर्णो वर्णस्य सहायः । एवं तर्हि बुद्धिविषयमेव शब्दानां पौर्वापर्यम् । इह य एष मनुष्यः प्रेक्षापूर्वकारी भवति स पश्यत्यस्मिन्नर्थेऽयं शब्दः प्रयोक्तव्योऽस्मिंस्ता-वच्छब्देऽयं तावद्वर्णस्ततोऽयं ततोऽयम् ।

mind and it forms the *saṁghāta*, and (iii) the meaning-bearing nature of *saṁghāta* cannot be assigned individually to each phoneme.

This is, however, not admitted by the later grammarians. Unaccountability of the succession of phonemes is the main argument that is used by them to establish the entity of *sphoṭa*. From Patañjali's point of view, the phonemes as differentiating units are structurally parts of the *saṁghāta*, although they are bereft of the significative function of *saṁghāta*. The later grammarians assume that the *sphoṭa* word is revealed through the phonemes, but it has no structural connection either with the isolated phonemes or with a series thereof.

Patañjali's views on sphoṭa and dhvani:

Patañjali,[16] while explaining the rules 1.1.70 and 8. 2. 18, directly refers to the word *sphoṭa*. Here he describes the relation

16. *Ibid.*, p. 181: सिद्धमेतत्। कथम् अवस्थिता वर्णा द्रुतमध्यमविलम्बितासु। किंकृतस्तर्हि वृत्तिविशेषः। वक्तुश्चिराचिरवचनाद्वृत्तयो विशिष्यन्ते। वक्ता कश्चिदाश्वभिधायी भवति। आशु वर्णानभिधत्ते। कश्चिच्चिरेण कश्चिच्चिरतरेण। तद् यथा। तमेवाध्वानं कश्चिदाशु गच्छति कश्चित् चिरेण गच्छति कश्चिच्चिरतरेण गच्छति। रथिक आशु गच्छति आश्विकश्चिरेण पदातिश्चिरतरेण। विषम उपन्यासः। अधिकरणमत्राध्वा व्रजतिक्रियायाः। तत्रायुक्तमधिकरणस्य वृद्धिह्रासौ स्याताम्। एवं तर्हि स्फोटः शब्दो ध्वनिः शब्दगुणः। कथम्। भेर्याघातवत्। तद्यथा भेर्याघातः। भेरीमाहत्य कश्चिद्विंशति पदानि गच्छति कश्चित् त्रिंशत् कश्चित् चत्वारिंशत्। स्फोटश्च तावानेव भवति ध्वनिकृता वृद्धिः।

ध्वनिः स्फोटश्च शब्दानां ध्वनिस्तु खलु लक्ष्यते।
अल्पो महांश्च केषांचिदुभयं तत्स्वभावतः॥

The meaning of the passage is not clear. According to Kaiyaṭa the passage means: 'when a drum is struck, (while

(*No.* 16 *Foot Note Contd. on page* 14)

(*No.* 16 *Foot Note Contd. from page* 13)

hearing the sound of it) one travels twenty feet, another thirty feet, and still another forty feet'. Nāgeśa interprets Kaiyaṭa to mean, 'when a drum is struck, (while hearing the reverberation of it) one (drum-beater) travels twenty feet, another thirty feet, and still another forty feet'. Accordingly, Nāgeśa interprets the passage to mean that the sound produced by the drum and stick remains of the same duration but increase and decrease in the steps is caused by the reverberation of sound, because it differs from drum to drum. To put it differently, although the initial sound is the same in all cases, still reverberation causes difference in it. That is to say, reverberation of sound lasts for a shorter or a longer period in the case of different drums and it causes the repeated perception of the original sound. The term *sphoṭa* stands for the initial sound (*prākṛta-dhvani*) of the drum while the term *dhvani* stands for the reverberation of initial sound. This reverberation is called *dhvani*, and it is responsible for the increase or decrease in lengths. See Prof. IYER's Article, "Bhartṛhari on *dhvani*", *ABORI*, Vol. XLVI, p. 50. Also Prof. BROUGH, "Theories of general linguistics", *TPS*, 1951, p. 35. BROUGH understands the passage to mean 'when a drum is struck, one drum-beat travels twenty feet, another thirty feet, (still) another forty feet'. The *sphoṭa* (beating) remains the same, but increase in steps is caused by the sound (produced by beatings). If we follow Nāgeśa's interpretation, 'increase and decrease in steps' might have its cause in fast or slow walking of different persons. Accordingly, Patañjali's statement *dhvanikṛtā vṛddhiḥ*: 'increase is caused by sound (i.e. *dhvani* = reverberation)' would not solely be justified, because even if the duration of reverberation remains the same, difference in steps can be justified by slow or fast walking of different persons. Context permits only BROUGH's interpretation, although it cannot be strictly supported by grammar. Grammatically the subject of *āhatya*: 'having beaten the drum' and that of *gacchati* must be the same.

between the two aspects of word: *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. According to him, the *sphoṭa* aspect of word, which is suddenly revealed to the listener's ear, is quite different from *dhvani* which refers to the distinctive or non-distinctive sound-elements uttered by the different speakers in varied tones, pitches etc. From Patañjali's statements, it seems to me that the term *sphoṭa* refers to the *constant element* in the auditory image of the varied articulated sounds, whereas the term *dhvani* refers to the *physical articulated sound* which is associated with length, tempos and various peculiarities of the individual speaker. The speech-properties belonging to the individual speakers are regarded as non-distinctive from the point of view of the perception of the *sphoṭa*. Patañjali says that phonemes are fixed (*avasthitāḥ varṇāḥ*) and tempos or intonation depend on the speech-habits of the speaker. The distinction between the *sphoṭa* aspect and *dhvani* aspect of a word is analogous to the distinction between the phonematic and the phonetic patterns of word. Patañjali, while explaining the rule 1.1.70, says that the nature of phonemes is not affected by a rapid, medium or a slow mode of pronunciation. Here he brings in, in order to explain these aspects, the analogy of the drum-beat. When a drummer strikes his drum, the *dhvani* (i.e. the drum-beat) may last long, so as to travel twenty, thirty or even forty steps, but *sphoṭa* remains precisely the same; the increase and decrease in the steps is caused by the difference in the duration of *dhvani*.

In another context, Patañjali[17] has used the term *sphoṭa* to denote the phonetic species of the phonetically different sounds. Accordingly, he interprets the rule *kṛpo ro laḥ* (VIII.ii.18) to mean that the *ra-sphoṭa* (i.e. phonetic species of *r*-sounds) is replaced by the *la-sphoṭa* (i.e. phonetic species of *l*-sounds).

17. *Ibid.*, p. 26: अथवोभयतः स्फोटमात्रं निर्दिश्यते । रश्रुतेर्लश्रुतिर्भवतीति ।

Thus, we substitute *l*-sound for *r*-sound (*karpate=kalpate*), and the vocalic *ḷ* for the vocalic *ṛ*, because in the rule the phoneme *r* refers only to phonetic species of *r*-sounds. Here it should be noted that, according to Patañjali, the two sounds, consonantal *r* and the *r*-element in the vocalic *ṛ*, which may not be phonemically distinguishable, belong to the single *sphoṭa*. In the example quoted earlier, also, the difference in duration caused by the rapid, medium and slow pronunciation of the speakers is non-phonemic.

Yet, which of these phonetic variations of particular sounds are regarded as non-discriminating in the *sphoṭa* (phonemic) perception of sounds, is not clearly brought out by Patañjali. He does not furnish the necessary conditions under which two sounds are regarded as distinctive and under which they are not. For the non-distinctiveness of phonetically different sounds, he states one condition: 'If a sound is uttered in rapid, medium and slow modes of pronunciation, its *sphoṭa* perception remains the same'.

Briefly stated, Patañjali's opinion is that the term *sphoṭa* is somewhat analogous either to the phonematic pattern of sounds or the phonetic species of sounds. Kaiyaṭa,[18] the famous commentator on the *Mahābhāṣya*, in fact, agrees with the latter view. Patañjali's notion of *sphoṭa* cannot be reduced precisely to modern linguistic terminology. Nor could we simplify his procedure.

It emerges from this, that Patañjali in all probability might have approached the problem of phonemics by a different method which is presented in different conditions. It can only

18. *Pradīpa on Mbh. under Śivasūtras* ' 3-4: जातिस्फोट इत्यर्थः। ततश्चान्तर्भूतानन्तर्भूतरेफलकारव्यङ्ग्य सामान्यं स्थान्यादेशभावेनाश्रीयते।

be said that, according to Patañjali, the term *dhvani* refers to the articulate sound which differs in phonetic value with reference to the variation in the utterance of different speakers. The term *sphoṭa,* on the other hand, stands for a type sound whose limits of non-distinctiveness are not precisely defined.

While commenting on the rule 1.1.1. Kātyāyana says: 'if the sound *t* is not added to the vowel *ā, ā* will not represent all its varieties with different accents and qualities etc., because the qualities render the phonemes distinctive'. Patañjali exemplifies this by saying that in the Vedic recitation, if a pupil utters a vowel with different accents, the instructor slaps him on his face for the mispronunciation. This shows that accents are distinctive.

But in the descriptive system of Pāṇinian grammar, the accent, nasalization etc. do not render the vowel distinctive as far as the application of this system is concerned. The procedure, followed by the descriptive system of grammar, purely takes into account the phonological behaviour of phonemes for the application of grammatical rules. All the different phonemic entities *ā́, ã̄́, ā, ã̄, ̀ā, ̀ã̄* fall into a single class *āt,* where the *t* indicates the non-distinctiveness of the members in the class. The descriptive procedure of Pāṇini does not examine the types of contrasts which exist in the language, but examines whether the distinctive feature is significant for grammatical analysis or not.

With regard to the phonemic system of language the grammarians admitted the phonetic difference in the varieties of vowels and consonants. But for the grammatical description of language all of them are not necessarily relevant. Thus, the task of specifying the distinctive and non-distinctive features of phonemes is intended as a mere technical aid for describing a

language. With this in my mind, I made the statement that Patañjali has approached the problems of phonemics by a different method. The term *sphoṭa* is not used by Patañjali primarily with reference to the non-distinctiveness of phonemes that exists in the language system, but it is restricted to the same class of varied spoken sounds, whose distinctiveness may not be grasped by the listener. This is suggested by his phrase *ra-śruter la-śrutir bhavati.* In other words, according to Patañjali, the distinction between the consonantal *r* and the *r*-element in the vocalic *ṛ* is not perceived auditorily and it is not relevant for grammatical analysis.

Thus the following points emerge out of the *Bhāṣya* discussion: i) Patañjali's conception of the indivisibility of wholes is quite different from the later-developed notion of the indivisibility of the *sphoṭa* word. He assumes that a *saṁghāta* is endowed with proper meaning, and it can be dissolved into smaller semantic units in the form of stem and suffixes. These semantic units can be further divided into ultimate differentiating constituents i.e. phonemes, which are the ultimate constituents of language. The phonemes are not necessarily endowed with a proper meaning. While establishing the meaningfulness of *saṁghāta* and non-meaning-bearing nature of phonemes, he has not relied for support on the *sphoṭa theory.*

ii) Patañjali distinguishes between the three different approaches from which speech-utterance may be studied: (1) *arthasaṁpratyāyaḳaḥ śabdaḥ*: 'meaningful word', (2) *dhvani*: 'articulate sound' and (3) *sphoṭaśabdaḥ:* 'an auditory impression of sounds grasped through intellect'. The first is essentially the same as the morpheme or morphemic-sequence. The second is the articulate sound which gives rise to the impression of the *sphoṭa* in the listener's mind. The abstract sound-image which

disregards the furtive elements in the phonetic features of sounds is called *sphoṭa.*

iii) Patañjali is consistent in maintaining the terminological distinction between the *dhvani* and the *sphoṭa* aspects of words. According to him, the phoneme (*varṇa*)[19] is the *sphoṭa* which remains the same in all the different modes of utterances. The term *dhvani*[20] is used to denote speech-sound, which is associated with all distinctions in the modes of utterances and individual peculiarities. It manifests the *sphoṭa.* The difference in the speeds of utterance does not affect the *sphoṭa,* but it is felt to be associated with it, due to the difference in the sounds which manifest the *sphoṭa.*

iv) The word *śabda*[21], as used by Patañjali, may stand either for *dhvani* or *sphoṭa* on the one hand, or for the meaning-bearing word (*saṁghāta*) on the other. While his term *śabda* is common to all these three, the terms *dhvani, sphoṭa* and the meaningful *saṁghāta* are not interchangeable. His term *sphoṭa* stands in much more intimate relation with the term *dhvani* than with the *arthasaṁpratyāyakaśabda.* There seems to be no natural inherent

19. I have used the term phoneme for the *varṇa* or *sphoṭa* in its loose sense. Exactly there is no parallel term in western linguistics for the *sphoṭa* or *varṇa* notions of the old Vaiyākaraṇas.
20. Nāgeśa has interpreted the *Bhāṣya* - passage somewhat differently. To him *sphoṭa* is the original sound and *dhvani* is a kind of reverberation of the original sound. The original sound (*sphoṭa*) is perceived in shorter or longer time owing to the differences in its reverberations. This explanation is based on the *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani* concepts developed by Bhartṛhari and his commentators. This distinction is nowhere mentioned by Patañjali in his *Mahābhāṣya.* See Prof. IYER's article, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.
21. See footnotes 5-10.

relation between the *sphoṭa* and the meaningful *saṁghāta*. The significant unit, when revealed to the listener's ear, may be referred to by the term *sphoṭa* not because it is significant, but because it is auditorily perceived, and it is revealed by the spoken sounds.

We are not sure to which degree Patañjali's conception of *sphoṭa* or *varṇa* is similar to the modern conception of phoneme or the phonemic pattern. He states that the *r*-element in the vocalic *ṛ* and consonantal *r* are not distinguished in the *sphoṭa* aspect of word. He also states that the slow and fast pronunciations do not render the phoneme distinctive. All these are stray hints. They do not sufficiently indicate under what conditions two phonetically distinctive sounds are united under the same *varṇa* or *sphoṭa*. From his statements it is only implied that Patañjali's conception of *sphoṭa* or *varṇa* is somewhat similar to the conception of modern phoneme or phonemic pattern of word. But Patañjali never shows implicitly or explicitly any relation between the *sphoṭa* and the single indivisible meaning-bearing word, as it is maintained by the later grammarians.

Bhartṛhari's views on dhvani and sphoṭa:

When we come to Bhartṛhari, we find that he presents the various views on the nature of *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* in the words *kecit* and *apare* etc. He holds the view that the *sphoṭa*[22] is manifested by the sound which is produced by the conjunction of the vocal organs with the points of articulation. In one of the

22. *VP*, 1.97:

ग्रहणग्राह्ययोः सिद्धा योग्यता नियता यथा।
व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावेन तथैव स्फोटनादयोः॥

kārikās[23] he says that *sphoṭa* is devoid of temporal distinctions. The *sphoṭa* is not short,[23] long or prolated. This distinction belongs in reality to the manifesting sounds, but it is falsely attributed to the manifested *sphoṭa* with which sounds are perceived as identical. Arguing on the same line, he states that the *sphoṭa* does not involve the differences in the speed of utterance (*vṛttibheda*). The sound spoken by the speaker and heard by the listener, is associated with the various differences in intonation, tempos, pitch etc., but the manifested sound is devoid of all these qualities.

While commenting on the verses[23] 75-77 of the first *Kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, Harivṛṣabha[24] says that the sound is of two kinds: primary (*prākṛtadhvani*) and secondary (*vaikṛtadhvani*)[25]. That sound is primary which causes the perception of the *sphoṭa* and without which the form of the *sphoṭa* remains

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23. *Ibid.*, 1.75-77:

स्फोटस्याभिन्नकालस्य ध्वनिकालानुपातिनः ।
ग्रहणोपाधिभेदेन वृत्तिभेदं प्रचक्षते ॥
स्वभावभेदान्नित्यत्वे ह्रस्वदीर्घप्लुतादिषु ।
प्राकृतस्य ध्वनेः कालः शब्दस्येत्युपचर्यते ॥
शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदं तु वैकृताः ।
ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥

24. Harivṛṣabha's *Vṛtti* on *VP*. 1.76 (quoted by IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 52): ध्वनिस्फोटयोः पृथक्त्वेनानुपलम्भात्तं स्फोटं तस्य ध्वनेः प्रकृतिभिव मन्यन्ते । तत्र भवः प्राकृतः तदुत्तरकालभावी तस्माद्विलक्षण एवोपलभ्यते इति विकारापत्तिरिव स्फोटस्य इति वैकृत उच्यते ।

25. I take the explanation of these terms from IYER, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

unmanifested.[26] However, the secondary sound is regarded as the cause of the continuity of the perception of the already manifested *sphoṭa*. The perception of the *sphoṭa* does not disappear with the primary sound at once. It continues to be perceived again and again, uninterruptedly for a longer duration of time. It lasts for a short time in a quick speech, a little longer in the medium speech and still longer in a slow speech. But this continued perception of the *sphoṭa* cannot be explained unless we assume that the manifesting sounds also continue in the succeeding moments. These sounds which become the cause of difference in the speed of utterance are called secondary sounds. However, the difference in duration associated with the secondary sounds is not even falsely attributed to the *sphoṭa,* because the secondary sound is produced after the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. Although the secondary sounds do not manifest the *sphoṭa*, these (sounds) become the cause of continued perception of the *sphoṭa* already manifested by the primary sounds. In short, the distinction between *prākṛtadhvani* and *vaikṛtadhvani,* drawn by Harivṛṣabha, may be shown as follows:

The primary sound is produced by the conjuction and disjunction of the organs with the points of articulation, and it causes the perception of the *sphoṭa* and of the secondary sound. The *sphoṭa* is wrongly perceived as identical with the primary sound. Accordingly, the properties of primary sound such as length, pitch etc. are wrongly felt to be associated with the manifested *sphoṭa* which, in reality, is free from such a distinction. The secondary sounds which originate from the primary sounds are produced after the manifestation

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53: तत्र प्राकृतो नाम येन विना स्फोटरूपमनभिव्यक्तं न परिच्छिद्यते वैकृतस्तु येनाभिव्यक्तं स्फोटरूप पुनः पुनरविच्छेदेन प्रचिततर कालमुपलभ्यते ।

of *sphoṭa*. They cause continuity of the perception of the *sphoṭa* through the provision of continued reverberation[27] of primary sounds. The secondary sounds, while causing the continuity in the perception of the *sphoṭa*, are associated with the differences in speeds—slow, medium and rapid—of utterance. The difference in the speed of utterance means greater or smaller number of repeated cognitions of the *sphoṭa*. The length of the time of continued cognition of *sphoṭa* solely depends on the speed of utterance with which secondary sound is associated.[28] The difference in the mode of utterance of the secondary sound does not affect in any way the nature of the *sphoṭa* which is already manifested by the primary sound. In other words, the secondary sounds are not considered as identical with the already manifested *sphoṭa*, and, accordingly, the properties of the secondary sounds are not superimposed on the *sphoṭa*.[29]

It emerges from this discussion that the listener's ability to receive auditory impression of *sphoṭa* is unaffected by changes in the frequency of the speaker's voice. Speech remains

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27. Helārāja (on verse 64, *Kālasamuddeśa*, *TSS.*, CXVI) interprets the term *Vaikṛtadhvani* to mean the secondary sounds, which are echos or reverberations of the primary sounds of the first moments. He reads: प्राकृतध्वनिभिरभिव्यक्ते शब्दतत्त्वेऽनुरणनरूपा ये पश्चात्कालभाविनो ध्वनयः संतानेन वर्तन्ते श्रोत्रान्तराल इव स्थिताः शीघ्रसंतानावर्तनात् ते श्रोत्रदेशमनुप्राप्ताः शब्दप्रचयग्रहणहेतुतां श्रोत्रगुणात्प्रतिपद्यमानाः द्रुतादिभेदवृत्तिं रचयन्ति। (Quoted by IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 58.)

28. See note 26.

29. *Vṛtti* on *VP.* 1.77 (quoted by IYER) *op. cit.*, p. 53: तस्माद्उपलक्षितव्यक्तिरेकेण वैकृतेन ध्वनिना संसृज्यमानोऽपि स्फोटात्मा तादूप्यस्यानध्यारोपात्शास्त्रे ह्रस्वादिवत्कालभेदव्यवहारं नावतरति ।

intelligible to a listener even if it is transmitted at twice the rate of normal talking. Similarly, even if it is slowed down, it does not make any significant change from the point of the listener's ability to discriminate words (*sphoṭa*). The variability involved in the perception of speech-sound uttered at a rapid or slow rate does not affect in any way the quality of the primary articulate sound.

However, in the case of length we observe some significant contrast in the articulatory position of the organs. In Sanskrit, as in many languages, two speech-units may be distinctively different, because a certain articulatory position is held longer in one of the speech-units than in the other. Since the time-distinction is associated with the articulatory positions of sound producing organs, length is recognised as a part of the phonetic system of language.[30] But speed involves the manner of moving the vocal organs from one position to another at a faster rate. Accordingly, it is not considered to be a part of the phonetic system of language. In other words, difference in speed is regarded as non-distinctive pattern of speech, and it is held as a secondary sound. But length of time is associated with the position of the articulatory organs in as much as it is regarded as associated with a primary sound.

Bhartṛhari refers to the distinction between the primary sound and the secondary sound in his commentary[31] on the *Mahābhāṣya*

30. *Ibid.*, p. 53. ध्वनिना संसृष्टं स्फोटस्य स्वरूपम् उपलभ्यते यस्मात्तस्मात् ध्वनेः स्थितिकालः स्फोटोपलब्धिरूपः परिवर्तते । (See also Helārāja, quoted by IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 58): ततश्च ते (वैकृतध्वनयः) शब्दतत्त्वाद् बहिर्भूतां न भिन्दन्ति ।

31. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, *ABORI*, Vol. XLIV, p. 49: एवमर्थमेव शब्दानां नित्यत्वमभ्युपगम्यते । तस्य नित्यस्य पुनर्यैऽभिव्यञ्जकास्ते च

on the first *Śivasūtra*. He says that the sound produced by the contact of articulatory organs is designated as primary sound. And that which is produced by such a sound (by holding the same articulatory position[32]) is also to be known as the primary sound. The primary sound, which continues also in succeeding movements, is responsible for the distinction in vowels. When the succeeding primary sound is produced, the activity of the articulatory organs is not considered to have ceased. These primary sounds manifest the *sphoṭa*, and these are perceived as identical with it. The sound which comes from another sound (after the cessation of activity of the articulatory organs) is called secondary sound, which arises from the previous sounds. It does not affect the quality of vowels (it only causes difference in speed). The distinction between the primary and secondary sounds as brought out by Bhartṛhari remains essentially the same as that pointed in Harivṛṣabha's commentary on the *Vākyapadīya*, because, in both the texts, the primary sounds are regarded as distinctive, whereas secondary sounds are not. Nevertheless, Bhartṛhari's passage seems somewhat obscure and does not clearly bring out the distinction between the second kind of primary sounds and secondary sounds.

केचित्प्राकृताः केचिद्वैकृताः । यश्च करणसंनिपातादुत्पद्यते यश्च तस्मात् तौ प्राकृतौ । ताभ्यां विशेषोपलब्धिः । यस्तु ध्वनितो ध्वनिरुत्पद्यते स वैकृतः । ततो विशेषाभावात् । केवलं तु स एवम् उपलब्धो वैकृत इति एष विशेषः । यदि शब्दान्तराभावात् भिन्नकालत्वं द्रुतमध्यमविलम्बितास्वपि भिन्नकालत्वम् । अथ दीर्घप्लुतेषु पुनः पुनः करणाभिघातः तद् द्रुतादिषु एवं (अ?)सति कालस्यास्याद्वाह्यत्वे (?) दुरुपपादं करणाभिघातस्यानुपरमादिति ।

32. The portion appearing in the brackets is supplied by me to make the sense of the passage clear.

Bhartṛhari, in his commentary[33] on the *Mahābhāṣya* under the *Śivasūtras* 3-4, also mentions the two alternative views regarding the nature of primary and secondary sounds. According to the first view, the primary sound reveals the nature of *sphoṭa*, while the secondary sound causes distinction not in a single phonemic unit taken by itself, but only in the whole unit combined out of two or more units. The second view maintains that, according to some, *sphoṭa* is produced by the contacts and separations of the articulatory organs, while (the secondary sound is) a kind of reverberation which arises from the (primary) sounds.

Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya* records the three different views[34] regarding the nature of the relation between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. He says that some are of the opinion that *dhvani* is perceived as identical with *sphoṭa*. The commentators explain

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33. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā*, *op. cit.*, p. 76: अध्वनिकः स्फोट इत्युक्तं भवति । ननु च ध्वनिम् अन्तरेण स्फोटस्योपलब्धिरेव नास्ति । एवं तर्हि य एवासौ आद्यो ध्वनिः रूपमात्रस्य प्रतिपादकस्तावानेव आश्रीयते । यस्त्वसौ विशेषस्य प्रतिपादकः यः समुदायस्थो यः स्वतन्त्र इति नासावाश्रीयते । ... अथवा कार्यवद् बुद्धिं कृत्वा इदमुच्यते । तत्र कार्यपक्षे स्फोट एव संयोगाद्विभागात्संयोगविभागाभ्यामुत्पद्यते । यत्त्वनुरणनं तत् शब्दत एव ।

34. *VP.* 1.81:

स्फोटरूपाविभागेन ध्वनेर्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।
कैश्चिद् ध्वनिरसंवेद्यः स्वतन्त्रोऽन्यैः प्रकल्पितः ॥

Puṇyarāja under *VP.* 1.81: यथा जपाकुसुमरूपानुषक्तमेव स्फटिकादीनां ग्रहणं तथा ध्वनिरूपानुषक्त एव स्फोटस्तदविभागेनोपलभ्यते इति केषांचिन्मतम् । It will be interesting to note here that K. A. S. IYER points out in his introduction (p. ix) to the translation of the *Vākyapadīya* (Deccan College, 1966) that the commentary on Kāṇḍa 1, published at Benares, is not a commentary of Puṇyarāja.

this by means of the analogy of the *japā*-flower. The redness in the crystal appears to be real, when it is placed next to the *japā*-flower. The same is true with regard to the *sphoṭa* which is not distinctly perceived from the *dhvani*. Thus the length and other peculiarities of sound are wrongly attributed to *sphoṭa*.

His second view regarding the nature of relation between the *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* maintains that the sounds, although they are not cognisable by themselves, cause the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. The commentators explain this by the analogy of senses. The senses[35], without themselves being perceived, cause the perception of the objects. In the same way the *sphoṭa* is perceived through the sound which is itself imperceptible.

His third view on the relation between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* points out that the perception of *sphoṭa* is not identical with the perception of sound. Sometimes we perceive the *dhvanis* without perceiving the *sphoṭa,*[36] just as we perceive the light without seeing the flame.

Bhartṛhari also records three different views on the nature of *sphoṭa*. He says that, according to some, the term *sphoṭa* stands for the initial articulated sounds produced by the various degrees of contacts of the articulatory organs with the points of articulation. The sound belonging to the first moment, according to this view, is the *sphoṭa*, while the sound resulting from the *sphoṭa* and belonging to the succeeding moments, are called *śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ* (sounds produced by sounds). The succeeding sounds (*dhvanayaḥ*) are regarded as a chain of repetition of

35. *Vṛtti* on *VP.* 1.81 (quoted by IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 59): केषांचित्तु यथेन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियगुणाश्च असंवेद्यस्वरूपा एव विषयोपलब्धिहेतवः तथाय ध्वनिरगृह्यमाणरूपः शब्दग्रहे निमित्तं भवति ।

36. *Ibid.*, p. 59: दृष्टा केवलस्य ध्वनेः स्फोटरूपानवधारणे दूरादुपलब्धिः ।

the first sound (*sphoṭa*)[37]. These sounds, moving like waves, become weaker and weaker as they spread farther and farther from the *sphoṭa* word.

In another view suggested by Bhartṛhari,[38] both the *dhvani* and the *sphoṭa* are said to be produced simultaneously. This is explained by the analogy of the flame and the light. The flame and the light are produced at the same moment. However, from a distance we see the light without seeing the flame. In the same manner, from a distance we may hear the sound and not the *sphoṭa*. According to this theory, there is no interval between the perception of the *sphoṭa* and that of *dhvani*. But these two aspects of a word are kept apart from each other, just as the initial sound of a bell and its reverberations are regarded as quite distinct from each other. These two views mentioned above suggest that the *sphoṭa* is regarded as a transitory sound rather than the eternal entity.

In accordance with the third view[39], the *sphoṭa* represents the universal nature of individual *dhvanis*. It is the individual that helps the manifestation of the universal. The varied individual sounds are called *dhvanis*, and the class-nature of these sounds is considered to be the *sphoṭa*.

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37. K. A. S. Iyer, "Who are *anityasphoṭavādins*", *POC*, 1935, pp. 258 ff.

38. *VP*. 1.103 and 104:

अल्पे महति वा शब्दे स्फोटकालो न भिद्यते ।
परस्तु शब्दसंतानः प्रचयाप्रचयात्मकः ।।
दूरात्प्रभेव दीपस्य ध्वनिमात्रं तु लक्ष्यते ।
घण्टादीनां च शब्देषु व्यक्तो भेदः स दृश्यते ।।

See also note 34.

39. *VP*. 1.93: अनेकव्यक्त्यभिव्यङ्ग्या जातिः स्फोट इति स्मृता ।
कैश्चिद् व्यक्तय एवास्या ध्वनित्वेन प्रकल्पिताः ।।

Bhartṛhari has used the term *sphoṭa* only nine times in the *Vākyapadīya* and that too occurs in the first *Kāṇḍa* of it. Like Patañjali, Bhartṛhari has also invariably used the term *sphoṭa* in its relation with the *dhvani*. Without referring to the *dhvanis*, he has nowhere used the term *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari has nowhere clearly stated in his *Vākyapadīya* that '*sphoṭa* is over and above the sounds, it is indivisible and without any inner sequence, and it is a meaning-bearing unit of the language.' It is now necessary to translate[40] the nine verses of the *Vākyapadīya*, where the term *sphoṭa* occurs, in order that the moot question whether *sphoṭa* is or is not a meaning-bearing unit may be examined.

VP.1.49[41]

Just as a reflection (of the object) appearing elsewhere (as in waters) assumes its (water's) properties, owing (to its association) with the movement of it (water), similar is the relation between *sphoṭa* and *nāda* (sound).

Notes[42]: The reflection of the moon in the waters appears to be associated with the properties of water such as agitation, etc. However, in reality, reflection by itself is free from (or without) such properties. Similarly the *sphoṭa* appears to have varied properties of sounds which differ in length and various modes of utterances.

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40. I have made use of Prof. K. A. S. IYER's and Miss M. BIARDEAU's translations of the *Vākyapadīya*, *Kāṇḍa*-I. (Deccan College, 1966 and Paris, 1964, respectively) wherever necessary.

41. प्रतिबिम्बं यथान्यत्र स्थितं तोयक्रियावशात् ।
तत्प्रवृत्तिमिवान्वेति स धर्मः स्फोटनादयोः ।।

42. Notes are based on the commentaries of Puṇyarāja and Harivṛṣabha (quoted by IYER in his article, *ABORI*, op. cit.).

VP.1.75[43]

The difference in duration (which gets introduced in the auditory perception) of the *sphoṭa* which does not involve the temporal distinction, but which appears to assume the duration of (succeeding) sounds— is explained by the difference in conditions which delimit the (continued) perception (of the *sphoṭa* through the secondary sounds).

Notes: The difference in various modes of pronunciation as rapid, medium and slow belongs in reality to the secondary sounds which are responsible for the continued cognition of the *sphoṭa*. Nevertheless, they are felt to be associated with the *sphoṭa,* although it is without time-distinction, because the act of repeated perception of the *sphoṭa* is wrongly conceived as mixed up with the differences in the modes of pronunciation of the secondary sounds.

VP.1.77[44]

The secondary sounds, after the manifestation of a word, give rise to the difference in the speed of utterance, but the *sphoṭa* in its essence is not rendered distinctive by them.

Notes: The primary sound causes the manifestation of the *sphoṭa*. Accordingly, the properties of the primary sounds are falsely attributed to the manifested *sphoṭa*. Therefore the *sphoṭa* of the articulated sound *a* ap-

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43. स्फोटस्याभिन्नकालस्य ध्वनिकालानुपातिनः ।
ग्रहणोपाधिभेदेन वृत्तिभेदं प्रचक्षते ।।

44. शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्वृत्तिभेदं तु वैकृताः ।
ध्वनयः समुपोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ।।

pears to be different from that of *ā*. After the manifestation of *sphoṭa*, the sounds which also continue in the succeeding moments are called secondary sounds. These keep up the continuity in the perception of the already manifested *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* continues to be perceived as long as the secondary sound lasts. The difference in rapid or slow mode of pronunciation of the secondary sound does not in any way affect the nature of the *sphoṭa* which is already manifested by the primary sounds. The secondary sounds are not considered identical with the *sphoṭa*. Accordingly, variabilities in the secondary sound do not make any significant change in the perception of the *sphoṭa*. Therefore the properties of the secondary sounds are not attributed to the *sphoṭa*. In other words, difference in speed is regarded as the non-distinctive pattern of speech, and thus, it is a secondary feature.

VP.1.81[45]

According to some, the sound is perceived as identical with the *sphoṭa*. Some hold that the sound is not perceptible at all, while others suppose that (sound is perceived) as an independent entity.

Notes: There are three different views on the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* word. The sound which is closely bound up with the *sphoṭa* is not perceived separately, like the colour which is not separately perceived from the object. But for others, the sound, without getting itself perceived, causes the perception of the *sphoṭa*, as

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45. स्फोटरूपाविभागेन ध्वनेर्ग्रहणमिष्यते ।
कैश्चिद् ध्वनिरसंवेद्यः स्वतन्त्रोऽन्यैः प्रकल्पितः ।।

the sense-organs and their qualities which, being themselves unperceived, cause the perception of objects. While, according to some others, sound is also perceived without giving rise to the apprehension of the form of *sphoṭa*. In other words, the perception of sound is not regarded as identical with the perception of the *sphoṭa*.

VP.1.93[46]

Some believe that the *sphoṭa* (stands for) the universal (concept) which is manifestable by many (i.e. varied) individual (sounds), and corresponding individual (instances) are what one imagines to be sounds (*dhvanis*).

Notes:— The varied individual sounds are called *dhvanis*, whereas the universal nature of these varied individual sounds is considered to be the *sphoṭa*.

VP.1.97[47]

Just as there is a fixed eternal relation between a thing which enables one to perceive (i.e. sense-organs) and the thing to be perceived (i.e. objects), similar is the relation of manifester and manifested between the sounds and the *sphoṭa*.

Notes: The colour inherent in the sense of vision, being itself an imperceptible entity, is regarded as the cause of the manifestation of external colour of objects. In the same manner, the sounds which are themselves

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46. अनेकव्यक्त्यभिव्यङ्ग्या जातिः स्फोट इति स्मृता ।
कैश्चिद् व्यक्तय एवास्या ध्वनित्वेन प्रकल्पिताः ।।

47. ग्रहणग्राह्ययोः सिद्धा नियता योग्यता यथा ।
व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावेन तथैव स्फोटनादयोः ।।

imperceptible entities, become the causes of the manifestation of external objects. The opponent's idea was that the manifesting sounds exist in the vocal organs, whereas the *sphoṭa* word exists in ether (*ākāśa*). The reply given to this is that there is the fixed eternal relation between the manifester and manifested. There can be a causal relation between the two things belonging to the different regions, and the effect may bear a different quality not found in its cause.

*VP.*1.102[48]

Others say that whatever is produced by the conjunction and disjunction with the points of articulation is the *sphoṭa;* while the sounds originated from the (initial) sounds are the *dhvanis.*

Notes: According to the view mentioned in this verse, *sphoṭa* is the first sound and it is transitory. It results from the conjunction and disjunction of the organs with the points of articulation. On the other hand, the sounds which originate from the first sound and spread in all directions, carrying reflection of the first sound, are the *dhvanis.*

*VP.*1.103[49]

Whether the sound (appears) small or large (in duration), it does not make (any) difference in the duration of the *sphoṭa.* But the series of sounds (which follows it) is subject to increase or decrease (in duration).

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48. यः संयोगविभागाभ्यां करणैरुपजन्यते ।
स स्फोटः शब्दजाः शब्दा ध्वनयोऽन्यैरुदाहृताः ।

49. अल्पे महति वा शब्दे स्फोटकालो न भिद्यते ।
परस्तु शब्दसंतानः प्रचयाप्रचयात्मकः ॥

Notes: The increase and the decrease in duration of sounds are not regarded as the properties that reside in the original sound. However, the sound produced by striking the stick against the drum causes uninterrupted succession of sounds. This succession of sounds is subject to the increase or decrease in duration.

VP.1.106[50]

Even after the organs have ceased to vibrate, other sounds, also originate from the *sphoṭa,* like the series of flames (which streams forth) from other flames.

Notes: When the vibrations follow one another without interruption, the sound produced by the contact of organs with the points of articulation does not disappear without producing a series of sounds. Even if the activity of sound-producing organs has ceased, the primary sound gives rise to the secondary sound. Since the articulatory position no longer exists, the variability produced by the secondary features of sounds in the speed of utterance does not affect in any way the quality of the articulatory sounds and that of the *sphoṭa* manifested thereby. The origination of the secondary sounds has the same nature of continuity as that of flames proceeding from burning fuel. Just as the series of flames causes the manifestation of object, so the continuity of secondary sounds helps the manifestation of the *sphoṭa* for a longer duration of time. Difference in speed is regarded as the non-distinctive pattern of speech and thus, it is a secondary feature.

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50. अनवस्थितकम्पेऽपि करणे ध्वनयोऽपि ते ।
स्फोटादेवोपजायन्ते ज्वाला ज्वालान्तरादिव ।।

It may be seen from the foregoing translation that Bhartṛhari's statements on the nature of *sphoṭa* do not support the view that 'the real word is *sphoṭa*, it is indivisible and without any inner sequence, and it is meaning-conveyer unit'. What we get from Bhartṛhari's statement is that the *sphoṭa* is manifested by the sounds produced by the articulatory organs. That the *sphoṭa* is indivisible and it is a meaning-conveyer word, is nowhere stated clearly by Bhartṛhari.

He has used the words *avibhāga* and *abhinnakāla*[51] while describing the relation between the *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. The phrases do not intend to maintain the indivisibility of the *sphoṭa* as understood by the later grammarians. This will be clear from the context in which these words are used by him. The context suggests that the manifested *sphoṭa* is free from the temporal distinction even if the manifesting sounds are endowed with it. The temporal distinctions pertaining to primary and secondary sounds are wrongly ascribed to the nature of *sphoṭa*. The later grammarians, probably on the basis of these statements, lay emphasis on the indivisible nature of the *sphoṭa*. They also quote another statement of Bhartṛhari to support their theories of *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa:* 'indivisible word as a meaning-bearing unit' and *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*: 'indivisible sentence as a meaning-bearing unit'. Bhartṛhari says in his *Vākyapadīya*:[52] 'There are no phonemes in a word and there are no words in a sentence'. Viewed from the theory of language-communication, Bhartṛhari speaks of indivisibility of speech-unit. According to him, the meaningful speech-unit cannot be correlated to the plurality of

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51. *VP.* 1.75, 1.81.

52. *VP.* 1. 73: पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा न च ।
वाक्यात्पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन ।।

phonemes. To put it differently, Bhartṛhari[53] maintains that meaning-bearing units, viz. *pada* or *vākya*, cannot be divided into smaller significant units. Like Patañjali, Bhartṛhari also holds the view that the meaning is neither cognised through the phonemes /k/, /s/ and /y/ in /ku:pə/, /su:pə/ and /yu:pə/, nor is it conveyed by the identical segment *ūpa*. Therefore, like Patañjali, Bhartṛhari too holds the opinion that the word as a whole unconnected with the isolated phonemes conveys meaning. However, the term indivisibility *(akhaṇḍatva)* employed by later grammarians assumes a different significance. What follows in the next paragraphs represents the later grammarians' view on the nature of *sphoṭa*.

The later grammarians[54] contend that each phoneme cannot convey any meaning, because in that case we might comprehend some meaning from individual phonemes constituting a word. Since a phoneme, taken as a single unit, has no meaning, a collection of phonemes (that is, taken as a whole) also has no

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53. *VP.* 2.169: न कूपसूपयूपानामन्वयोऽर्थस्य दृश्यते ।
अतोऽर्थान्तरवाचित्वं संघातस्यैव गम्यते ।।

54. *Pradīpa* on the introductory passage of *Mbh.*, (Haryana-Sahitya Samsthana, edn., p. 7): वैयाकरणा वर्णव्यतिरिक्तस्य पदस्य वाक्यस्य वा वाचकत्वमिच्छन्ति. वर्णानां प्रत्येकं वाचकत्वे द्वितीयादिवर्णोच्चारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् । आनर्थक्ये तु प्रत्येकमुत्पत्तिपक्षे यौगपद्येन उत्पत्त्यभावात्, अभिव्यक्तिपक्षे तु क्रमेणैवाभिव्यक्त्या समुदायाभावादेकस्मृत्यारूढानां वाचकत्वे 'सरो' 'रस' इत्यादावर्थप्रतिपत्त्यविशेषप्रसङ्गात्तद्व्यतिरिक्तः स्फोटो नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यो वाचको विस्तरेण वाक्यपदीये व्यवस्थापितः ।।
It will be interesting to note that Kaiyaṭa's commentary which derives its authority from Bhartṛhari's pronouncements, considerably differs here from the *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* of Bhartṛhari.

meaning. Furthermore, it is impossible to maintain a collection of phonemes, since these are transient. In the word *gauḥ*, when *au* is uttered, *g* disappears. It is impossible to maintain a combination of what is non-existent with what is existent. It is of no use to say that the collective remembrance of all phonemes in a single memory-impression conveys meaning, because in that case we will not be able to distinguish between the words like *nadī*, *dīna*, *rāja* and *jarā* which are constituted by the same phonemes. Therefore, the grammarians assume that the *sphoṭa* is indivisible into phonemes and their sequences. It is only manifested by the articulatory sound and is considered as a meaning-bearing unit.

It will be interesting to note here that the later grammarians' idea of indivisibility seems to claim that the semantic units cannot be divided into smaller distinctive units i.e. phonemes. They say, the *sphoṭa*: 'meaningful unit' is over and above the phonemes and is without any inner sequence. However, Bhartṛhari's idea of indivisibility of *pada* and *vākya* is something else. He means to say that the significative level of language cannot be divided into smallest units i.e. phonemes, because phonemes have no correlation with meaning which is denoted by *saṁghāta*: 'whole'. He does not maintain that *pada* cannot be structurally divided into smaller differentiating units. Bhartṛhari's explanation suggested here is based on my own understanding and interpretation of the *Vākyapadīya*, but of course, I may have misunderstood him.

It seems to me that Bhartṛhari does not favour the view that the *sphoṭa* is the indivisible and meaningful unit. He states three different views on the nature of *sphoṭa*. He points out that (i) according to some, *sphoṭa*[55] is cognised as identical with sound; (ii) according to another view, *sphoṭa* stands for articulate

55. *VP.*, 1.81.

sounds produced by the contacts of the different vocal organs with the points of articulation; and (iii) according to the third view, *sphoṭa* represents the universal[56] sound, whereas the term *dhvani* refers to the individual sound. Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, if the *sphoṭa* is a sound or a type sound or for that matter, even a phoneme manifested by sound, it cannot be obviously the denoter. It is inconsistent to say that the *sphoṭa* is the sound auditorily perceived in the time-series-pattern and at the same time indivisible and meaningful. The later grammarians[57] maintain that when the speaker utters a sound, not only are phonemes heard and cognised by listeners, but also the indivisible entity in the form of the *sphoṭa* word. Thus, according to them, in the cognition of the word *gauḥ* the phonemes appear as a part of the word while the cognition of the *padasphoṭa* appears to be partless. This appears to be paradoxical. Nowhere has Bhartṛhari mentioned the view that three sounds *g*, *au* and *ḥ* in the word *gauḥ* reveal the three phonemes to the listener and also the indivisible *sphoṭa* entity *gauḥ*. He[58] says that each sound reveals the phonemes

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56. *Ibid.*, 1.93:

57. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, pp. 589-90: तथा च वाचकत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या तदेवेदं वाक्यं सोऽयं गकार इति प्रतीत्या च स्फोटोऽखण्डः सिध्यति । एतेन गौरित्यादौ गकारौकारादिविसर्गव्यतिरेकेण स्फोटाननुभवाच्छ्रूयमाणवर्णानामेव वाचकत्वमस्तु इत्यपास्तम् ।

58. *VP.* 1.84:

नादैराहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।
आवृत्तिपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यते ॥

The later commentators, however, say *śabda* is perceived as a single unit. See *Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddyota*, *op. cit.*, p. 11:
इदमेकं पदमेकं वाक्यमिति प्रत्ययः स्फोटसत्त्वे तदेकत्वे च प्रमाणम् ।

(sphoṭa) and when the last sound accompanied by the impressions of the previous sounds is perceived, the word is grasped in the mind.

Thus, according to Bhartṛhari, the listener may perceive each phoneme, but he cannot perceive the word as a whole. Only the perception of the phonemes gives rise to the mental image of a single whole. The later grammarians, on the other hand, contend that they perceive the word as a single unit. This realisation is, according to them, based on the common experience of the unitariness of a word or a sentence in the form 'this is one word or one sentence'. However, according to Bhartṛhari, the unitariness of a word or a sentence is purely conceptual.

I get the impression that—unless, of course, I am mistaken—all this confusion has arisen in the mind of the later grammarians, because they identify Patañjali's and Bhartṛhari's conception of *śabda* with the concept of *sphoṭa*. All the statements of Patañjali and Bhartṛhari regarding the nature of *śabda* are interpreted in the light of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. I feel that Bhartṛhari's conception of *sphoṭa* can only be interpreted on a careful analysis of his statements with regard to the *sphoṭa*. The later interpretation of *sphoṭa* departs from the line of thought associated with the *vākyapadīya*. To support my statement, I present two or three instances to show how Bhartṛhari's statements on *śabda* are utilised by the later grammarians to establish their new interpretation of *sphoṭa*.

(i) Bhartṛhari while discussing the nature of *śabda* makes the statement about the nature of word.[59] He says that gram-

59. *VP.* 1.44: द्वावुपादानशब्देषु शब्दौ शब्दविदो विदुः ।
एको निमित्तं शब्दानामपरोऽर्थे प्रयुज्यते ।।
cf. also R. JAKOBSON, *Fundamentals of Language*, Netherlands, 1956, pp. 2-4, and 24.

marians recognise two kinds of words. Of these two, one is said to be the cause of articulate sound, while the other is associated with meaning. Hence, Bhartṛhari says that the linguistic utterance can be analysed into two different levels: sound or differentiating level and semantic or significative level. On the basis of this statement, the later grammarians contend that, out of these two levels, the significative level of linguistic utterance is regarded as *sphoṭa*. The linguistic utterance which is directly related to the meaning is the *sphoṭa*. Accordingly, it cannot be divided into smaller constituents, because in conformance with the established opinion, *sphoṭa* is the single partless utterance. In the context of meaningful speech-unit, Bhartṛhari has never used the term *sphoṭa*. He has strictly reserved it for indicating the distinctive function of language possibly from the point of auditory perception of sounds that reached the listener's ears[60]. Bhartṛhari's statements clearly point out that any sound, revealed to the listener's ear through the process of articulation, is the *sphoṭa*, which need not necessarily involve the notion of meaning. In other words, he has used the term *sphoṭa* in the context of distinctive function of language. On the other hand, the later grammarians use the term *sphoṭa* with reference to the significative aspect of language. They have made use of Bhartṛhari's verse to establish their favourite doctrine of meaning-bearing nature[61] of *sphoṭa*, assuming that the significative aspect of *śabda* is the *sphoṭa*. It seems to me that their assumption does not have the support of Bhartṛhari.

In the same manner, Bhartṛhari has never said that *sphoṭa* is self-revealing. His statement points out that just as a light,

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60. *VP.*, 1.81, 97.

61. *Sphoṭavāda*, *op. cit.*, p. 9: तत्र स्फुटत्यर्थोऽस्मादिति स्फोटः, वाचक इति यावत् । एवं च वर्णस्फोटादिपदानां वर्णादयो वाचका इत्यर्थः ।

while revealing itself,[62] reveals others as well, the *śabda* is likewise self-revealing, i.e. a word fully cognised reveals the object to be cognised. This self-revealing character of word, has been applied to the *sphoṭa* by the later grammarians to propound the metaphysical concept of the *śabdādvaita.*

It is erroneous to hold that *sphoṭa* reveals itself. Actually, Bhartṛhari[63] has only said that *sphoṭa* gets manifested through the articulate sound. On the other hand, one can say that *śabda* is a self-revealing entity, because *śabda,* as a single unit, cannot be revealed by sounds. The later grammarians[64] have gone so far as to identify *sphoṭa* with the vedāntic *Brahman.* It is interesting to note that the doctrine of *sphoṭa* developed by Bhartṛhari becomes subsequently merged in the *śabdādvaita*

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62. *VP.* 1.55: ग्राह्यत्वं ग्राहकत्वं च द्वे शक्ती तेजसो यथा ।
तथैव सर्वशब्दानामेते पृथगवस्थिते ।।

See also *ibid.*, 1.83. Actually, according to Bhartṛhari, the term *grāhyatva* refers to the form of a word cognised through the sounds, while the term *grāhakatva* stands for the meaning-conveying nature of a word. The later grammarians, however, identify these concepts with the nature of *svaparaprakāśakatva* of the *Brahman.*

63. *Ibid.*, 1.97:

ग्रहणग्राह्ययोः सिद्धा योग्यता नियता यथा ।
व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावेन तथैव स्फोटनादयोः ।।

64. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra, op. cit.*, p. 606:

इत्थं निष्कृष्यमाणं यच्छब्दतत्त्वं निरञ्जनम् ।
ब्रह्मैवेत्यक्षरं प्राहुस्तस्मै पूर्णात्मने नमः ।।

ब्रह्मैवेत्यनेन "अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिः", "तमेव भान्तम् अनुभाति सर्वम्", "तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति" इति श्रुतिसिद्धं स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वं सूचयन्स्फुटत्यर्थोऽस्मादिति स्फोट इति यौगिकं स्फोटशब्दाभिधेयत्वं सूचयति।

philosophy of Bhartṛhari, as understood by the later grammarians.

(ii) In the first chapter of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari[65] deals with the metaphysical and semantic problems side by side. He states that the eternal word is the supreme reality; it is transcendental and devoid of all qualities. *Śabdabrahman* is the originator of *śabdaprapañca* as well as *arthaprapañca*. It is existence in its essence. From this *śabdabrahman* the whole universe evolves. It does not change nor does it cease. Both the denoter (*vācaka*) and the denoted (*vācya*, i.e. supreme existence) should not be looked upon as two different realities[66]. But these are the two aspects of the one ultimate reality and, therefore, it is identical with them in essence. The whole phenomenon of material existence is only an appearance (*vivarta*) of the *śabdabrahman*.

It may be that Bhartṛhari was a staunch believer in the Advaitic concept of the *Brahman*. Accordingly, he tried to link grammar with *Advaita*. In fact, later grammarians have taken the trouble to identify Bhartṛhari's *sphoṭa* doctrine with the *śabdādvaita* concept. How far *sphoṭa* is one with *śabdabrahman* is a matter which has to be continuously reexamined in the light

65. *VP.*, 1.1 and 2:

अनादिनिधनं ब्रह्म शब्दतत्त्वं यदक्षरम् ।
विवर्ततेऽर्थभावेन प्रक्रिया जगतो यतः ॥
एकमेव यदाम्नातं भिन्नं शक्तिव्यपाश्रयात् ।
अपृथक्त्वेऽपि शक्तिभ्यः पृथक्त्वेनेव वर्तते ॥

See also *ibid.*, 1.13, 1.23-30 etc.

66. *Ibid.*, 2.31: अर्थभागैस्तथा तेषामान्तरोऽर्थः प्रकाश्यते ।
एकस्यैवात्मनो भेदौ शब्दार्थावपृथक् स्थितौ ॥

not only of the so-called metaphysical implications involved in the *vākyapadīya*, but also of the linguistic principles enunciated by Bhartṛhari. The metaphysical aspect of word-doctrine has been wrongly attributed to the doctrine of *sphoṭa*. The higher reality of the *śabdabrahman* is confused with the lower reality of *sphoṭa*. The identity between *śabda* and the *Brahman* conceived by the later grammarians is based on the misunderstanding of the real nature of *sphoṭa*. This ultimately leads to the misunderstanding of the modern Sanskritists that the *sphoṭa* doctrine is 'mysterious'[67]. The importance of the *sphoṭa* theory, from the point of linguistic interpretation, has been overlooked and neglected by the later commentators. It will be interesting to note here that Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita in his *Śabdakaustubha*[68] anticipates that the linguistic theory of *sphoṭa* has no direct connection with the metaphysical doctrine of *śabdabrahman*. He states that Bhartṛhari, dealing with the nature of linguistic utterance, incidentally discusses the illusory creation of world. It is also interesting to note that Śaṁkara[69] criticizes the doctrine of *sphoṭa* and spares the doctrine of the *śabdabrahman* which generally agrees with his philosophical thinking. By identifying the doctrine of *śabda* with *sphoṭa* the later grammarians have subjected the theory of *sphoṭa* to a great deal of unnecessary mystification and, as a result, the importance of this theory from the point of linguistic interpretation has been side-tracked.

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67. J. BROUGH, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.
68. *Śabdakaustubha*, Chokhamba Sanskrit Series, p. 10:
वराटिकान्वेषणाय प्रवृत्तश्चिन्तामणिं लब्धवान् इति वासिष्ठरामायणोक्ता-भाणकन्यायेन शब्दविचाराय प्रवृत्तः सन् प्रसङ्गादद्वैत औपनिषदे ब्रह्मण्यपि व्युत्पाद्यतामित्यभिप्रायेण भगवान् भर्तृहरिर्विवर्तवादादिकम् अपि प्रसङ्गाद् व्युदपादयत् ।
69. *Brahmasūtraśāṁkarabhāṣya* under 1.3.28.

The later grammarians classify the *sphoṭa* into eight varieties[70]. The fundamental principle underlying this classification is meaningfulness and indivisibility. At the first level, *sphoṭa* is basically divided into three categories: *varṇasphoṭa, padasphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa*. The *varṇasphoṭa* theory maintains that roots, stems and suffixes are the smallest meaning-vehicles in the language. They cannot be further divided into smaller meaningful units. On the other hand, the theories on the *padasphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa* maintain that meaning is understood by a listener from a word or a sentence as a whole. The theories of *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*: 'word as an indivisible meaningful unit' and *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*: 'sentence as an indivisible meaningful unit' maintain that word or sentence as a unique entity conveys meaning. The theory of *jātisphoṭa* maintains that the universal nature of speech-unit is denotative, whereas the *vyaktisphoṭa* theory denies the plurality of indivisible speech-units.

The later grammarians claim that Bhartṛhari himself has developed these theories. To prove this they quote the following statements of Bhartṛhari:

(1) 'There are no phonemes in the word and no words in the sentences'. This[71] verse is quoted by the later grammarians to prove the indivisibility of the word-*sphoṭa*. Similarly, to support their theories on the *jātisphoṭa* and *vyaktisphoṭa* they refer to the following verse:

(ii) Some believe that *sphoṭa*[72] (stands for) the universal (concept) which is manifestable by many (i.e. varied) individual

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70. This has been fully explained in the section "on the classification of *sphoṭa*".
71. See note 52.
72. See note 39.

(sounds), and corresponding individual (instances) are what one imagines to be sounds (*dhvanis*).

The first statement suggests that it is the sentence that communicates the meaning to the listener. Viewed from the theory of language communication, the primary unit of language is sentence and not the words or phonemes. Bhartṛhari's theory of indivisibility of words and sentence denies that words and sentences are constructions of smaller constituents. The listener hears the sentence as undivided linguistic utterance and does not identify the sentence–elements like words, stems, suffixes, phonemes etc.

One should not ignore the important fact that, while describing the nature of *vākya* and *pada* in the second and third *kāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari has never used the term *sphoṭa*. The later grammarians interpret the term *sphoṭa* to mean indivisible meaning-bearing speech-unit, and find it convenient to quote Bhartṛhari's statements which deal with the indivisibility of meaningful speech-unit, to support their views on the *akhaṇḍatva* and *arthavattva* of *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari's analysis of language 'breaks down' into two broad levels: (1) *Śabda* or morphemic level involving both simple and complex meaningful units. His final view is that the sentence is a meaningful unit which cannot be dissolved into ultimate constituents: morphemes and phonemes. (2) The second level is phonemic or distinctive. According to him, it has two different aspects: (i) *sphoṭa* or auditorily grasped speech-unit which is heard but not necessarily understood, and (ii) sound which reveals the *sphoṭa*. The analysis of later grammarians also 'breaks down' into two levels (1) *sphoṭa* or significative level and (2) sound or distinctive level. The difference between the view of Bhartṛhari and that of later grammarians lies in the fact that what is *śabda* level of Bhartṛhari becomes the

sphoṭa level of later grammarians. Bhartṛhari's discussion on the nature of *sphoṭa* is free from the significative aspect of language, and he tries to explain the nature of relationship between the sounds emitted by the vocal organs and the sounds received by the listener's ears. The later grammarians have shifted Bhartṛhari's conception of the *sphoṭa* from the feature level of language to the semantic level.

I furnish here another instance to indicate that the chief characteristics of *sphoṭa* are not meaningfulness and indivisibility,– a theory which won the recognition of later grammarians. In fact, the term *varṇasphoṭa* provides evidence for thelateness of such a recognition. This term originally represented the smallest distinctive unit heard by a listener. According to Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, the term *varṇasphoṭa* need not necessarily involve the consideration of meaning. The later grammarians, however, are faced with the difficulty in interpreting the term *varṇasphoṭa*, because a phoneme as a single unit is neither invariably meaningful nor does it necessarily involve the question of divisibility. Therefore, they have assigned a new meaning to the term *varṇasphoṭa*[73] to represent the smallest meaningful units like stems, roots and suffixes, which may exactly fit in with their conception of *sphoṭa*. This deliberate attempt to assign a new meaning to the term *varṇasphoṭa* only indicates that the term originally might not have been used in the sense of the significant unit.

Bhartṛhari's statement with regard to *jātisphoṭa*[74] is also essentially confined to the relation between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. Accord-

73. *Laghumañjūṣā*, Kashi Sanskrit Series, 1963, pp. 453-54: तत्र प्रकृतिप्रत्ययनिपातानामेकवर्णानामर्थवत्त्वदर्शनात्—इत्यादिना प्रत्याहाराह्निके भाष्ये उक्तः प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोर्वाचकत्वमित्येवंरूपो वर्णस्फोटः शास्त्रप्रक्रियोपयोग्येव न वास्तवः ।

74. See note 46.

ing to him *sphoṭa* represents a class of universal sounds, whereas *dhvani* represents a particular sound. *Sphoṭa* is a class of sounds related to the individual instances of sounds through a relation of the manifester and the manifested. It seems to me, from Bhartṛhari's statement, that the term *sphoṭa* represents the constant distinctive phonetic features which are sorted and extracted from the gross spoken sound-matter. In the *sphoṭa* perception non-distinctive redundant phonetic features are eliminated. Another important thing, worth to be noted here, is that Bhartṛhari considers *sphoṭa* to be merely a class whose members are not themselves *sphoṭas*[75]. Bhartṛhari mentions three different views regarding the relation between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani*. The first view states that the *sphoṭa* entity perceived by the listener is not different from the sound (*dhvani*) produced by the speaker. To put it differently, the concept of *sphoṭa* cannot be divorced from the concept of sound. The second view states that the relation between sound and *sphoṭa* is that of manifester and manifested. That is to say, the *sphoṭa* is not sound but it represents "the minimum sum"[76] of a sound-matter revealed to the listener's ears in which the non-distinctive personal element is eliminated. The third view propounded by Bhartṛhari is the generic view. According to this view, *sphoṭa* is opposed to *dhvani* as a class to individual. He makes another statement regarding the function of phonemes from the communicative aspect of language. According to this theory, *varṇāḥ*: 'phonemes' are abstract fictional entities. Phoneme, in this case, is a fiction in the same way as a morpheme or a word is in a sentence. This fictionality of phonemes shows merely a functional aspect of language and it does not affect the distinctive analysis of it.

75. J. BROUGH, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
76. I borrow this terminology from R. JAKOBSON, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

While mentioning the generic view, Bhartṛhari points out that *sphoṭa* is always a generic representation, while *dhvani* represents particular sounds. According to him, the term *vyakti-sphoṭa* does not exist. For him, *vyaktis* are always sounds and *jāti* is the *sphoṭa*. This may serve as an additional proof to point out why *sphoṭa* is not a meaningful sound. If the *dhvanivyakti* does not stand necessarily for a meaningful unit, how can *jātisphoṭa*, which necessarily includes all the *dhvani-vyaktis* in a general form, be a meaningful sound?

The later grammarians,[77] however, have extended this concept to the words and sentence. According to them, the word *hari* is a universal, it is a class comprising a host of varied individual utterances made by different people. This universality of word corresponds to the semantic universality, as, for instance, the word *gauḥ* denotes the class of cows into which all individuals are grouped. It appears to be strange, however, that this universality of word and sentence does not correspond to the generic nature of *varṇasphoṭa*, not only because a word cannot be divided into phonemes, but also because the word-*sphoṭa* is not revealed by *varṇasphoṭa* but by the *dhvanivyaktis*. Nāgeśa makes the observation that the individual sounds always reveal the generic nature of *sphoṭa*. The *padajātisphoṭa*[78] of later grammarians does not mean the class of spoken word-events, whose members are individual word-events, but a class whose individual members are sounds rather than individual word-events. Similarly, the *padavyaktisphoṭa* does not mean individual word-events

77. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣanasāra*, p. 603: इदं हरिपदमित्यनुगतप्रतीत्या हर्युपस्थितित्वावच्छेदेन हरिपदज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वात्तदवच्छेदकतया च जाति-विशेषस्यावश्यकल्प्यत्वात् ।

78. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra, op. cit.*, p. 605: केश्चिद्व्यक्तयो ध्वनय एव ध्वनिवर्णयोर्भेदाभावादित्यभ्युपेयन्त इति शेषार्थः ।

spoken with varied accents and tones. It, on the other hand, denies the plurality of word-events. The *jātisphoṭa* assumes the plurality of individual word-events while *vyaktisphoṭa* denies this. The latter view maintains that word is only one but it appears to be manifold owing to the variation in the manifesting sounds. The new grammarians (including Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa) hold the *jātisphoṭa*[79] view while the modern school (Nāgeśa and his followers) support the view of *vyaktisphoṭa*.

Bhartṛhari's concept of *śabda* is analogous to a certain extent to the modern concept of linguistic sign[80]. A linguistic sign is considered a two-sided entity by modern linguists. According to Bhartṛhari also, *śabda* is related to the phonetic structure on the one hand, and to the semantic fact on the other. Bhartṛhari[81] says that the grammarians recognise two kinds of words: sound-word and semantic-word. The latter is not a material word but a psychical entity or mental equivalent of an articulated sound (*buddhistha*)[82]. Bhartṛhari's philosophy of *śabda* starts on the higher plane of linking a name with a thing signified. The concept of *sphoṭa* emerges, on the other hand, in the context of how language utilizes the sound-matter. To explain the process of revelation of sound-matter to the listener, he examines the distinctive function of language. In this respect, the final view of Bhartṛhari seems to be that *dhvani* represents the articulate sound

79. *Sphoṭavāda*, p. 99.
80. This has been already pointed out by K. K. RAJA, *op. cit.*, p. 121. See also F. DE SAUSSURE, *Course in general linguistics*, pp. 65-66, London.
81. *VP.* 1.44.
82. This modern terminology, although it does not exactly correspond to Bhartṛhari's words, is somewhat useful to interpret the *Vākyapadīya*, which is otherwise a "closed book" to the modern semantists. Also cf. R. JAKOBSON, *op. cit.*, pp. 2-4.

associated with gross matter, whereas the term *sphoṭa* represents a class sound sorted and extracted by the listener from the gross sound-matter. *Sphoṭa* cannot be pronounced, so, to represent the notion of *sphoṭa*, one may use the term phoneme or phonemic sequence[83], much used by the linguists today, because both of them represent the abstract entity extracted from the gross sound-matter.

Like Patañjali[84], Bhartṛhari also uses the term *śabda* in the *Vākyapadīya* to mean various things, such as: (i) the supreme reality, the *Brahman*[85]. (ii) From the stand-point of communication, *śabda* represents indivisible meaning-bearing unit[86]. At the beginning of the second book of the *Vākyapadīya*, Bhartṛhari defines the sentence in the words *eko'navayavaḥ śabdaḥ*: 'a single undivided speech-unit.' He maintains that a sentence is indivisible[87] into constituents, because the process of communication is not concerned with the division of sentence into its constituents. Bhartṛhari's theory of the indivisibility of the sentence maintains that the listener hears the sentence as an undivided linguistic unit, and does not identify the word-elements like stems and suffixes etc. while he understands the meaning of the speech-unit. In other words, the process of undestanding the sentence-meaning is indifferent to the constituents and their meanings. In this sense he says that sentence is over and above the phonemes. This should not be taken to mean that word and

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83. *Cf.* J. BROUGH, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
84. See footnotes 5-10.
85. *VP.* 1.1-2.
86. *Ibid.*, II.1:

    आख्यातशब्दः संघातो जातिः संघातवर्तिनी ।
    एकोऽनवयवः शब्दः क्रमो बुद्धयनुसंहृतिः ॥

87. *Ibid.*, 1.73.

sentence are over and above the phonemes at the articulatory and auditory levels of language. (iii) With reference to the perception of speech-unit also, the term *śabda* is used by Bhartṛhari[88]. It is in this last aspect, that *śabda* may be *sphoṭa*. When the speech-unit intends to represent the significative value attached to it, it is meaning-bearing speech-unit, but when it intends to represent the differentiating sound-values attached to it, it is the *sphoṭa*. Since *śabda* is a two-sided entity, one side of it is the *sphoṭa* while the other side is *arthavatsvarūpa*. In its former capacity the speech-unit might be auditorily grasped, but not necessarily understood semantically. The word *sphoṭa* reflects the relationship between the words and their constituents at the level of distinctive function of language. The perception of *sphoṭa* enables the listener to grasp the sound-pattern of language even without apprehension of the meaning. The term *sphoṭa* stands for a single phoneme or sound-pattern, subjected to the listener's ear, which may or may not be meaning-bearing. It is in this sense that Bhartṛhari, while describing the nature of *dhvani,* has used the term *śabda*[89]. Similarly, while commenting on Patañjali's definition of *śabda,* he has used the word *sphoṭa* in the sense of signifying word's own phonetic shape[90]. He clearly states there the two-fold function of word: significative and distinctive (self-revealing nature). Only in its latter aspect *śabda* is *sphoṭa.*

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88. 1.44, 1.54, 1.59 etc.
89. *VP.* 1.77, 103, 104 etc.
90. *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā, ABORI,* Vol. XLIII, p. 3: यो वाऽयमुच्चार्यते क्रमवान् अवरः कश्चिदन्यः अक्रमः शब्दात्मा बुद्धिस्थो विगाहते तस्मादर्थप्रतिपत्तिः । कुतः । यथैवार्थान्तरनिबन्धनो नार्थान्तरं प्रत्याययति एवं स्वरूपनिबन्धनो नोत्सहते प्रत्याययितुम् । अन्ये तु मन्यन्ते । यथा वर्णेषु वर्णतुरीया भागा वर्णजातिं व्यञ्जयन्ति । एवं वर्णा वाक्यान्तरेषु ये

Bhartṛhari's analysis of language generally breaks down into two broad aspects: significative and distinctive. The words *prakṛti, pratyaya, śabda, pada* and *vākya* are used to represent the meaning-bearing aspect of language. His final view is that the division of sentence into words and that of words into stems and suffixes is a grammatical fiction, although a useful one, for the description of language. Sentence, as he says, is one single undivided speech-unit. The analysis at the word (*pada*) level is not totally denied by him. According to him, such an analysis would be useful for learning the language. However, the ultimate truth lies in the fact that the sentence is a single undivided speech-unit, and the word is an unreal abstraction. As regards the indivisibility (*akhaṇḍatva*) of the speech-unit, a doubt remains in my mind, as to whether Bhartṛhari maintains that divisibility of speech-units into smaller significant units is grammatical fiction or that phonemes are also the unreal abstract entities of language. It appears to me, however, that when he says: 'there are no phonemes in the word', it means that phonemes have no connection with the meaning. That is to say, phonemes do not play any independent part in conveying the sense. However, the importance of phonemes as distinctive units is not denied by him. In fact, the indivisible meaning-bearing unit is grasped through the sounds emitted by a speaker and heard by a listener.

क्रमजन्मानः अयुगपत्कालास्ते तां पदस्थां वर्णजातिमभिव्यञ्जयन्ति। वृक्षशब्दो वृक्षत्वम्। जातेरर्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिः। एतच्चार्थस्वरूपम्। स्फोटोऽयमेव शब्दात्मा नित्यः। ये तु क्रमजन्मानः अयुगपत्काला व्यक्तयो ध्वन्यात्मानस्ते इति। अन्ये मन्यन्ते द्विशक्तिः शब्द आत्मप्रकाशनेऽर्थप्रकाशने च समर्थः। यथा प्रदीपः आत्मानं प्रकाशयन् विध्यर्थान् प्रकाशयति। यस्त्वाध्यात्मिकः इन्द्रियाख्यः प्रकाशः स आत्मानमप्रकाशयन् बाह्यमर्थं प्रकाशयतीति।

At the distinctive level of language, Bhartṛhari first makes distinction between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa*. *Sphoṭa* is not merely sound-entity, but it is a class of which the varied individual instances are *dhvanis*. *Sphoṭa* is not emitted sound, but it is auditorily perceived. *Sphoṭa* is opposed to *dhvani* as a class to individuals. *Sphoṭa* is not associated with the gross phonetic features of sound. The sound-producing movements reveal the *sphoṭa* in such a way that the listener enables himself to extract only the relevant distinctive class-features of sound by way of eliminating its non-distinctive individual variations. Therefore, *sphoṭa* is the revealed (*vyaṅgya*), whereas *dhvanis* are the revealer (*vyañjaka*). To explain the distinction between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* clearly, Bhartṛhari speaks of two aspects of *dhvani*: *prākṛtadhvani*: 'primary sound' and *vaikṛtadhvani:* 'secondary sound'. *Prākṛtadhvani* is a spoken sound produced by vocal organs which manifests the *sphoṭa*. The features of primary sounds are attributed somewhat wrongly to the abstract entity *sphoṭa* which is revealed through the primary sounds. To put it into modern terminology, which, of course, may not exactly correspond to Bhartṛhari's way of understanding, the sound endowed with primary features can be recognised as a part of the phonemic system of language. The *vaikṛtadhvanis* represent the secondary features of language. For their production the articulatory position is not directly responsible, but they are produced by the primary sounds *(śabdajāḥ śabdāḥ)*. Helarāja calls them 'reverberation of sounds'. The secondary features, like speed of utterance, do not affect in any way the quality of the primary sound and *sphoṭa,* for they are produced from the primary sounds after the manifestation of *sphoṭa*. Therefore, the secondary features are not even wrongly superimposed on the abstract sound-entity *sphoṭa*. To put it into modern terminology,

the secondary features do not form part of the phonemic system of language.

From the foregoing discussion it will be clear that, according to Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, the term *sphoṭa* may refer to a single phoneme or a sound-pattern, which is revealed by *dhvani*. *Sphoṭa* as the indivisible meaning-bearing eternal word is nowhere suggested in either Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* or Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*. I do not see anything mysterious in the *sphoṭa* doctrine. The great masters Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, while making pronouncements on *sphoṭa*, are not engaged in irrational speculations. However, the later grammarians regard the *sphoṭa* as an indivisible meaningful eternal word from which the whole universe evolves. One may see that their way of describing *sphoṭa* is almost parallel to that of describing the supreme reality. All the elaborate terminology—*Brahman*, *sattā*, *avyakta*, *śakti*, *avidyā* etc.—is employed by later grammarians to describe the nature of *sphoṭa*. All this confusion arises on their part—as I have already explained in great detail—because they identify the metaphysical concept of *śabda* with the doctrine of *sphoṭa*. Another possible reason for misunderstanding Bhartṛhari's text is that he packs his arguments into small pithy verses which deal with metaphysical, linguistic and semantic doctrines side by side. This unusual mixture has resulted in diverse interpretations of his teaching. Accordingly, Bhartṛhari's linguistic doctrine is quite forgotten in the wake of metaphysical and semantic philosophy of language.

To conclude our discussion on Bhartṛhari, if one were allowed to cut across the terminological tangle, which has been involved in Bhartṛhari's thought, one may differentiate the linguistic elements from the non-linguistic semantics on the one hand, and the metaphysics of the *Vākyapadīya* on the other. The later

commentators, in my opinion, might have failed to draw the distinction between the linguistic interpretation and the philosophical thought of Bhartṛhari. Subsequently, the *sphoṭa* doctrine has assumed a new interpretation at the hands of grammarians, logicians and literary critics.

Sphoṭa—the views of later grammarians:

What is the *nimitta* of *śābdabodha* (verbal knowledge)? How does the listener grasp the meaning of a sentence? How is the meaning of a sentence communicated? Does the division of a sentence into words and that of words into their grammatical components concern the listener? When the listener grasps the meaning of a sentence, does he account for the inter-relation of the words in the sentence and of the phonemes constituting the word? Is a sentence to be regarded as the single meaning-bearing symbol? Or is it made up of different sound-units arranged in a particular order? These are the various questions which have puzzled the Indian philosophers since a long time and have been answered differently by Indian thinkers.

The grammarians *(sphoṭavādins)* hold that the sentence-*sphoṭa* conveys the meaning of a sentence which is a single meaning-bearing unit indivisible into smaller grammatical components and into phonemes. The *sphoṭa* has no time-order even if we dissolve it into smaller units at the descriptive level of language. On the authority of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* (1.44), the later grammarians maintain the two-fold aspect of a word:[91] *dhvani* and *sphoṭa,* viz. (i) the phonetic aspect of a word which forms the structure of expression and (ii) the semantic aspect of a word which is connected with meaning. In fact,

91. K. K. RAJA, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

linguistic utterance should be studied on two different levels: sound (*dhvani*) and significant utterance (*sphoṭa*).

These two levels do not correspond to each other but they are somewhat kept apart. To put it differently, they are loosely rather than intrinsically connected with each other. The grammarians hold that the relation between these two levels (*dhvani* and *sphoṭa*) is *vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāva* (revealer-revealed). The sounds uttered by the speaker which manifest the *sphoṭa* (significant expression) to the listeners, are called *vyañjaka*. The sound reveals the *sphoṭa*, therefore the latter is called *varṇābhivyaṅgya*[92] (revealed by phonemes). The *sphoṭa* revealed by sound conveys the meaning. So the relation between the significant unit (*sphoṭa*) and signified (*artha*) is *vācya-vācaka-bhāva* (conveyor-conveyed or denoter-denoted). The *sphoṭa* is called *vācaka* (denoter), and the meaning conveyed by it is called *vācya* (denoted).

The *sphoṭa* as explained by the later grammarians is somewhat analogous to the concept of linguistic unit (as described by De Saussure)[93] and has two sides: *signifiant* and *signifié*. The *sphoṭa* concept is somewhat analogous to the linguistic unit in the sense that both are two-sided entities. On the one hand, the *sphoṭa* is connected with sound which reveals it, and, on the other hand, it is connected with the meaning denoted by the *sphoṭa* word. The later grammarians maintain that *sphoṭa* is an indivisible and

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92. *Kāvyaprakāśa*, B. O. R. Institute, p. 19: बुधैर्वैयाकरणैः प्रधानभूतस्फोटरूपव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकस्य शब्दस्य ध्वनिरिति व्यवहारः कृतः ।

93. De SAUSSURE, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-68. See also K. K. RAJA, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

timeless entity, something over and above the phonemes,[94] while the sound (*dhvani*) is regarded as the uninterrupted sequence of phonemes. According to the later grammarians, there is no *sphoṭa* without meaning. It is the meaning-bearing nature of a word or of an expression that makes it *sphoṭa*. The time-order of sound (*dhvani*) is merely a means for revealing the timeless and partless *sphoṭa*.

The term *sphoṭa*[95] is derived from the root *sphuṭ* which means 'to burst' and is defined in two ways: In its linguistic sense, it is normally defined as 'that from which the meaning bursts forth', i.e. 'the word denoting a meaning (*sphuṭati artho yasmāt*)'. Secondly, it means 'an entity manifested by sounds' (*sphuṭyate varṇaiḥ yaḥ* i.e. *varṇābhivyañgyaḥ*). Although the sounds are produced serially, the *sphoṭa* manifested by different sounds is bereft of the time-series-pattern[96]. Each sound serves to manifest an indivisible unit. But it is not maintained that each sound reveals a part, because such a theory would lead to the divisibility of *sphoṭa*[97].

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94. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, *op. cit.*, pp. 594-95: शब्दकौस्तुभे तु वर्णमालायां पदमिति प्रतीतेर्वर्णातिरिक्त एव स्फोटः। अन्यथा कपालातिरिक्त-घटाद्यसिध्दिप्रसङ्गश्चेति प्रतिपादितम्।

95. See, footnote No. 61.

96. I borrow this terminology from J. BROUGH, *op. cit.*, p. 40, and K. K. RAJA, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

97. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*, *op. cit.*, pp. 589-90: तथा च वाचक-त्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या तदेवेदं वाक्य सोऽय गकार इति प्रतीत्या च स्फोटोऽखण्डः सिध्यति। एतेन गौरित्यादौ गकारौकारविसर्गव्यतिरेकेण स्फोटाननुभवाच्छ्रूयमाणवर्णानामेव वाचकत्वमस्त्वित्यपास्तम्। तेषां स्फोटातिरिक्तत्वाभावात्। p. 592: प्रत्येकमेव संयोगा अभिव्यञ्जकाः। परं केचिद् गत्वेन केचिदौत्वेन केचिद् विसर्गत्वेन इत्यनेकैः प्रकारैः। अत एव वर्णानां तदतिरेकास्वीकारोऽपि (स्फोटातिरेकास्वीकारोऽपि) उपपद्यते।

The sounds which we hear in the course of revelation of the *sphoṭa* appear to be present in the *sphoṭa* itself, only because of our inability to distinguish the *sphoṭa* apart from the sounds. In reality, the sounds are regarded only as manifesting agencies and have no function other than that of revealing *sphoṭa*. No doubt, each sound reveals the *sphoṭa,* but there is quantitative difference in each revelation. The first sound reveals indistinctly, the second sound more distinctly and this process continues to the last one. The last sound, helped by the impressions left behind by the previous perception of sounds, reveals the *sphoṭa* completely. It is one and the same *sphoṭa* that is revealed by each one of the sounds. Bhartṛhari in his *Vākyapadīya*[98] states: 'with the last sound the word is grasped in the mind (of the listener).' This process of communication of the *sphoṭa* is explained by the grammarians with reference to a concrete example: The process of the cognition of *sphoṭa* is like a jeweller[99] examining a precious stone by looking at it steadily for some time to enable himself to determine its real value. He has a series of perceptions; each perception leaves its own impression behind. The first gives him general knowledge; the second a clearer knowledge than the first, and so on. The last perception aided by the previous impressions makes him grasp the real value of the jewel completely. In other words, the object of all cognitions is the same. But it (the object) is perceived progressively. Similarly the *sphoṭa* is cognized progressively by the perception of each

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98. *VP.* 1.84:

नादैराहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह ।
आवृत्तिपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दोऽवधार्यते ॥

99. *Sphoṭasiddhi;* Pondiche'ry, 1958, p. 89: यथा रत्नपरीक्षिणः परीक्षमाणस्य प्रथमसमधिगमानुपाख्यातम् अनुपाख्येयरूपप्रत्ययोपहित-संस्काररूपाहितविशेषायां बुद्धौ चरमे चेतसि चकास्ति रत्नतत्त्वम् ।

phoneme. The cognition of the series of phonemes finally leads to the cognition of the same *sphoṭa*. Bhartṛhari[100] also explains the cognition of word by means of the analogy of the process of learning a verse by heart through its repeated readings. Each successive reading gives a clearer impression of the verse than the one left by the previous one. The last reading helped by the previous readings fixes the verse fully and clearly in memory. The same is true of *sphoṭa*. This theory is explained much more meaningfully by Śeṣakṛṣṇa, the teacher of Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, in his *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*[101]. He says that when a man utters *ka-* sound with the intention of saying *kamala,* we are aware of the fact that he wants to utter a word with the initial syllable *ka;* but then there are thousands of words which begin with the syllable *ka*. So how do we know from his utterance of the first syllable *ka,* which word the speaker will utter? When he utters the next syllable *ma,* we, the listeners, get one more clue that he intends to utter a word whose first two syllables are *ka-ma-*. When he utters the last syllable *-lam,* the listener grasps the *sphoṭa* word immediately and clearly. That is to say, the *sphoṭa* word is not grasped clearly until the last sound is heard.

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100. *VP.* 1.82:

यथानुवाकः श्लोको वा सोढत्वमुपगच्छति ।
आवृत्त्या न तु स ग्रन्थः प्रत्यावृत्ति निरूप्यते ।।

See also: K. A. S. IYER, "The Doctrine of *Sphoṭa*", *JGRI.* Vol. V. P. 235.

101. *Sphoṭatattvanirūpaṇa*, p. 10: (quoted by IYER, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-36): तथा हि कमलमित्युक्ते ककारमकारानुभवेऽपि किं कमलीयः स्फोटः किं कमनीयो वेति संदेहो नापगच्छति तावद् यावन्न चरमो लो वानुभूयते। तस्मादीषत्त्वं संदिग्धत्वं, निश्चितत्वमेव स्फुटतरत्वम्।

The function of phonemes in a word is to reveal[102] the indivisible meaningful single entity *sphoṭa* progressively. With each of the successive phonemes the *sphoṭa* is increasingly revealed. The phonemes have no meaning of their own. The significance of phonemes lies in differentiating or progressively revealing the single entity *sphoṭa* (meaningful unit). But the differentiating unit is not necessarily the meaningful unit. This can be compared to the view of modern linguistics[103] that the function of phonemes (the smallest distinctive units) is to differentiate semantic units from one another.

The grammarians maintain that the *sphoṭa* as a single indivisible unit is not an imperceptible entity but it is something which is actually perceived in speech-situation. The grammarians accept the *sphoṭa* as a single meaningful entity because, while hearing the sounds, one feels that the word or the sentence is a single entity. Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa[104] says that the justification of the *sphoṭa* arises from the experience: 'this is one word' and 'this is one sentence'. To support their theory, the grammarians present another illustration: we say that we understand the meaning from the word *gauḥ (gośabdād arthaṁ saṁpratyay-*

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102. *Nyāyamañjarī*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit series, p. 340: एके तावदाचक्षते प्रथमवर्णश्रवणवेलायां स्फोटोऽभिव्यक्तो भवति, न च द्वितीयादिवर्णवैफल्यं तदवगतेरेवातिशयकरणाद्यथा रत्नपरीक्षकाणां प्रथमदर्शने रत्नरूपममलमप्रकाशमानमपि पुनः पुनः परीक्षमाणानां चरमे चेतसि चकास्ति निरवद्यं रत्नतत्त्वम्, एवमिहापि प्रथमवर्णश्रुत्या व्यक्तेऽपि स्फोटे स्फुटतरप्रतीत्यै वर्णान्तराणि प्रयोक्ष्यन्ते इति ।

103. See K. A. S. IYER, "The Doctrine of *sphoṭa*" and K. K. RAJA, *Indian theories of meaning*, p. 129.

104. *Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddyota*, Vol. 1, *op. cit.*, p. 7: इदमेकं पदम्, एकं वाक्यमिति प्रत्ययः स्फोटसत्त्वे तदेकत्वे च प्रमाणम ।

āmahe)[105]. We do not say on the other hand, that we understand the meaning from the phonemes **g**, *au* and *ḥ*. This shows that the meaning of word is something over and above the phonemes.

The grammarians contend that the unity of word or sentence cannot be attributed to an aggregate of phonemes, simply because one cannot account for the simultaneity of phonemes (or succession of phonemes). The combination of phonemes itself is impossible, because each phoneme perishes as soon as it is uttered. There cannot be a combination of what exists and what has ceased to exist. Nor can the unity of the word be explained with reference to the collective recollection of the phonemes. In the collective recollection also, the phonemes do not figure in any sequence, because the sequence of phonemes is an impossible task. Further this would lead to the cognition of the same meaning from the words which contain the same phonemes in a different order. The difference between the words (*nadī* and *dīna*)[106] and their meaning (river and poor) will be unaccountable by the collective recollection of phonemes which constitute the words *nadī* (river) and *dīna* (poor), because the constituent phonemes of the said words are the same. The impression left by the phonemes will be the same even when the order is reversed. There is no sequence in the recollection, because we cannot remember the objects in the same order as we have perceived them. Since the unitary experience: 'this is one word' cannot be explained with reference to the series of phonemes, and since the difference between the words *nadī* and *dīna* etc. is otherwise unaccountable, the grammarians establish the existence of the *sphoṭa* as an indivisible meaning-bearing unit.

105. *Sphoṭasiddhi*, *op. cit.*, pp. 79 and 81.
106. See note 54.

The Mīmāṁsakas' 'non-acceptance of the grammarians' Sphoṭa theory':

The Mīmāṁsakas[107], however, strongly criticise the doctrine of *sphoṭa* put forth by the grammarians. They maintain that a word is nothing more than phonemes which constitute it, and a sentence is an aggregate of several such words. Śabara[108] in his Bhāṣya on *Jaiminisūtra* 1.1.1(5) quotes the view of Upavarṣa who maintains that the word *gauḥ* is nothing more than the three phonemes found in it, viz.: *'g', 'au'* and *'visarjanīya'(ḥ)*. Thus each indivisible word is an aggregate of phonemes and conveys the single unit of meaning known as *padārtha.*

The Mīmāṁsakas then turn to explain how the grouping of phonemes can take place. They admit that the simultaneous existence of phonemes is unaccountable, since the first phoneme dies out as soon as the second is uttered. The Mīmāṁsakas, however, assert that even if the cognition of preceding and succeeding phonemes cannot be simultaneous, still the phonemes apprehended in succession may leave behind the impressions which give rise to the cognition of unity of meaning and word. Thus, according to the Mīmāṁsakas, the last phoneme in combination with the impressions produced by the cognition of the preceding phonemes in a word or a sentence conveys the unitariness of word and meaning. If the cognition of *visarga (ḥ)* together with the impressions of previous sounds *g,* and *au* constituting the word *gauḥ,* is present in the mind of

107. In interpreting the Mīmāṁsaka view, I have made use of the excellent article of K. A. S. IYER, "The Doctrine of *sphoṭa*" and *The philosophy of word and meaning,* by Gaurinatha SHASTRI, Calcutta.

108. *Śābarabhāṣya*: 1.1.1.(5): अथ गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः। गकारौकार-विसर्जनीया इति भगवानुपवर्षः।

a listener, he understands the notion of 'a cow'. If the impression of the preceding sound *g* and *au* in the same order is not present in the mind of a listener at the time of cognition of the last phoneme *ḥ*[109], he does not comprehend the meaning 'cow'. Thus, the Mīmāṁsakas assign a special power[110] to the impressions also. Therefore, they argue that there is no necessity of postulating an indivisible entity *sphoṭa.*

Against the Mīmāṁsakas' contention, the grammarians argue that this defence does not succeed in explaining the felt unity of word. The single memory impression does not account for the particular order of phonemes[111]. The individual phonemes in a word can produce only the recollection of the phonemes heard, but they have nothing to do with the order of phonemes. The impression left by the phonemes will be the same even if the order of phonemes is reversed. Thus, the difference between *jarā* and *rāja* and *nadī* and *dīna* will be unaccountable to those who do not accept the *sphoṭa* theory. The order, which is an external fact of utterance and of audition, does not affect or alter the phonemes or their impressions. Moreover, it is not possible to attribute any sequence to the sound-units, because according to the Mīmāṁsakas the phonemes are permanent and all-pervading. The spatio-temporal[112] relation is only conceivable with regard to the things which are transitory.

109. *Sphoṭasiddhi, op. cit.*, p. 78: अपि च क्रमव्यतिक्रमभावित-पूर्ववर्णसंपादितसंस्कारसद्भावेऽपि नार्थाधिगमः समीक्ष्यते । तन्नासौ तद्धेतुर्भवितुमर्हति ।

110. K. A. S. IYER, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

111. *Sphoṭasiddhi, op. cit.*, p. 80: प्रतिवर्णोपलम्भनप्रभावितानि च भावनाबीजानि कामं संहतिसमासादनादेकमनेकालम्बि स्मरणं जनयेयुः, तावता चरितार्थेभ्यो नापरो वर्णात्मसु विशेषो लभ्यते ।

112. *Ibid.*, p. 80: स्वतो वर्णाः नित्यतया विभुतया च न देशनिबन्धं नापि कालनिबन्धं परापरभावमनुपतन्तीति प्रख्याननिबन्धन एष समुपाश्रीयते ।

The Mīmāṁsakas answer to this objection by pointing out that, when the speaker utters the phonemes of a word in their fixed order, they are heard by the listener in the same sequence. The cognition of such phonemes which leaves an impression in the mind of listener is more like potency *(apūrva)*[113]. It is like a transcendental result produced by the sacrifice. In the case of sacrifice, the *apūrva*: 'potency' is produced only if the various subsidiary acts are performed in a particular order by a particular agent. The different subsidiary rites performed in a succession leave behind the *apūrva*. It is through the medium of this *saṁskāra* that the different sacrificial acts produce the single result. Similarly, the different acts of articulatory movements produce the impression through which the unity of the word is realized. The phonemes uttered in a particular order and apprehended by the hearer in the same sequence leave behind the impression which together with the perception of final phoneme conveys the meaning[114].

The grammarians strongly criticise the view of the Mīmāṁsakas that the memory-impression leads to the cognition of meaning on the ground that the cognition of phonemes can very well produce the memory impression, but it cannot be supposed to have power of conveying meaning. The grammarians further point out that the nature of memory-impression is such that it can produce the recollection of the very object

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113. *Ibid.*, p. 82: मा भूदेष ज्ञानप्रसवः स्मरणनिमित्तं संस्कारः। अपि तु यागादिकर्मभेदोपपादित इव स्वर्गादिनिमित्तमपूर्वाभिधानोऽन्य एव नियतक्रमभेदप्रयुक्तवर्णविज्ञानोपहितोऽर्थाधिगमफलः यथा चापूर्वाभिधानभावनोपजने कर्तृक्रमनियमोपयोगावगमः शास्त्रसामर्थ्यात्तथेहापि कार्यदर्शनसामर्थ्यात् कर्तृक्रमनियमोपयोगावगमः।

114. For a more systematic treatment of the Mīmāṁsakas' view see "Doctrine of *sphoṭa*" by IYER, p. 129.

which was the object of cognition. Since the phonemes by themselves are not meaning-conveyors, their impressions cannot posses additional capacity for conveying meaning[115]. To this the Mīmāṁsakas answer that the impressions do not denote the meaning directly, but the cognition of the last phoneme accompanied by the impressions of previous phonemes causes one to have a simultaneous recollection of all the phonemes, which conveys the meaning[116]. As regards the second objection the Mīmāṁsakas point out the fact that, although the sequence cannot be attributed to the phonemes which are eternal, it is still possible to attribute it to the manifestation of individual phonemes, which is not regarded as eternal. Therefore, the Mīmāṁsakas argue that there is no necessity for postulating the one indivisible entity, *sphoṭa.*

Vācaspatimiśra in his *Tattvabindu*[117] defends the unity of word and sentence without accepting the *sphoṭa.* He holds the view that this experience of unitariness of word is due to the association of the two external adjuncts. According to him, the unitariness of word and sentence is based on the idea conveyed by it.

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115. *Sphoṭasiddhi, op. cit.*, p. 78: संस्कारं तु वासनाद्वितीयनामानं पटुतरसंवेदनसमनुभूतवस्तुगोचरं सर्वं एव संगिरन्ते स्मरणफलप्रसवोन्मीयमानात्मानं प्र ादिनः, अर्थाधिगमनिमित्ततायां तु तस्य विवादः।

116. *Ibid.*, p. 79: न खलु साक्षाद् भावनानां व्यापारमभिधेयप्रत्ययविषयमुपेमः, अपि तु ताभ्यः स्थायित्वेन प्रतिलब्धयौगपद्याभ्यः प्रत्यवमृष्टसकलवर्णरूपात्मा एकः प्रत्ययः उदेति तत्र स एव वा तद्विपरिवर्तिनो वा वर्णास्तत्र समधिगतसहभावा जनयन्त्यर्थविबोधमिति वृथा शब्दपरिकल्पनापरिश्रमः।

117. *Tattvabindu*, Annamalai University Sanskrit Series, No. 3, p. 50: उपाधिः खलु एकज्ञानविषयता भवेदेकाभिधेयप्रत्ययहेतुता वा। See, also S. S. SHASTRI, "Vācaspati's Criticism of *Sphoṭavāda*", *JORM*, Vol. 6, p. 313.

The word and the sentence cause the cognition of a single idea, and therefore they are regarded as one unit *(ekābhidheyapratyayahetutā)*. Moreover, since the word and the sentence are the object of a single cognition *(ekajñānaviṣayatā)*, they are regarded as one unit. Concomitantly, Vācaspatimiśra argues that the word *gauḥ* is one, because it conveys a single idea and also because it becomes the content of a single cognition. Therefore, to maintain the idea of unity of word or sentence, the postulation of the *sphoṭa* entity is unnecessary.

Vācaspati[118] criticises the *sphoṭa*-concept by pointing out that the phonemes cannot be said to be different or non-different from the *sphoṭa*. If one phoneme is non-different from the *sphoṭa*, then the single phoneme would also be competent to convey the meaning. Accordingly, the remaining phonemes will obviously be futile (meaningless). On the other hand, if the phonemes are different from the *sphoṭa*, why should they manifest the *sphoṭa* and why should there be association between the sound and the manifestation of *sphoṭa*? Similarly, the idea that the *sphoṭa* is progressively revealed by the succession of phonemes, does not hold good, because the *sphoṭa* is regarded as indivisible and devoid of parts. To put it differently, it cannot be maintained that the phonemes reveal the *sphoṭa*, because the *sphoṭa* being partless cannot be revealed gradually as the grammarians would like its revelation. Therefore, *Vācaspati*[119] concludes that, since

118. *Tattvabindu, op. cit.*, p. 57-58. अपि चानंशस्य वैशद्यावैशद्ये न यज्येते सामान्यविशेषतद्वत्तानुभूयमानता हि वैशद्यम् सामान्यमात्रस्य विशेषमात्रस्य वा वेदनमवैशद्यम् । न च निखिलसामान्यविशेषविरहिणः स्फोटस्यास्फुटस्य दर्शनमुपलभ्यते ।

119. *Ibid.* pp. 73-74: तदिह दृश्यमानेभ्यो दृश्यमानप्रकारानुपातिभ्यः अभिधेयप्रत्यय उत्पद्यमानो नैवाज्ञातावयवमत्यन्तानन्भूतं पदतत्त्वम् उपकल्पयति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् ।

the meaning of the sentence or of the word can be well-cognized from the knowledge of the words after the auditory perception of phonemes, it is not necessary to establish the *sphoṭa*, devoid of properties and parts.

Some of the points raised by the Mīmāṁsakas are subject to criticism. The impressions (*saṁskāras*) of the individual phonemes in a word can produce only the recollection of the phonemes heard, but they have no power to convey the meaning[120]. The Mīmāṁsakas and the Naiyāyikas do not make any gain by postulating the concept of *saṁskāra* which is assumed by them as endowed with the denotative function and which is the intermediate factor between the cognizance of phonemes and comprehension of meaning. The grammarians maintain that instead of assigning the denotative power to the concept of *saṁskāra*, it is better to assume the *sphoṭa* which explains also nicely the unity of words and sentence. The grammarians object to the Mīmāṁsakas' theory: 'the unity of word or sentence is based upon the unity of meaning', because such an assumption involves the fallacy of interdependence[121]. Unless the word is cognized as a unit, the unity of meaning cannot be established; and unless the unity of meaning is cognized, a word cannot be considered as a unit. Moreover, the Mīmāṁsakas' conception that the *saṁskāra* is like *apūrva* is based on the technicality and the procedure of the Mīmāṁsā system which are hardly convincing to others.

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120. See note 115.

121. *Tattvabindu, op. cit.*, p. 51. न चैकार्थसम्बधाख्यानमेकपदत्वमापादयति। वर्णानाम् अनाश्रितपदरूपाणामप्रत्यायकत्वेनासम्बद्धानां संबद्धाख्यानानुपपत्तेः। संबन्धाख्यानात्तु पदभावे तदेवेतराश्रयत्वमापद्यते। पदत्वाद्धि संबन्धित्वे सत्याख्यानमाख्यानाच्च पदत्वे सति संबन्धितेति।

Vācaspati's[122] argument: 'since the memory follows the experience and since the sequence of phonemes is experienced at the time of perception, the sequence is also figured in memory', sounds to be equally unjustifiable. The phonemes being eternal and all-pervasive have no sequence belonging to them. Therefore, it would not be appropriate to hold that one thing is auditorily perceived and another thing is apprehended in memory. Even if it is granted that the phonemes are remembered in the same order in which they are uttered, it still remains unanswered as to why they fall simultaneously in the collective memory.

Maṇḍana Miśra[123] gives an answer to the question – raised by Vācaspati against the *sphoṭa* theory– Are the phonemes manifesting the *sphoṭa*, different or non-different from it? Maṇḍana Miśra argues that *sphoṭa* is non-different from the phonemes as the whole from its parts and yet it is different, because the whole is considered neither as part nor as an merely aggregate of the parts. Although the indivisible *sphoṭa* word is not cognised apart from and independently of phonemes, still the felt unity is not illusion, because the whole as a single unit has independent existence even if it is associated and appears to be mixed up with the cognition of parts. The grammarians maintain that the phonemes cause progressive revelation of indivisible *sphoṭa* and also cause the cognition of phonemes. In other words, the single cognition has two objects associated with it: the indivisible *sphoṭa* and the phonemes. The final cognition of the *sphoṭa* arises through the series of the unreal cognition of the phonemes. Through this erroneous knowledge, the phonemes also appear as the part of the indivisible *sphoṭa*. The *sphoṭa* word itself is

122. S. S. SHASTRI: *op. cit.*, p. 320.

123. *Sphoṭasiddhi*, *op. cit.*, p. 97: तदेवमभिन्नेषु भिन्नेषु च वर्णात्मसु यत्रानैकं च प्रकाशते, तत्प्रत्यक्षं पदमिति ।

bereft of any sequence. The unity of the *sphoṭa* word and the plurality of phonemes constituting the word cannot both be viewed as real. It is the unity of the word that is real. It is only on the empirical plane that the *sphoṭa* word appears to be made up of several phonemes. On the other hand, the Mīmāṁsakas are not able to answer the question satisfactorily as to how the phonemes figure in the collective remembrance.

However, Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa[124] disagrees with the grammarians' view that the main justification of the *sphoṭa* entity stems forth from the fact that the combination of the sequence of phonemes which constitute the word cannot be accounted for. Following the theory of association, he maintains that each succeeding phoneme progressively reveals the substructure of a word in the form of a certain sequence, and all these substructures directly or indirectly reveal the word which is an aggregate of phonemes. For instance, the word *paṭa* is composed of the four phonemes *p*, *a*, *ṭ* and *a*. Now at the time of the perception of the second phoneme, not only the phoneme *a* is cognized, but the substructure *pa* also is cognized through the impression of the phoneme which is left on the mind of listener. In this manner, the whole structure *paṭa* is cognized at the time of the perception of the last phoneme *a*. Each subsequent sound reveals the substructure of the preceding and the succeeding

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124. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra, op. cit.*, pp. 590-93: पदज्ञानसंभवस्योपपादितत्वात् । प्रत्येकमेव संयोगा अभिव्यञ्जकाः । परं तु केचिद् गत्वेन, केचिदौत्वेन केचिद् विसर्गत्वेनेत्यनेकैः प्रकारैः । अत एव वर्णानां तदतिरेकास्वीकारोऽप्युपपद्यते । एवं चाव्यवहितोत्तरत्वसंबन्धेन घवत्वं टकारे गृह्यते । एतादृशपदज्ञानकारणताया अविवादात् । परं त्वव्यवहितोत्तरत्वं स्वज्ञानाधिकरणक्षणोत्पत्तिकज्ञानविषयत्वं वाच्यम् । अत एव घज्ञानानन्तरटज्ञानविषयत्वानुपूर्वीत्यादिर्नैयायिकवृद्धानां व्यवहारः । एवं च न कश्चिद् दोषः ।

sounds, and thus, we can establish the coexistence of phonemes through the impression left by them on the mind of the listener. Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa points out that, although the relation of priority and posterity arises only when two things exist simultaneously, still the combination of non-simultaneous things can be maintained in the cognition, because, at the time of the production of the second phoneme, the knowledge of the duration of the first phoneme has not become extinct. Therefore he argues that the main reason for accepting the *sphoṭa* theory is not unaccountability of the idea of sequence, but the experience that the word is single and unitary.

The Naiyāyikas' non-acceptance of the sphoṭa theory:

The Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāṁsakas do not seem to disagree with each other when they level their criticisms against the grammarians' theory of *sphoṭa*. There is no fundamental difference between the approaches of the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā schools towards the criticism of the grammarians' theory of *sphoṭa*. Diverting our attention to the Nyāya philosophy, we find that Gautama denies the eternality of sound, because it has a beginning and an end. According to the Nyāya System, *śabda* is only an aggregate of phonemes that are produced by the movements of the vocal organs of the speaker. It is true that the conception of word in Nyāya and in Mīmāṁsā is fundamentally different. The Naiyāyikas contend that the word has transitory existence[125]. During the first moment the sound is produced. The second moment is the moment of

125. *Nyāyamañjarī*, *op. cit.*, p. 189: उच्चारणाद्ऊर्ध्वमनुपलब्धेः अनित्यः शब्दः, न ह्येनमुच्चरितं मुहूर्तमप्युपलभामहे, तस्माद् विनष्ट इत्यवगच्छामः। करोतिशब्दव्यपदेशाच्च कार्यः शब्दः, शब्दं कुरु, शब्दं मा कार्षीरिति व्यवहर्तारः प्रयुञ्जते ते नूनमवगच्छन्ति कार्यः शब्द इति ।

its existence. It disappears at the third moment. To the Mīmāṁsakas, on the other hand, the *varṇa:* 'phoneme' is eternal and ubiquitous, revealed by the articulate sounds.

Leaving aside the question of eternality and non-eternality of phonemes, we find very little difference between the respective approaches of both these schools in refuting the *sphoṭa* theory. The Naiyāyikas maintain that whatever is meaningful or significant is a word which is composed of several phonemes. The listener apprehends the meaning of a word when he hears the last phoneme of a word together with the recollection of previous phonemes through their impressions[126]. They admit that a word is a single unit since this is shown by experience; but it arises from the single act of collective memory of the phonemes. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the sequence of phonemes is denotative of meaning on the basis of the principle of contrast and agreement *(anvaya-vyatireka)*[127]. The particular meaning is not apprehended in the absence of a particular phoneme. The whole is meaningful because its parts are meaningful. The logicians consider that the phonemes uttered by different speakers in different tones are regarded as

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126. *Ibid;* p. 346: यथा पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोऽन्त्यवर्ण इति तत्रभवता मीमांसाभाष्यकृता वर्णितं तथा वा वर्णानामर्थप्रत्यायकत्वमस्तु ।

127. *Ibid.*, p. 354: यत्पुनः कूपसूपयूपादौ सत्यपि वर्णानुगमेऽर्थानुगमो न दृश्यते तेन चाकारणमर्थप्रतीतेर्वर्णानुगम इत्युक्तम्, तदयुक्तम्, यतो नान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामनुत्पन्ना प्रतीतिरुत्पाद्यते येन कूपादौ तदुत्पादनमाशङ्क्येत। सिद्धायां तु प्रतीतौ वाचकभागेयत्तानियमपरिच्छेदेऽनयोर्व्यापारो न चैकत्र वर्णानुगमेऽनुगमो दृष्ट इत्यन्यत्रादृश्यमानोऽपि हठादापादयितुं युक्तः ।

non-distinctive, because the phonemes represent a class[128] rather than a particular instance. The phoneme *p* uttered by the different speakers is regarded as non-distinctive on account of its common features (labiality, stopness, unvoicedness and unaspiratedness) that comprise all the varied utterances of individual speakers under the single phoneme *p*. Accordingly, the Naiyāyikas do not find propriety in postulating the entity *sphoṭa* apart from the combination of phonemes. Thus, the collective remembrance of the preceding phonemes together with the perception of the final phoneme is regarded as conveyor of meaning.

The view propounded by the Naiyāyikas does not appear quite convincing to the grammarians for the same reasons which are put forward by them against the theory of non-acceptance of the *sphoṭa* by the Mīmāṁsakas. The grammarians feel that language has two levels: distinctive and significative. These must be kept apart from each other. The meaning-bearing aspect of a word cannot be dispensed with regarding the notion of the phonemes and their sequences. The phonemes are not directly associated with the meaning, and hence it is necessary to postulate the *sphoṭa* concept as a single meaning-bearing entity.

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128. *Ibid.*, p. 354: तत्र योऽर्थो यं शब्दम् अनुगच्छति, स तस्यार्थ इत्यवसीयते तत्कथमसत्या भागाः ।

Also *ibid.*, p. 203: उदात्तानुदात्तस्वरितसंवृतविवृतादिभेदोऽपि शब्दविदां प्रत्यक्ष एव गीतज्ञानामिव स्वरग्रामभाषाविभागः, तस्मादष्टादशभेदमकारमाचक्षते अत्वं च तत्सामान्यमवर्णकुलशब्देन व्यवहरन्तीति प्रतिपद्यन्ते लोकाः ।

Sphoṭa—its classification:

The later grammarians have classified the *sphoṭa* into eight different varieties:

(i)	*varṇasphoṭa*	*vyaktisphoṭa*
(ii)	*padasphoṭa*	
(iii)	*vākyasphoṭa*	
(iv)	*akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*	
(v)	*akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*	
(vi)	*varṇajātisphoṭa*	
(vii)	*padajātisphoṭa*	
(viii)	*vākyajātisphoṭa*	

Indivisibility and meaningfulness are the two fundamental principles on which this classification is based. Let us consider the 8 varieties of *sphoṭa* in the order of enumeration:

(i) *The Varṇasphoṭa:*

The term *varṇasphoṭa* does not mean that each single phoneme is regarded as *sphoṭa*, but the phoneme or phonemes constituting either a stem or a suffix are regarded as such *(varṇasphoṭa)*[129]. When a single phoneme or a stem or a suffix is found to be denotative, it is regarded as *vācaka* (denotative). Accordingly, it is designated as the *varṇasphoṭa*. Actually, the term *varṇasphoṭa* originally might have represented the smallest differentiating units rather than the meaningful units. According to Patañjali and Bhartṛhari, the term *varṇasphoṭa* need not necessarily involve consideration of meaning. They

129. *Laghumañjūṣā*, Kashi Sanskrit Series edn. by Sambasadashiv Sharma UPADHYAYA, p. 7: तत्र शास्त्रप्रक्रियानिर्वाहको वर्णस्फोटः। प्रकृतिप्रत्ययास्तत्तदर्थवाचका इति तदर्थः।

used the term *sphoṭa* always in its relation with sound. The later grammarians, however, interpret the term *sphoṭa* to mean the indivisible meaning-bearing unit. According to them, the term *varṇasphoṭa* cannot refer to each individual phoneme which need not necessarily be associated with meaning. Since the term *sphoṭa*, as understood by the later grammarians, necessarily refers to the significant unit, they are forced to interpret it differently. The new meaning assigned to the term is the 'smallest significant unit'. Accordingly, it stands for the stems, roots, suffixes etc. which are the smallest meaningful units in language. Thus, it stands virtually for the notion of morpheme. Morpheme is the speech-unit which cannot be further divided without destroying or altering the meaning. Similarly *varṇasphoṭa* cannot be divided into further smaller meaningful units.

According to the theory of *varṇasphoṭa*, the forms *rāmaḥ* and *pacati* etc. can be described as composite forms consisting of two or more simple morphemes. In the form *rāma-ḥ*, *rāma* is the stem-morpheme and the *visarga*(*ḥ*) is the suffix-morpheme. Similarly, the verbal form *pacati* consists of three simple morphemes: (i) the verbal root *pac*, (ii) the empty infixal morpheme *a* (*śap-vikaraṇa*) and the verb-ending suffix *ti* (present tense, 3 sg. marker).

A grammatical analysis built up according to this plan, brings out hierarchical structure of the utterance. The *varṇasphoṭa* theory represents essentially the analytical approach which proceeds from stem, suffix etc. to higher units. It intends to describe the arrangement of recurring grammatical items in such a manner that the structure of hierarchical utterance can be clearly built up. For instance, the *varṇasphoṭa* theory attempts to show

that the grammatical elements[130] *kar, kār, kur, cakar, cakār*, occurring repeatedly in the forms *karoti, kārayati, kurutaḥ, cakara, cakāra* etc. are the smallest meaningful units. In modern terminology, these are morphemic alternants having practically the same meaning but containing different phonemes. These recurring partials do not occur in the same environment as the others. In short, the theory of *varṇasphoṭa* handles the problem of meaning by splitting up of the words into their component parts which can be categorised and brought into relation with one another. In fact, the Pāṇinian analysis proceeds from "bottom-'to'-top". According to Nāgeśa,[131] the theory of *varṇasphoṭa* mainly justifies the spirit of "bottom-'to'-top" analysis, that dominates Pāṇini's work.

With regard to the analysis of word into meaningful components, the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas differ in assigning the meaning-bearing nature to the grammatical units. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the prototypes *(sthānins)*[132] should be regarded as the meaning-bearing units. On the other hand, the grammarians assert that it is the substitute *(ādeśa)* that bears the meaning and not the prototypes. In the verb *pacati,*

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130. *Śabdakaustubha, Paspaśā, op. cit.*, p. 7: तथा हि किञ्चिद्वर्णव्यत्यासादिना शक्तताक्च्छेदकानुपूर्वीभङ्गस्य प्रतिपदमौत्सर्गिकत्वात्तत्र च केनचित् क्वचित् प्रथमं शक्तिग्रहात् केन कस्य स्मरणमित्यत्र विनिगमनाविरहादृषभो वृषभो वृष इत्यादाविव कर्, कार्, कुर् चकर् इत्यादीनां प्रयोगसमवायिनां सर्वेषामेव वर्णानां तत्तदानुपूर्व्यवच्छिन्नानां वाचकतेति वर्णस्फोटपक्षः ।

131. See, note 129.

132. G. N. BHATTACHARYA, "A study in the dialectics of *Sphoṭa*", *Journal of the Department of Letters*, University of Calcutta, 1937, pp. 91 ff.

the substitute *ti* denotes the sense of 'agent' and not the prototype *laṭ* which is a fictional entity invented by the grammarians. The Naiyāyikas criticise the grammarians' view on the ground that it involves *gaurava*. If the substitute is the real meaningful unit, then the grammarians will have to admit endless denotative functions, because as compared to the prototypes the substitutes are many. Similarly, in the case of zero morphemes, it would be absurd to say that zero is endowed with denotative function. The grammarians, in answer to this objection, point out that the different systems accept the different prototypes which are limitless[133]. On the other hand, the substitutes are fixed and limited. Moreover, the prototypes have no reality of their own as they do not form a part of the language-system. People who actually use the language are concerned only with the substitutes which form part of the language system and not with the prototypes which are fictitious units.

The defects of the varṇasphoṭa theory:

According to the theory of *varṇasphoṭa*, a simple or composite form can be described by listing the morphemes and their arrangements. But this way of description presents a difficulty when we have forms like *ghaṭena, te, me* etc. In these forms it is very difficult to ascertain exactly what part of the word conveys the meaning 'substance' (*dravya*) and what part of it 'the case-relation' (*kārāka*=factor). Furthermore, we find a difficulty in ascertaining the exact stem or base and suffix in the form

133. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra, op. cit.*, p. 574: तथा हि पचतीत्यादौ लकारमविदुषोऽपि बोधान्न तस्य वाचकत्वम् । . . . . आदेशिनामपि तत्तद्वैयाकरणैः स्वेच्छया भिन्नानामभ्युपगमात्, कः शक्तः को नेति व्यवस्थानापत्तेश्च ।

ghaṭena. There is no criterion to arrive at the decision that the portion *ghaṭa* is the stem-portion, and *ina* is the suffix; or *ghaṭe* is the stem-portion, and *na* is the suffix. Similarly, in the genitive forms like *te, me,* it would be hard to identify the base form and the suffix. The same thing is true of most of the forms like *haraye, harau, harīn, rāmāya, rāmeṇa*[134] etc. The meaning and the phonetic form of the whole do not give the precise notion for identifying and isolating the stem constituent from suffix constituent. The methods employed in the analysis of *varṇasphoṭa* are troublesome, because it suggests multiplicity of solutions, and it is difficult to state precisely the exact or correct solution in relation to other possibilities. Therefore, it would be better to treat words as single units.

(ii) *The Padasphoṭa:*

The *padasphoṭa* theory maintains that the finished word as a unique entity conveys the meaning. Accordingly, the division of words into grammatical components does not concern the listener. The theory assumes that words are the real constituents of the stream of speech, as they are capable of conveying the meaning. That is to say, when the same word occurs in different environments, it is possible to assign the same meaning to it. The meaning of the word can be described, when we identify it morphologically. The theory also assumes that word should be reckoned as a single unit rather than composite for the purposes of communication; because the listener does

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134. *Śabdakaustubha, Paspaśā, op. cit.*, p. 7: रामं, रामेण, रामाय, हरये, हरौ, हरीन्, इत्यादौ परिनिष्ठिते रूपे कियानंशो द्रव्यादिवाचकः, कियांश्च कर्मत्वादेरित्यस्य विनिगन्तुमशक्यतया राममित्यादि परिनिष्ठितं पदमेव वाचकं कर्मत्वादिविशिष्टस्येति पदस्फोटः ।

not grasp the division of words[135] into phonemes and morphemes at the time of comprehension of the meaning from the word-unit.

The defects of the padasphoṭa theory:

The theory of *padasphoṭa* claims that a sentence can be described by listing the finished words, their meanings, order and syntactic relation. However, the method of grammatical description furnished by the *padasphoṭa* theory presents a difficulty in analysing the sentence such as *hare'va*[136]: 'O Hari, protect (me)'; because the listener grasps the meaning, even if he is ignorant of the rules of euphonic combinations to recognize discriminatingly the two words *hare* and *ava*. The same is true about the sentence *dadhīdam*: 'This is curds'. Since the listener grasps the meaning without understanding the division of sentence, the grammarians contend that the sentence should be considered as a single unit for the purposes of communication.

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135. J. BROUGH, *TPS*, 1953, *op. cit.*, p. 165; see also *VP*. II. 13:

शब्दस्य न विभागोऽस्ति
कुतोऽर्थस्य भविष्यति ।
विभागैः प्रक्रियाभेदम्
अविद्वान् प्रतिपद्यते ।।

136. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra, op. cit.*, p. 580:

घटेनेत्यादिषु न हि प्रकृत्यादिभिदा स्थिता ।
वस्तुसादाविवेहापि संप्रमोहो हि दृश्यते ।।

ibid., p. 581: हरेवेत्यादिषु दृष्ट्वा वाक्यस्फोटं विनिश्चिनु । ...हरेऽव विष्णोऽवेत्यादौ पदयोः 'एङः पदान्तादति' इत्येकादेशे सति न तद्विभागः सुज्ञानः ।

(iii) *The Vākyasphoṭa*:

The *Vākyasphoṭa* theory, therefore, maintains that the sentence as a unique entity conveys the meaning. The grammarians argue that people use invariably a sentence to communicate their ideas to others. Therefore, the sentence is regarded as a unit of meaning[137]. This theory does not claim that *padas,* or stems or suffixes do not exist or they do not have any meaning, because the grammarians and lexicographers who are interested in the analysis of language, isolate the words, prefixes and stems which are the fragments of utterance recurring completely or partially in the speech. The *Vākyasphoṭa* theory assumes that sentence alone is the conveyor of meaning, but it does not maintain categorically that the constituents of sentence have no meaning at all. According to it, it is possible to assign some meaning to the components on the basis of structural analysis. The main implication of the theory is that the meaning of word is always contextual, and no study of meaning apart from a complete sentence can be taken seriously. In other words, the words have meaning only when they form a part of sentence.

(iv) *The Akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*:

The theory of *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* intends to abolish the hierarchical structure at the level of recurring partials. It points out that the listener hears the word as an undivided linguistic unit and does not identify the grammatical constituents like stem, suffix etc. which constitute the word. The listener grasps the word undivided and understands their

137. The facts are best treated by J. BROUGH in his learned article: "Some Indian Theories of meaning" *TPS*, 1953, p. 165.

meaning as undivided. Therefore, the *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭavādin* argues that the division of words into smaller meaningful units is purely convenient fiction[138] useful for the description of language, but, in reality, the undivided word conveys its meaning as a single linguistic unit.

(v) *The Akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa*:

This theory claims that even the view of *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa*: 'word as undivided meaning-bearing unit', is not satisfactory, since the isolated words do not occur as meaningful units in ordinary language. The words do not mean the same thing in one to one relation and thus their meanings depend upon the sentence as a whole. Bhartṛhari[139] says that the division of sentence into words and that of words into phonemes does not exist. The theory maintains that when one hears or speaks a sentence in ordinary conversation, a sentence is not taken into account in terms of a series of meaningful units but as a whole. When the speaker grasps the meaning of a sentence he may analyse it into words, syllables and phonemes. But during the course of conversation a listener pays no attention to the structure of lang-

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138. *VP.* II. 238: उपायाः शिक्षमाणानां बालानामुपलालनाः ।
असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा ततः सत्यं समीहते ॥

139. *Ibid.*, 1.73. See also *Śabdakaustubha* p. 7: एकः पट इतिवद् एकं पदं वाक्यं वा इत्रबाधितप्रतीतेर्वर्णातिरिक्तमेव पदं वाक्यं वा अखण्डं वर्णव्यङ्ग्यम् ।

140. See, J. BROUGH's article, "Some Indian Theories of meaning," *TPS.*, p. 166. See also *VP.* II. 14:
ब्राह्मणार्थो यथा नास्ति कश्चिद् ब्राह्मणकम्बले ।
देवदत्तादयो वाक्ये तथैव स्युरनर्थकाः ॥

uage[140]. If he does so, he would grasp it only in terms of phonemes, syllables etc. Accordingly, he would not be able to apprehend the meaning of sentence. To put it differently, the theories of *varṇa-sphoṭa* and *padasphoṭa* are concerned more with 'how the language functions' than 'how the language is used'. The procedure adopted by these theories takes into account the actual constituents of utterance for the formal analysis of language. However, according to the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* theory, this attitude is entirely inadequate and unreal from the point of listeners who instantaneously understand the meaning of the sentence as a whole, even without understanding its constituents[141].

(vi and vii) *The Vyaktisphoṭa and the Jātisphoṭa:*

Further, the philosophical question arises as to whether the *sphoṭa* is particular or universal[142]. The ancient grammarians are followers of *jātisphoṭa*, while the modern grammarians (Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa and others) accept the *vyaktisphoṭa*[143]. It has been already pointed out that the linguistic utterance is related to two facts: (i) semantic fact (content) and (ii) phonetic fact (expression). On the content side, it is essential to distinguish between particular content and universal content. The content denoted by the word 'cow' may be a concrete object (particular) or it may be a universal entity. The grammarians[144] argue that

141. It is necessary to draw attention of readers to the fact that Bhartṛhari has never used the term *sphoṭa* while discussing the nature of sentence-meaning. For later grammarians, the concept of *sphoṭa* essentially represents the theory of language-meaning.

142. Cf. J. BROUGH, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

143. *Sphoṭavāda, Upodghāta, op. cit.*, p. 7.

144. *VP.* II. 1:

आख्यातशब्दः संघातो जातिः संघातवर्तिनी ।
एकोऽनवयवः शब्दः क्रमो बुद्धयनुसंहृतिः ॥

the same thing almost can be said of the expression side. The *sphoṭa* word may be particular or universal. The word-concept *gotva* does not mean the individual word-event, spoken with varied tones and accents, but the class into which all the individual word-events are ensembled. For instance, the word *gauḥ* represents a class which comprises a host of varied utterances made by different people. Therefore, the different listeners respond similarly to the word *gauḥ* spoken in different tones[145]. What is said about the word-concept is true about the phoneme-concept and sentence-concept also. Therefore, the grammarians distinguish between the phoneme-event and phoneme-type (*varṇavyaktisphoṭa* and *varṇajātisphoṭa*), word-event and word-type (*padavyaktisphoṭa* and *padajātisphoṭa*) sentence-event and sentence-type (*vākyavyaktisphoṭa* and *vākyajātisphoṭa*).

The advocates of *jātisphoṭa* contend that it is the conveyor of meaning, because an expression uttered by different people does not carry different meanings to the listeners. The linguists, grammarians and lexicographers are not concerned with the utterance of the particular speakers but with the type-utterance *(jātisphoṭa)*. Nāgeśa[146], while commenting on the concept of the *jātisphoṭa*, points out that, if the utterance *ghaṭa* of any particular speaker is regarded as conveyor of the meaning 'jar', it would be necessary to have knowledge of as many denotative functions as there are different utterances of the word *ghaṭa*. This is, however, absurd. Therefore, it would be appropriate to admit that there is only one class of all particular events of the spoken

145. Colin CHERRY, *On human Communication*, *MIT*, 1957, p. 268.

146. *Laghumañjūṣā*, *op. cit.*, p. 484: अनन्ता वर्णा उत्पादविनाशशालिनस्तत्समूहश्च पदं बोधकमिति पक्षे तु पदानामानन्त्याच्छक्तिग्रहासंभवेनानुगताकारप्रतीत्या सिद्धायास्तत्तत्पदगतघटपटत्वादिजातेर्वाचकत्वम् ।

word *ghaṭa*. If a listener apprehends the denotative function of the class-word *ghaṭa*, he would necessarily understand the meaning of all individual events of it which can be grouped under the single class-word *ghaṭa*.

Nāgeśa[147] finally maintains that the *sphoṭa* is present in the particular rather than in the universal. He does not admit the plurality of individuals. According to him, the phoneme *a* is in reality only one, but appears to have diverse forms when it is associated with the diversity in the speech-events. The one and the same individual phoneme associated with time qualities and individual speech-habits etc. assumes varied forms. Thus, this diversity is associative *(aupādhika)*[148]. Therefore, Nāgeśa puts forth the view that the phoneme *a* is one, not because it belongs to the same class, but because it is actually the same. The distinction between these two views is not what it appears to be at first sight. Both of them *(vyaktisphoṭavādin* and *jātisphoṭavādin)* admit that the phonemes, words and sentences pronounced by different people at different times with different intonations are different. The exponent of *vyaktisphoṭavāda* maintains that seemingly different phonemes viz. *a*-s are really one. The difference belongs to the associative features *(aupādhika)*. On the other

147. *Ibid., op. cit.*, pp. 485-86: परे तु यथा अद्वैतिनामात्मभेद औपाधिको मायाकृतः चेतनस्यैकत्वेऽप्यस्त्येव । तत्रानुगमार्थं जातिकल्पना च दृश्यते । तथैकस्यैव तत्तत्कालतत्तद्वर्णानुरागरूपोपाधिभेदेन आनन्त्यात् तत्पक्षेऽपि अनुगतशक्तिग्रहाय जातिरावश्यकी । परं तेषां तत्तदुपाध्यवच्छिन्नः स्फोटो व्यक्तिभाक् । तत्तदुपाध्युपलक्षितश्च जातिभाक् । पूर्वमते तु जातिः पदार्थान्तरम् ।

148. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra, op. cit.*, Verse 69, p. 601:

शक्यत्व इव शक्तत्वे जातेर्लाघवमीक्ष्यताम् ।
औपाधिको वा भेदोऽस्तु वर्णानां तारमन्दवत् ॥

hand, the exponent of *jātisphoṭa* contends that the individual phonemes viz. *a*-s are really different, but there is a class *atva* which represents a common property comprising the varied individual events. In other words, the *jātisphoṭavāda* maintains that non-difference in the varied individuals is generic, while the *vyaktisphoṭa* maintains that difference is associative *(aupādhika)*.

The *jātisphoṭavādin* assumes that the meaning-bearing word is the class and is revealed by the individual instances *(vyaktis)*. The individual members, according to this view, are not meaning-bearers. As against this, Nāgeśa maintains that the individual member is the meaning-conveyor which is revealed by the individual sounds associated with diverse features.

It is interesting to note here that even the later discussion on *jātisphoṭa* and *vyaktisphoṭa* is essentially concerned more with the sound-aspect of language than with its meaning-bearing function. The latter is really irrelevant to the discussion whether the *sphoṭa* is *jāti* or *vyakti*. The *vyaktisphoṭa* maintains that a single integral unit (phoneme or word or sentence) is considered the *sphoṭa*, while the second view maintains that *sphoṭa* is a class (phoneme-class, word-class or sentence-class) residing in various individual events. The meaning-bearing aspect of language can hardly be concerned in defining class or individual character of the phonemic pattern of speech revealed by sounds (*dhvanis*).

The principle[149] advanced by Bhartṛhari in pointing out the distinction between *dhvani* and *sphoṭa* is that the latter appears to be different from sound as class from individual.

149. See note 46.

Sphoṭa is characterized as a family or class of sounds related to *dhvani* through phonetic similarities. The sounds may vary widely but the *sphoṭa* remains the same in all environments. *Dhvani* refers to the distinctive or non-distinctive sound elements uttered by different speakers in varied tones, whereas the term *sphoṭa* refers to the constant element in the varied sounds.

To Bhartṛhari, *sphoṭa* represents merely generic aspect whose individual members are not designated as *sphoṭa*. To put it differently, *dhvanis* (the individual sounds) are always *vyaktis* and their common denominator revealed by individual instances is always *jāti*. The later grammarians, however, say that the phoneme or phonemic sequence revealed by the individual instances is either *vyakti* or *jāti*. According to them, the term *vyaktisphoṭa* also is confined to the revealed sound rather than to revealer. The other point which is worthwhile mentioning in this connection is that the later grammarians have extended the concept of *jātisphoṭa* and *vyaktisphoṭa* to the words and sentences also. It was not possible for the later grammarians to explain the concept of the universality of words with reference to the revealed phonemes, because the conception of universal word-*sphoṭa* is indifferent to the universality of phonemes. The theory later developed emphatically assumes that the *sphoṭa* is over and above the phonemes.

Thus the Sanskrit grammarians hold that there are two different aspects which concern the nature of meaningful linguistic unit. One is *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* which is somewhat similar to the modern operational approach of semantics. As opposed to this, the approach advanced by the theories of *varṇasphoṭa* and *padasphoṭa* is analytical, and tries to dissolve the meaning of utterance into its constituent elements. Their value lies in presenting a formal account of language and

in building the descriptive semantic theory of language. The *varṇasphoṭa* and the *padasphoṭa* theories advanced by the later grammarians mainly lay emphasis on the formal treatment of linguistic analysis. The teaching put forward by them need not be looked upon as true, from the point of view of language communication. The descriptive analysis furnished by these theories is undoubtedly a fiction, because the listener, while receiving the message, does not grasp the existence of words or their constituents. It is only after hearing the sentence that the grammarians or linguists analyse it into its constituents. These theories are advanced with the view that the words are real constituents of language, from the point of formal description of language. On the contrary, the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* theory has no part in building up descriptive semantics.

The Sanskrit grammarians did not avoid the problems of semantics. Actually, the large portion of the grammatical works deals with the description of the semantic aspect of language. The Sanskrit grammarians did not hesitate to analyse meaning, which modern descriptive linguists have relegated to linguistic fields. Nāgeśa maintains the relation of identity between the sign and the signified *(arthapadayos tādātmyam)*. Strictly speaking, modern linguists also cannot dispense with the concept of meaning totally. They employ it in one form or another (distributional approach or contrastive features etc.). However, according to the Sanskrit grammarians, the descriptive and the semantic systems are closely knit together and do not exist separately. Even Pāṇini who described non-philosophical structural account of Sanskrit language classified the forms of language on the basis of significant classes.

The ancient Indian theories on Sanskrit offer almost parallel analysis of content and expression sides. The theories of *varṇasphoṭa* and *padasphoṭa* contend that the higher units are made up of smaller units. The *padasphoṭa* admits that the sentence is divisible into word-constituents. Following the same line of argument, the theory of *abhihitānvayavāda* maintains that the individual words and grammatical units have meaning in themselves. These two views put together form the theory: 'The words can be isolated from a sentence and each word-isolate denotes its distinct meaning. The distinct meanings of words, when joined together with syntactic relation, form the sentence-meaning'.

The theory of *saḳhaṇḍavāḳyasphoṭa* maintains that words or stems or suffixes exist as parts of the sentence. The sentence can be analysed into word-constituents provided that they form a single unit as a sentence. In other words, the theory denies independent existence to words. Arguing on the same line, the theory of *anvitābhidhānavāda* maintains that the meaning of word can be comprehended only as related to sentence. Words have no independent meaning when they are isolated from sentence. The two theories put together maintain: 'Words and their meanings have no independent existence but they are real constituents of sentence and they convey meaning only in the context of sentence'.

The *aḳhaṇḍavāḳyasphoṭa* theory maintains the indivisibility of sentence-unit. According to this theory, the words are unreal abstractions. In reality, the sentence is a single undivided utterance. The splitting of a sentence into a number of constituents is only a grammatical fiction invented to enable the beginner to understand the structure of a sentence. On the content side, the grammarians' theory of *vāḳyaśaḳtivāda*

puts forth the view that the entire sentence is endowed with denotative function. Bhartṛhari maintains that its meaning is the instantaneous flash of insight (*pratibhā*) which is indivisible into word-meanings. These two theories put together maintain: 'The sentence as a single undivided unit denotes a single undivided meaning'. The theories mentioned earlier assume the reality of words and their meanings in one form or another. But the theories of the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* and the *vākyaśaktivāda* point out the unreality of words and their meanings in transmitting the message.

The Prābhākaras, who hold the *anvitābhidhānavāda* advance the argument that the procedure of understanding the meaning is to set side by side the sentences in which only one word is different. On the basis of agreement and contrast, a child learns the meaning of the whole sentence and at a later stage identifies the meaning of isolated words. This shows that analysis of meaning proceeds from the "top–'to'–bottom". The theory of *pratibhā* holds that the sentence meaning is grasped by the listener in an instantaneous flash of insight. The common identical elements which constitute the different sentences may have similar meanings but not the same. Actually they cannot be separated from the context of sentence–meaning.

However, the theories on words differ from the theories on meaning in one respect. The former proceed from the elements to the whole, from the sounds to the stems and suffixes, from the word-constituents to the finished words. The grammarians provide the rules to construct words and sentences. Sanskrit grammar can be described as a word-producing grammar. Any one, who has learnt the Sanskrit grammar traditionally, would be able to show, how any given sentence might be generated from the morphemes mentioned in the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, *Gaṇapāṭha*

and *Dhātupāṭha.* While generating the sentence, he would proceed to build up the higher units from smaller units. As opposed to this, the theories on meaning (excluding the theory of *vākyaśakti*) are based on the procedure of identification and isolation of morphemes. Accordingly, the analysis of meaning proceeds from the "top–'to'–bottom". However, the logicians' theory of *saṁsargamaryādā,* which is formulated to explain the syntactic relation between the isolated word-meanings, attempts to show how the higher meaningful units are built up from the smaller meaningful units.

Let us turn back to the problem of parallel analysis of content and expression. The Sanskrit grammarians offer parallel analysis of content and of expression as particular and universal. They feel it necessary to distinguish between the particular–meaning and class-meaning, on the one hand, and between particular–word and class-word on the other. Similarly, the Sanskrit grammarians establish that all the words denote the meaning *sattā*: 'existence' and, due to the *avidyā* (ignorance), the existence assumes the different forms. It is only secondarily that the words stand for different objects such as cow, horse, etc., whose primary meaning is pure existence. Following the same line, on the expression side the grammarians maintain that there is only one supreme eternal word *(Śabdabrahman).* The *Śabdabrahman* which assumes various forms, due to the *avidyā,* is expressive of meaning. To the grammarians, the *Śabdabrahman* is the supreme reality. It is devoid of all qualities and distinctions. The *Śabdabrahman* is the ultimate principle of existence. Finally, the supreme word is identified with the supreme meaning. The *Śabdatattva* is regarded as existence in essence. That which cannot be subjected to the expression of the supreme sound cannot exist and consequently cannot be the content of our thought. The supreme word gives to an object its existential status. As has been pointed

out in the foregoing pages, the descriptive and the semantic systems appear to represent the two sides of the *sphoṭa* entity. To the Sanskrit grammarians they are closely knit together.

The later grammarians interpret the *sphoṭa* theory in order that the two levels of the language may be kept apart. The function of the language at sound level is to differentiate one significant unit from the other. The function of the language at the *sphoṭa* level is meaning-transmission. The relation between these two levels is one of revealer and to be revealed. The smallest distinctive units (*dhvanayaḥ*) are considered as revealer of the significative units. Bhartṛhari and the later grammarians realise that the listener, while receiving the message, does not grasp the hierarchical structure of language. If he attempts to do so, he will lose sight of the meaning of an expression. Thus, the communicative aspect of language will be impaired if a listener, while receiving the sounds, pays attention to the structure of language. Therefore, the *akhaṇḍavākyasphoṭa* theory abolishes the hierarchy of linguistic units from the point of communication and reduce the utterance to a single indivisible unit.

To avoid a conflict between the two levels of language, distinctive and significative, the grammarians maintain that there is no intrinsic relation between them. The formal relation that exists between them is *vyaṅgyavyañjakabhāva*: 'revealer-revealed'. Therefore, the *sphoṭa* at the communicative level remains over and above the constituents. Distinctive unit is only differentiating and not communicative. The significative unit is not divisible into distinctive units as far as the meaning is concerned. To put it differently, the undivided utterance conveys undivided meaning.

The *sphoṭa* theory has undergone the two different interpretations furnished by the two traditions of grammarians,

linguistic and philosophic. For Patañjali and Bhartṛhari the term *sphoṭa* stands for the unit-sound grasped but not necessarily understood. The later grammarians, however, have shifted the earlier conception of the *sphoṭa* from the feature level of language to the semantic level. The discussion on the nature of *sphoṭa*, according to the later grammarians, essentially deals with the significative aspect of language. And, finally, the later grammarians have attributed the metaphysical aspect of word doctrine to the *sphoṭa*. The higher reality of *śabdabrahman* is identified with the lower reality of *sphoṭa*. This ultimately led to the misunderstanding of the modern Sanskritists that the *sphoṭa* doctrine is mysterious.

From the point of view of language description and communication, the concept of *sphoṭa* is not unnecessary and mysterious. We cannot but admire the greatness of the Indian philosophers who have made a significant contribution to the language function and communication by making use of such new terminology as *sphoṭa, dhvani, anvitābhidhānavāda, abhihitānvayavāda, vākyaśakti* etc. Some of the discussions are even relevant to the modern linguistic theories, and the Indian contribution holds a high place in the history of linguistic thought. One will find that the arguments of Patañjali and Bhartṛhari or of modern Naiyāyikas are far from dead. The scholars of the west are working on the same problems but most of them are ignorant of the achievements of the ancient Indian philosophers in this field. I hope that, perhaps, by the acquaintance with the new thoughts in modern linguistics, semantics and philosophy, one may point out the relevancy of ancient Indian linguistic thought to the modern one, although the former has been developed in different environments and written from different angles of vision.

The text of the *Vaiyākaraṇas'iddhāntakārikā* (a collection of 74 pithy verses by Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita) with the commentary *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* by Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa has has been repeatedly printed in India with and without commentaries. I have had access to eight different editions:

1) Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Vol. 43, Poona, 1901.

2) Bombay Sanskrit and Prākrit Series, Vol. LXX, with the commentary *Kāśikā* by Harirama KALE, Bombay, 1915.

3) Kashi Sanskrit Series, Vol. 3, with the commentary *Darpaṇa* by Harivallabha, Benares, 1939.

4) Kashi Sanskrit Series, Vol. 133, with the commentaries *Darpaṇa* by Harivallabha, *Parīkṣā* by Bhairava Miśra and *Bhūṣaṇavyākhyā* by Kṛṣṇamitra, Benares, 1939.

5) Ādarśagranthamālā, Vol. 4, with the commentary *Prabhā* by PANCOLI and *Darpaṇa* by Harivallabha, Benares, 1947.

6) Śrīharikṛṣṇanibandhamālā, Vol. 7, with the commentary *saralā* by Gopalashastri NENE, Benares, 1952.

7) Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series, Vol. 135, with the commentary *Śāṁkarī* by Shankarshastri MARULKAR, Poona, 1957.

8) Rajasthan Sanskrit College Granthamālā, Vol. 10, Benares, 1934.

In constituting the text of *Sphoṭanirṇaya*, I have closely followed the critical edition printed in the Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series. But I have revised this edition with my own punctuation and introduced changes here and there in the readings which seemed obviously misprints, on the authority of the other editions.

All the editions of the work agree in many places except in minor points. If we ignore obvious misprints, the variant readings worth con-

sidering are very few. Accordingly, it is only seldom that they will be found recorded in my notes.

In writing the notes I have made use of all the available commentaries but have relied more particularly on the excellent *Darpaṇa* of Harivallabha and *Kāśikā* of Hariram KALE. Wherever the explanation given by the commentaries appeared to be oversubtle or too far removed from the natural meaning of the text, I have ventured on my own authority to give what seemed to me a stricter and more straightforward interpretation. I have tried throughout to make my translation as accurate as possible. Accordingly, I have preferred literal renderings when these could given without cost to intelligibility.

वैयाकरणभूषणसारः।

अथ स्फोटनिरूपणम् ।

सिद्धान्तनिष्कर्षमाह—

वाक्यस्फोटोऽतिनिष्कर्षे तिष्ठतीति मतस्थितिः ।
साधुशब्देऽन्तर्गता हि बोधका न तु तत्स्मृताः ॥ ५९ ॥ (१)

यद्यपि वर्णस्फोटः पदस्फोटो वाक्यस्फोटोऽखण्डपदवाक्यस्फोटौ वर्णपदवाक्यभेदेन त्रयो जातिस्फोटा इत्यष्टौ पक्षाः सिद्धान्तसिद्धा इति वाक्यग्रहणमनर्थकं दुरर्थकं च तथापि वाक्यस्फोटातिरिक्तानामन्येषामवास्तवत्वबोधनाय तदुपादानम् । एतदेव ध्वनयन्[१]आह-**अतिनिष्कर्षे** इति। **मतस्थितिः** वैयाकरणानां महाभाष्यकारादीनाम् । तत्र क्रमेण सर्वांस्तान् निरूपयन् वर्णस्फोटं प्रथममाह-**साधुशब्द** इति। साधुशब्दान्तर्गता वाचका न वेति विप्रतिपत्तिः। विधिकोटिरन्येषां नेति वैयाकरणानाम् । **साधुशब्दे** पचति राम इत्यादि[२]प्रयुज्यमानेऽन्तर्गतास्तिब्विसर्गादय एव **बोधका** वाचकास्तेषा[३]मेव शक्तत्वस्य[४] प्राग्व्यवस्थापितत्वान्न तु तैः **स्मृता** लादयः स्वादयश्चेत्यर्थः ॥ ५९ ॥ (१)

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१. ध्वनयन्निति D, D_1, D_3
२. इति प्रयु° P, A, D_2
३. °स्तस्यैव D_1, D_2, Com.
४. शवितत्वस्य D_1.

यत्तु प्रयोगान्तर्गतास्तिबादयो[५] न वाचकास्तेषां बहुत्वेन शक्त्यानन्त्यापत्तेः । एधाञ्चक्रे ब्रह्मेत्यादावादेशभूतलुगादेरभावरूपस्य बोधकत्वासंभवाच्च । किं तु तैः स्मृता लकाराः स्वादयश्च वाचकाः । लत्वस्य जातिरूपतया शक्ततावच्छेदकत्वौचित्यादव्यभिचाराच्च । आदेशानां भिन्नतया परस्परव्यभिचारित्वात् । **'लः कर्मणि'** (३.४.६९) इत्याद्यनुशासनानुगुण्याच्च । न ह्यादेशेष्वर्थबोधकमनुशासनमुपलभामह इत्याहुस्तान् स्वसाधकयुक्तिभिर्निराचष्टे—

व्यवस्थितेर्व्यवहृतेस्तद्धेतुन्यायतस्तथा ।
किं चाख्यातेन शत्राद्यैर्लडेव स्मार्यते यदि ।
कथं कर्तुरवाच्यत्ववाच्यत्वे तद्विभावय ॥ ६० ॥ (२)

व्यवस्थानुरोधात् प्रयोगान्तर्गता एव वाचका न तु तत्स्मृता इत्यर्थः । तथा हि पचतीत्यादौ लकारम[६]विदुषां बोधान्न तस्य वाचकत्वम् । न च तेषां तिङ्[७]षु शक्तिभ्रमाद्बोधः तस्य भ्रमत्वे मानाभावात् । आदेशिना[८]मपि तत्तद्वैयाकरणैः स्वेच्छया भिन्नभिन्नानामभ्युपगमात् कः शक्तः को नेति व्यवस्थानापत्तेश्च । सर्वेषां शक्तत्वे गौरवं व्यभिचारश्चास्त्येव । आदेशानां प्रयोगान्तर्गततया नियतत्वाद्युक्तं तेषां शक्तत्वम् । तथा

५. °स्तिब्विसर्गादयो D_1.
६. °मविदुषो P
७. तिङन्तशक्ति D_2.
८. प्रयोगांशानामादेशिनामपि P.

चादेशिस्मरणकल्पना नेति लाघवम् । साधकान्तरमाह–व्यवहृतेरिति व्यवहारस्तावच्छक्तिग्राहकेषु मुख्यः । स च श्रूयमाणतिङादिष्वेवेति त[९] एव वाचका इत्यर्थः । किं च–तद्धेतुन्यायत इति । लकारस्य बोधकत्वे भू ल इत्यतोऽपि बोधः स्यात् । तादृशे बोधे पचतीति समभिव्याहारोऽपि कारणमिति चेत्, तर्ह्यावश्यकत्वादस्तु[१०] तादृशसमभिव्याहारस्यैव वाचकत्वशक्तिः । अन्यथा लकारस्य वाचकत्वं समभिव्याहारस्य कारणत्वं चेत्युभयं कल्प्यमिति गौरवं स्यात् । तथा च तादृशसमभिव्याहार[११]: समभिव्याहृता वर्णा वेत्यत्र विनिगमनाभावात् प्रयोगान्तर्गता वर्णा वाचका इति सिध्यतीति भावः । अपि च लकारस्यैव वाचकत्वे कृत्तिङोः कर्तृभावना[१२]वाचकत्वव्यवस्था त्वत्सिद्धान्त[१३]सिद्धा न स्यादित्याह–किं चेति । आदेशानां वाचक[१४]त्वे तिङत्वेन भावना[१५]यां मानत्वादिना कर्तरि शक्तिरित्युपपद्यते विभाग इति भावः । न च शानजादौ कृतिर्लकारार्थ आश्रयः शानजर्थ इत्यस्तु 'कर्तरि कृत्' (३.४.६७) इत्यनुशासनादिति शङ्क्यम् । स्थान्यर्थेन निराकाङ्क्षतया शानजादौ कर्तरीत्यस्याप्रवृत्तेरन्यथा घञादावपि प्रवर्तेत ॥ ६० ॥ (२)

९. तत्त A.
१०. तर्ह्यस्तु तादृश° D.
११. °समभिव्याहार एव A, D_3.
१२. वाचकव्यवस्था । D_2.
१३. त्वत्सिद्धान्तसिद्धा न स्यादित्याशयेनाह P; त्वत्सिद्धा न स्यादित्याह A.
१४. वाचकत्वे च तिङ्त्वेन D_2, D_3.
१५. भावनाया A.

देवदत्तः पचमान इत्यादिसामानाधिकरण्यानुरोधाच्छानचः कर्ता वाच्यः स्याद् इत्याशङ्क्याह—

तरबाद्यन्ततिङ्क्ष्वस्ति नामता कृत्स्ववव स्फुटा ।
नामार्थयोरभेदोऽपि तस्मात्तुल्योऽवधार्यताम् ॥ ६१ ॥ (३)

पचतितरां मैत्रः पचतिकल्पं मैत्र इत्यादिषु नामार्थत्वाभेदान्वययोः संभव एव इति कर्तृवाचकता स्यादिति भावः । न च पचतिकल्पमित्यत्र सामानाधिकरण्यानुरोधात् कर्तरि लक्षणा, पचमान इत्यत्राप्यापत्तेरिति। '**लः कर्मणि**' इत्यनुशासनं च लाघवाय कल्पिते लकारे कर्त्रादिवाचित्वं कल्पितमादायेत्युक्तम् ॥ ६१ ॥ (३)

इति[16] स्फोटवादे वर्णस्फोटनिरूपणम्[17] ।

अथादेशा वाचकाश्चेत् पदस्फोटस्ततः स्फुटः ॥ ६२ ॥ (४)

एवमादेशानां वाचकत्वे सिद्धे पदस्फोटोऽपि सिद्ध एवेत्याह—**अथेत्यादि** । **आदेशास्तिब्**विसर्गादयः । अयं भावः—समभिव्याहृतवर्णानां वाचकत्वे सिद्धे तादृशवर्णसमभिव्याहाररूपपदस्य वाचकता सिध्यति। प्रतिवर्णमर्थस्मरणस्यानुभवविरुद्धत्वात्। प्रत्येकं वर्णानामर्थवत्त्वेन प्रातिपदिकत्वापत्तौ '**न लोपः प्रातिपदिकान्तस्य**' (८.२.७) इत्यादिभिर्घनं

१६. इति रङ्गोजिभट्टात्मजकौण्डभट्टविरचिते वैयाकरणभूषणसारे स्फोटवादे वर्णस्फोट° P.

१७. P. adds समाप्तम्; A and D drop स्फोटवादे.

वनमित्यादौ नलोपाद्यापत्तेश्च[18]। एतच्च चरमवर्ण एव वाचकत्वशक्तिः शक्तेर्व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वे मानाभावात्। पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानुभवजन्यसंस्काराश्चरमेणार्थधीजनने सहकारिण इति न तन्मात्रोच्चारणादर्थधीरिति वर्णस्फोटवादिनां[19] मतान्तरस्य दूषणायोक्तम्। रामोऽस्तीति वक्तव्ये रामित्यनन्तरं[20] घटिकोत्तरमकारोच्चारणेऽर्थबोधापत्त्या तादृशानुपूर्व्या एव शक्ततावच्छेदकत्वौचित्यादिति दिक्॥ ६२॥ (४)

'सुप्तिङन्तं पदम्' (१.४.१४) इति परिभाषितपदस्य वाचकत्वस्वीकर्तृणां मतमाह—

घटनेत्यादिषु न हि प्रकृत्यादिभिदा स्थिता।
वस्नसादाविवेहापि संप्रमोहो हि दृश्यते॥ ६३॥ (५)

घटनेत्यादौ 'घटे' इति प्रकृतिर्नेति प्रत्ययः। 'घट्'[21] इति प्रकृतिरेनेति प्रत्यय इति विभागस्य **'सर्वे सर्वपदादेशाः'** इति स्वीकारे विशिष्य प्रकृतिप्रत्ययोः ज्ञानासंभवान्न वाचकत्वमित्यर्थः। वैयाकरणैर्विभागः सुज्ञेय इत्यतो दृष्टान्तव्याजेन आह—**वस्नसा**विति। 'बहुवचनस्य वस्नसौ' (८.१.२१) इति समुदायस्यादेशविधानान्नात्र तद्विभागः संभवतीत्यर्थः॥ ६३॥ (५)

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१८. नलोपापत्तेश्च A, D_3.
१९. मतान्तरदूष° P, D_2.
२०. राम इत्यन° A, D_2, D_8.
२१. घट इति D; घ इति D_3.

सुप्तिङन्तचयरूपवाक्यस्यापि तदाह—

हरेऽवेत्यादि दृष्ट्वा च वाक्यस्फोटं विनिश्चिनु ।
अर्थे विशिष्य संबन्धाग्रहणं चेत् समं पदे ।
लक्षणादधुना चेत्तत्पदेऽर्थेऽप्यस्तु तत्तथा ॥ ६४ ॥ (६)

हरेऽव विष्णोऽवेत्यादौ पदयोः **'एङः पदान्तादति'** (६.१.१०९) इत्येकादेशे सति न तद्विभागः सुज्ञानः[२२]। तथा च प्रत्येकपदाज्ञानेऽपि समुदायशक्तिज्ञानाच्छाब्दबोधात् समुदायेऽप्यावश्यिका शक्तिः। एवं प्रकृतिप्रत्ययेषु विशिष्याज्ञायमानेष्वपि समुदायव्युत्पत्त्या[२३] बोधात्तत्राप्यावश्यिकैव शक्तिरिति भावः। वस्तुतः पदैः पदार्थबोधवद्वाक्येन वाक्यार्थबोध[२४] इति पदार्थशक्तिः पदेष्विव वाक्यार्थशक्तिर्वाक्येऽभ्युपेयेति पदस्फोटवाक्यस्फोटौ व्यवस्थितौ। अन्यथा घटः कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिरित्यादौ तादृशव्युत्पत्तिरहितस्यापि बोधप्रसङ्गः। घटमानयेत्यत्रैव पदार्थानामुपस्थितौ[२५] सत्यपि तात्पर्यज्ञाने बोधाभावाच्च। तत्रैव घटकर्मकमानयनमिति बोधे घटार्थप्रातिपदिकोत्तरं[२६] कर्मत्ववाचकविभक्तेस्ततो[२७] धातोस्तत आख्यातस्य समभिव्याहारः कारणमिति कार्यकारणभावज्ञानवतो बोधा-

२२. सुज्ञातस्तथा D_2.
२३. °व्युत्पन्नत्वबोधात् P, A, D_2.
२४. पदार्थबोध P, A, D.
२५. यत्र घटमानयेति प्रयोगस्तत्रैव घट° D_2.
२६. घटार्थकपदोत्तरं D_1, D_2.
२७. वाचकाम्विभक्ते° D_1.

[२८]त्तज्ज्ञानमपि हेतुरिति चेत्तर्हि सिद्धो वाक्यस्फोटः । घटादिपदार्थबोधे बोधकता[२९]रूपपदशक्तिज्ञानकार्यकारणभावस्येव विशिष्टवाक्यार्थबोधे पदसमभिव्याहाररूपवाक्यनिष्ठबोधकतारूपवाक्यशक्तिज्ञानस्यापि हेतुत्वकल्पनात् । अर्थोपस्थापकज्ञानविषयशब्दवृत्तिज्ञानकारणत्वस्यैव शक्तित्वात्। युक्तं चैतद्विषयतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबोधमात्रे वृत्तिज्ञानस्य लाघवेन हेतुत्वसिद्धेः । विवेचितं चैतद् **भूषणे**। ननु वाक्यार्थस्यापूर्वत्वात् **कथं तत्र** शक्तिग्रह इत्याशङ्क्याह—**अर्थ** इति । वाक्यस्येति शेषः । वाक्यस्य वाक्यार्थे विशिष्य शक्त्यग्रहणं चेत्तर्हि पदेऽपि समम् । पद एवान्वयांशे शक्तिरिति पक्षेऽपि तद्ग्रहासंभवस्तुल्य इत्यर्थः । यदि च पदशक्तिः पदार्थांशे ज्ञातान्वयांशे [३०]चाज्ञातोपयुज्यत इति कुब्जशक्तिवादस्तदा ममापि वाक्यशक्तिरज्ञातैवोपयुज्यत इति वादाभ्युपगमस्तुल्य इति भावः । ननु वृद्धव्यवहारं पश्यतो मनसा पदार्थवद्वाक्यार्थेऽपि तद्ग्रह इति चेत्तुल्यमित्याह—**लक्षणादि**ति । लक्ष्यते तर्क्यतेऽनेनेति लक्षणं मनस्तस्मात् । अपिः पदपदोत्तरं बोध्यः । पदेऽपि लक्षणात्तद्ग्रहश्चेत्तर्ह्यस्तु वाक्येऽपीति शेषः । वस्तुतस्तु समुदितार्थे विशिष्टवाक्यस्यैव प्रथमं तद्ग्रहः । आवापोद्वापाभ्यां परं प्रत्येकं तद्ग्रह इति बोध्यम् ॥ ६४ ॥ (६)

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२८. तद्ज्ञानमपि D_3.

२९. °शक्तिज्ञानस्येव D_2.

३०. वाज्ञातो° D_3.

इयमेव मीमांसकानां वेदान्तैकदेशिनां च गतिरित्याह—

सर्वत्रैव हि वाक्यार्थो लक्ष्य एवेति ये विदुः ।
भाट्टास्तेऽपीत्थमेवाहुर्लक्षणाया ग्रहे गतिम् ॥६५॥ (७)

भाट्टा इति तदनुयायिनां **वाचस्पतिकल्पतरु**प्रभृतीनामुपलक्षणम् । स्पष्टमेतत्[३१] । ननूक्तपक्षद्वयमनुपपन्नमुत्पत्तेरभिव्यक्तेर्वैकदाऽसंभवेन वर्णसमूहरूपपदज्ञानासंभवात् । तथा च सुतरां तत्समूहरूपवाक्यार्थज्ञानासंभव इति चेन्न । उत्तरवर्णप्रत्यक्षसमयेऽव्यवहितोत्तरत्वसंबन्धेनोपस्थितपूर्ववर्णवत्त्वं तथा[३२] तदुत्तरप्रत्यक्षकाल उपस्थितविशिष्टतद्वर्णवत्त्वं तस्मिन् सुग्रहमिति तादृशानुपूर्वीघटितपदत्वस्येव वाक्यत्वस्यापि सुग्रहत्वात् ॥ ६५ ॥ (७)

इदानीमखण्डपक्षमाह—

पदे न वर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा न च ।
वाक्यात् पदानामत्यन्तं प्रविवेको न कश्चन ॥६६॥ (८)

पदे पचतीत्यादौ न **वर्णाः** नातो वर्णसमूहः पदमिति शेषः[३३] । दृष्टान्तव्याजेनाह **वर्णेष्विति** । एकारौकारलकारऋकारादिवर्णेष्ववयवाः प्रतीयमाना अपि यथा नेत्यर्थः । क्वचिदिवेत्येव[३४] पाठः । एवं वाक्येऽप्याह—

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३१. स्फुटमेतत् । A.
३२. तत्तथा च तदुत्तर° D_1.
३३. भावः D; D_2.
३४. क्वचिदित्येव पाठः D_1, Com.

वाक्यादिति । पदानामपि वाक्याद्विवेको भेदो नास्तीत्यर्थः । अयं भावः– वाक्यं पदं वाखण्डमेव न तु वर्णसमूहः । अनन्तवर्णकल्पने मानाभावात् । तत्तद्वर्णोत्पादकत्वेनाभिमतवायुसंयोगनिष्ठं तत्तद्वर्णजनकताया व्यञ्जकताया वावच्छेदकं वैजात्यमादायैव ककारो गकार इत्यादिप्रतीतिवैलक्षण्यसंभवात् । स्पष्टं हि **भामत्याम्** '**तारत्वादि वायुनिष्ठं वर्णेष्वारोप्यते**' (१.३.२८) इत्युक्तं देवताधिकरणे । न चैवं वायुसंयोग एव वाचकोऽपि किं न स्यादिति वाच्यम् । प्रत्यक्षोपलभ्यमानककारादेरेव वाचकत्वस्यानुभवसिद्धत्वात् । तथा च वाचकत्वान्यथानुपपत्त्या तदेवेदं वाक्यं सोऽयं गकार इति प्रतीत्या च स्फोटोऽखण्डः सिध्यति । एतेन गौरित्यादौ गकारौकारविसर्गादिव्यतिरेकेण स्फोटाननुभवाच्छ्रूयमाणवर्णानामेव वाचकत्वमस्त्वित्यपास्तम् । तेषां स्फोटातिरिक्तत्वाभावात् ।

यत्तु वर्णानां प्रत्येकं वाचकत्वे प्रत्येकादर्थबोधापत्तिः । समुदायस्य[३५] तु क्रमवतामाशुतरोत्पन्नानां तथैवाभिव्यक्तानां वा ज्ञानम् असंभव्येव। पूर्वपूर्ववर्णानुभवसंस्कारसहकारेणैकदा समूहालम्बनरूपसकलज्ञानसंभवस्तु सरो - रसो - जरा-राज - नदी - दीना - दिसाधारण इत्यतिप्रसङ्ग इति स्फोट एवाखण्डो नादाभिव्यङ्ग्यो वाचक इति **कैयट**ः । तत्तुच्छम् । पदज्ञानसंभवस्योपपादितत्वाद्वर्णानां प्रत्येकं व्यञ्जकत्वं समुदितानां वेत्यादिविकल्पग्रासाच्च[३६] । ननु त्वन्मतेऽप्येष दोषः, तत्तद्वर्णोत्पादकत्वे-

३५. °मसंभाव्यमेव P, A, D.
३६. वैति विकल्प° D_2.

नाभिमतवायुसंयोगानां प्रत्येकं व्यञ्जकत्वं समुदितानां वेति विकल्पगण-संभवादिति चेदुच्यते । प्रत्येकमेव संयोगा अभिव्यञ्जकाः । परं तु केचिद् गत्वेन केचिदौत्वेन केचिद्विसर्गत्वेनेत्यनेकैः प्रकारैः । अत एव वर्णानां तदतिरेकास्वीकारोऽप्युपपद्यते । एवं चाव्यवहितोत्तरत्वसंबन्धेन घवत्त्वं टकारे गृह्यते । एतादृशपदज्ञानकारणताया अविवादात् । परं त्वव्यवहितो- 5
त्तरत्वं स्वज्ञानाधिकरणक्षणोत्पत्तिकज्ञानविषयत्वं वाच्यम् । अत एव
घज्ञानानन्तरटज्ञानविषयत्वरूपानुपूर्वीत्यादिर्नैयायिकवृद्धानां व्यवहारः ।
एवं च न कश्चिद्दोषः । एतेन पर्यायस्थलेष्वेक एव स्फोटो नाना वा ।
नाद्यः । घटपदे गृहीतशक्तिकस्य कलशपदाद्बोधप्रसङ्गात् । न च
तत्पर्यायाभिव्यक्ते शक्तिग्रहस्तत्पर्यायश्रवणेऽर्थधीहेतुरिति वाच्यम् । एवं 10
सति प्रतिपर्यायं शक्तिग्रहावश्यंभावेन तत्तत्पर्यायगतशक्तिग्रहहेतुताया
उचितत्वात् । तथा सति शक्तिग्रहत्वेनैव हेतुत्वे लाघवाच्च । अन्यथा
तत्पर्यायाभिव्यक्तगतशक्तिग्रहत्वेन तत्त्वे गौरवात् । न द्वितीयः । अनन्त-
पदार्थानां तेषां शक्तिं चापेक्ष्य कल्पितवर्णेष्वेव शक्तिकल्पनस्य लघुत्वादिति
परिमलोक्तमपास्तम् । पर्यायेष्वनेकशक्तिस्वीकारस्य सर्वसिद्धत्वात्तदव- 15
च्छेदकानुपूर्व्याः प्रागुपपादनादिति दिक् । शब्दकौस्तुभे तु वर्णमालायां
पदमिति प्रतीतेर्वर्णातिरिक्त एव स्फोटोऽन्यथा कपालातिरिक्तघटासिद्धि-
प्रसङ्गश्चेति प्रतिपादितम् ॥ ६६ ॥ (८)

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३७. पटज्ञानानन्तरज्ञान° D_2.

नव्वेवं शास्त्राप्रामाण्यप्रसङ्गः पदस्याखण्डत्वात् । शास्त्रस्य च प्रकृतिप्रत्ययाभ्यां पदव्युत्पादनमात्रार्थत्वादित्याशङ्कां समाधत्ते–

पञ्चकोशादिवत्तस्मात् कल्पनैषा समाश्रिता ।

उपेयप्रतिपत्त्यर्था उपाया अव्यवस्थिताः ॥६७॥ (९)

उपेयप्रतिपत्यर्था इत्यन्तेनान्वयः । अयं भावः । यथा भृगुवल्ल्या[३८]- 5
मन्नप्राणमनोविज्ञानानन्दात्मककोशपञ्चक[३९]व्युत्पादनं शुद्धब्रह्मबोधाय[४०] यथा[४१] वानन्दवल्ल्यां कोशपञ्चकव्युत्पादनं वास्तवपुच्छब्रह्मबोधनाय एवं प्रकृतिप्रत्ययादिव्युत्पादनं वास्तवस्फोटव्युत्पादनाय एवेति । ननु प्रत्यक्षस्य स्फोटस्य श्रवणादितोऽपि बोधसंभवान्न शास्त्रं तदुपाय इत्यत आह– **उपाया** इति । उपायस्योपायान्तरादूषकत्वात्। तथा च व्याकरणाभ्यास- 10

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३८. भृगुवल्ल्याम् 'भृगुर्वै वारुणिर्वरुणं ब्रह्म पृष्टवान्। स उवाचान्नम्' इति तस्योत्पत्त्यादिकं बुद्ध्वा पृष्टे प्राणमनोविज्ञानानन्दात्मकपञ्चकोशोपदेशोत्तरं 'ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा' इति ज्ञेयं ब्रह्म प्रतिपादितम्। तच्च कोशपञ्चकव्युत्पादनं शुद्धब्रह्मबोधनाय यथा वानन्दवल्लीस्थपञ्चकोशव्युत्पादनं वास्तवशुद्धब्रह्मबोधनाय यथानन्दवल्ल्याम् अन्नप्राणमनोविज्ञानानन्दमयात्मककोशपञ्चकव्युत्पादनं वास्तवपुच्छब्रह्मबोधनाय एवं प्रकृति° P.
D_1 has यथानन्दवल्ल्यामन्नप्राणमनोविज्ञानानन्दमयात्मकपञ्चकोशव्युत्पादनं वास्तवपुच्छब्रह्मबोधनाय यथा वा भृगुवल्ल्यां कोशपञ्चकव्युत्पादनं शुद्धब्रह्मबोधनाय एवं etc.

३९. पञ्चकोशव्युत्पादनम् D_2.

४०. °बोधनाय A, D_2.

४१. यथा वानन्दवल्ल्यामन्नप्राणमनोविज्ञानानन्दमयात्मकपञ्चकोशव्युत्पादनं etc. D.

जन्यज्ञाने वैजात्यं कल्प्यते मन्त्रजन्यमिवार्थस्मरण वेदान्तजन्यमिव ब्रह्मज्ञाने तस्य च ज्ञानस्य यज्ञादीनामन्तःकरणशुद्धाविव शरीरादिशुद्धौ उपयोगः साक्षात् परम्परया वा स्वर्गमोक्षादिहेतुत्वं च । तदुक्तं **वाक्यपदीये–**

तद् द्वारमपवर्गस्य वाङ्मलानां चिकित्सितम् ।
पवित्रं सर्वविद्यानामधिविद्यं प्रकाशते[४२] ॥ १.१४
इदमाद्यं पदस्थानं सिद्धिसोपानपर्वणाम् ।
इयं सा मोक्षमार्गाणामजिह्मा राजपद्धतिः ॥ १.१६
अत्रातीतविपर्यासः केवलामनुपश्यति ॥ १.१७ (अ ब)

इति । न चालीकया प्रकृतिप्रत्ययकल्पनया कथं वास्तवस्फोटबोधः । तस्य अलीकत्वासिद्धेर्वक्ष्यमाणत्वात् । एवं रेखागवयन्याय आदिना गृह्यते ॥ ५७ ॥ (९)

ननु स्फोटस्य वर्णजातीनां[४३] च नित्यतया ककार उत्पन्न इति न स्यात् । वायुसंयोगनिष्ठजातेः स्फोटे भाने कादिप्रतीतीनां भ्रमत्वापत्तिश्चेत्यत आह–

कल्पितानामुपाधित्वं स्वीकृतं हि परैरपि ।
स्वरदैर्घ्याद्यपि ह्यन्ये वर्णेभ्योऽन्यस्य मन्वते ॥ ६८ ॥ (१०)

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४२. प्रकाश्यते A.
४३. वर्णजातीयानां P, A, D, D_1.

स्वीकारस्थलमाह–**स्वरदैर्घ्याद्यपी**ति । आदिनोत्पत्तिविनाशादिसंग्रहः । उदात्तत्वादि न वर्णनिष्ठं तस्यैकत्वान्नित्यत्वाच्च । तच्च स एवायमिति प्रत्यभिज्ञानात् । न च गत्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकभेदाभावस्तद्विषयः । व्यक्त्यंशाभेदस्यापि भासमानस्य विना बाधकं त्यागायोगात् । न च उत्पत्तिप्रतीतिर्बाधिका । प्रागसत्त्वे सति **सत्त्व**रूपाया उत्पत्तेर्वर्णेष्वनुभव- 5
विरुद्धत्वात् । अत एव वर्णमुच्चारयतीति प्रत्ययो **न** तूत्पादयतीति प्रत्ययो व्यवहारश्च। उच्चरितत्वं[४४] च तालोष्ठसंयोगादिजन्याभिव्यक्तिविशिष्टत्वम्। किं च व्यञ्जकध्वनिनिष्ठोत्पत्त्यादेः परम्परया वर्णनिष्ठत्वेनाप्युपपत्तेर्न सा अतिरिक्तवर्णसाधिका परम्परया वर्णनिष्ठत्वाभ्युपगमाच्च न भ्रमत्वम् । साक्षात्संबन्धांशे भ्रम इत्यवशिष्यते । तदपि सोऽयमित्यत्र 10
व्यक्त्यभेदांशे तव भ्रमत्ववत्तुल्यम् । परं तु ममातिरिक्तवर्णतत्प्रागभाव-ध्वंसकल्पना नेति लाघवमतिरिच्यते । न च वर्णस्थले ध्वनिसत्त्वे मानाभावः । तदुत्पादकशङ्खाद्यभावेन तदसंभवश्चेति वाच्यम् । ककाराद्युच्चारणस्थले तत्तत्स्थानस्य जिह्वाया ईषदन्तरपाते वर्णानुत्पत्तेर्ध्वन्युत्पत्तेश्च[४५] दर्शनाज्जिह्वाभिघातजवायुकण्ठसंयोगादेः ध्वनिजनकत्वकल्प- 15
नात् । तस्य च वर्णोत्पत्तिस्थलेऽपि सत्त्वात्तवैव प्रतिबन्ध्यप्रतिबन्धक-

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४४. **उच्चारितत्वं** D.
४५. **वर्णानुपपत्ते**° D_2.

भावकल्पना निष्प्रामाणिकी[४६] स्यादिति गौरवं[४७] विपरीतम् । एवं परस्पर-विरोधादुदात्तत्वानुदात्तत्वह्रस्वत्वदीर्घत्वादिकमपि न वर्णनिष्ठं युक्तमिति तेषामभिप्रायः । एवं चोत्पत्त्यादिप्रतीतीनां तत्प्रमात्वस्य च निर्वाहः परेषामपि समान इति प्रतिबन्द्येवोत्तरमिति भावः ॥ ६८ ॥ १०

इत्थं पञ्चव्यक्तिस्फोटाः ॥ 5

जातिस्फोटमाह–

शक्यत्व इव शक्तत्वे जातेर्लाघवमीक्ष्यताम् ।
औपाधिको वा भेदोऽस्तु वर्णानां तारमन्दवत् ॥६९ ॥ (११)

अयं भावः—वर्णास्तावदावश्यकाः । उक्तरीत्या सोऽयं गकार इतिवद्योऽयं गकारः[४८][४९] श्रुतः सोऽयं हकार इत्यपि स्यात्; स्फोटस्यैकत्वात्। 10 गकारोऽयं न हकार इत्यनापत्तेश्च । किं च स्फोटे गत्वाद्यभ्युपेयं न वा । आद्ये तदेव[५०] गकारोऽस्तु । वर्णनित्यतावादिभिरतिरिक्तगत्वानङ्गीकारात्। तथा चातिरिक्तस्फोटकल्पन एव गौरवम् । अन्त्ये गकारादिप्रतीति-विरोधः। वायुसंयोगवृत्ति ध्वनिवृत्ति वा वैजात्यमारोप्य तथा प्रत्यय इति

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४६. निष्प्रमाणिकी or का P; निष्प्रमाणिकी A, D_1; निष्प्रामाणिकी D_3.
४७. विपरीतं गौरवम् P.
४८. इति योऽयम् A.
४९. गकार इति श्रुतः P.
५०. स एव P.

चेन्न । प्रतीतेर्विना बाधकं भ्रमत्वासंभवात् । अस्तु वा वायुसंयोग एव गकारोऽपि । तस्यातीन्द्रियत्वं दोष इति चेद्धर्मवदुपपत्तेः इति कृतं स्फोटेन । तस्मात्सन्त्येव वर्णाः परं तु न वाचका गौरवात् । आकृत्यधिकरणन्यायेन जातेरेव वाच्यत्ववद्वाचकत्वस्यापि युक्तत्वाच्च । इदं हरिपदमित्यनुगतप्रतीत्या हर्युपस्थितित्वावच्छेदेन हरिपदज्ञानत्वेन हेतुत्वात्तदवच्छेदकतया च जातिविशेषस्यावश्यकल्प्यत्वात् । न च वर्णानुपूर्व्यैव प्रतीत्यवच्छेदकत्वयोर्निर्वाहः । घटघटत्वादेरपि संयोगविशेषविशिष्टमृदाकारादिभिः चान्यथासिद्धचापत्तेः[५१] । तस्मात्सा जातिरेव वाचिका तादात्म्येन तदवच्छेदिका चेति । ननु सरो रस इत्यादौ तयोर्जात्योः सत्त्वादर्थभेदबोधो न स्यादित्यत आह–**औपाधिको** वेति । **वा** त्वर्थे । उपाधिरानुपूर्वी सैव **जाति**विशेषाभिव्यञ्जकेति भेदः कारणीभूतज्ञानस्येति नातिप्रसङ्ग इति भावः । उपाधिप्रयुक्तज्ञानवैलक्षण्ये दृष्टान्तमाह–**वर्णानामिति** ॥ ६९ ॥ (११)

ननु जातेः प्रत्येकं वर्णेष्वपि सत्त्वात् प्रत्येकादर्थबोधः स्यादित्यत आह–

अनेकव्यक्त्यभिव्यङ्ग्या जातिः स्फोट इति स्मृता ।
कैश्चिद्व्यक्तय एवास्या ध्वनित्वेन प्रकल्पिताः ॥७०॥ (१२)

अनेकाभिर्वर्णव्यक्तिभिरभिव्यक्तैव जातिः स्फोट इति स्मृता । योगार्थतया बोधिकेति यावत् । एतेन स्फोटस्य नित्यत्वात्सर्वदार्थबोधा-

५१. °सिद्धापत्तेः A.

पत्तिरित्यपास्तम् । अयं भावः—यद्यपि वर्णस्फोटपक्षे कथितदोषोऽस्ति तथापि पदवाक्यपक्षयोर्न तत्र तस्या व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वस्य धर्मिग्राहकमानसिद्धत्वादिति **कैश्चिद्व्यक्तयो** ध्वनय एव ध्वनिवर्णयोर्भेदाभावादभ्युपेयन्त इति शेषार्थः[५२] । उक्तं हि **काव्यप्रकाशे**—'**बुधैर्वैयाकरणैः प्रधानीभूतस्फोट-व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकस्य[५३] शब्दस्य ध्वनिरिति व्यवहारः कृतः**' इति ॥ ७० ॥ (१२).

ननु का सा जातिस्तत्राह—

सत्यासत्यौ तु यौ भागौ प्रतिभावं व्यवस्थितौ ।
सत्यं यत्तत्र सा जातिरसत्या व्यक्तयो मताः ॥७१॥ (१३)

प्रतिभावं प्रतिपदार्थं सत्यांशो जातिरसत्या व्यक्तयः तत्तद्व्यक्तिविशिष्टं[५४] ब्रह्मैव जातिरिति भावः । उक्तं च '**कैयटेन—असत्योपाध्यवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं द्रव्यशब्दवाच्यमित्यर्थः**' इति । '**ब्रह्मतत्त्वमेव शब्दस्वरूपतया भाति**' इति च । कथं तर्हि ब्रह्मदर्शने गोत्वादिजातेरप्यसत्त्वादनित्यत्वम् । '**आत्मैवेदं सर्वम्**' इति श्रुतिवचनादिति **कैयटः** संगच्छताम् । अविद्याविद्यको धर्मविशेषो वेति पक्षान्तरमादायेति द्रष्टव्यम् ॥ ६१ ॥ (१३)

तदेव सत्यांशं स्पष्टयति—

इत्थं निष्कृष्यमाणं यच्छब्दतत्त्वं निरञ्जनम् ।
ब्रह्मैवेत्यक्षरं प्राहुस्तस्मै पूर्णात्मने नमः ॥७२॥ (१४)

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५२. शेषार्थः A.
५३. P, D, D_1 and Com. drop व्यङ्ग्य
५४. विशिष्टं D, D_3, Com.

अयं[५५] भावः—'**नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि**' इति श्रुतिसिद्धा द्वयी सृष्टिस्तत्र रूपस्येव नाम्नोऽपि तदेव तत्त्वम् । प्रक्रियांशस्त्वविद्याविजृम्भणमात्रम् । उक्तं च **वाक्यपदीये**—

शास्त्रेषु प्रक्रियाभेदैरविद्यैवोपवर्ण्यते । ३.१४.७८ (अ ब)
समारम्भस्तु भावानामनादि ब्रह्म शाश्वतम् ॥ २.२३७ (कड) 5

इति । ब्रह्मवैत्यनेन '**अत्रायं पुरुषः स्वयंज्योतिः**' '**तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सर्वम्**' '**तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति**' इति श्रुतिसिद्धं स्वपरप्रकाशकत्वं सूचयन् स्फुटत्यर्थोऽस्मादिति[५६] स्फोट इति यौगिकं[५७] स्फोटशब्दाभिधेयत्वं सूचयति । निर्विघ्नप्रचयान्ते मङ्गलं स्तुतिनतिरूपमाह[५८]—**पूर्णात्मन** इत्या- 10
दिना ॥ ७२ ॥ (१४).

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५५. P. has at the end of the last *Kārikā* (इति भट्टोजिदीक्षितविरचितकारिकासु पदादिस्फोटनिरूपणम् । समाप्तः स्फोटवादः)—इति भट्टोजिदीक्षितविरचितवैयाकरणसिद्धान्तकारिकाः समाप्ताः)

५६. यत्स्फुटत्यर्थो° A.

५७. यौगिकस्फोट° D_2.

५८. °नुति° for °नति° P, A, D_3.

अशेषफलदातारमपि[५९] सर्वेश्वरं[६०] गुरुम् ।
श्रीमद्भूषणसारेण[६१] भूषये शेषभूषणम् ॥

इति श्रीमत्पदवाक्यप्रमाणपारावारीण[६२]धुरीण[६३]रङ्गोजिभट्टात्मजकोण्ड[६४]भट्ट[६५]कृते
वैयाकरणभूषणसारे[६६] स्फोटवादः
समाप्तो[६७] ग्रन्थश्च[६८] ॥ 5

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५९. °भूषा° for °फल° A, D_3.
६०. विश्वेश्वरं A, D_3.
६१. P. has after this verse: इति रङ्गोजिभट्टात्मजकौण्डभट्टविरचिते वैयाकरणभूषणसारे स्फोटवादे पदादिस्फोटनिरूपणं समाप्तम् । समाप्तश्च स्फोटवादः ।
६२. °पारावारपारीण° D.
६३. °वारीण° P.
६४. कौण्ड° P, D_1.
६५. °विरचितो P, °विरचिते D.
६६. °सारः P.
३७. समाप्तः P; समाप्तोऽयं ग्रन्थश्च D_1.
६८. D_2 has after ग्रन्थः—श्लोकसंख्या १३७५; D has शुभमस्तु after ग्रन्थश्च.

TRANSLATION AND NOTES

95, 1-3

TR.*: (The author of the *kārikā*) states the essential features of the settled doctrine (of the *sphoṭa* in the following *kārikā*).

(*Kārikā 59*). The sentence-*sphoṭa* represents the very essence (of the *sphoṭa* doctrine). This is the established view (of the grammarians). In the correct forms, the constituents (*antargatāḥ*) are conveyors of meaning and not (the prototypes) which are (artificially) called to mind on account of them (substitutes).

NOTES: The first half of the verse means that, although the eight[1] varieties of the *sphoṭa* are accepted by the grammarians, it is the sentence-*sphoṭa* alone which represents the essential nature of the *sphoṭa* doctrine. To the grammarians,[2] the *vākyasphoṭa* remains as the only right view, because it is only the sentence which conveys the meaning in the process of communication. However, the word-*sphoṭa* and the phoneme-*sphoṭa* cannot be easily ruled out as meaningless units. They have practical utility for the description of linguistic structure. Both the word-*sphoṭa* and the phoneme-*sphoṭa* function from the point of view of practical utility, since the former assumes that words are meaning-bearing constituents of the sentence, while the latter assumes that stems and suffixes form the meaning-bearing constituents of the word.

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* The numerals above "TR" refer to the page and line number of the Sanskrit text. "TR" is the abbreviation of "Translation".

1. The classification of the *sphoṭa* into eight varieties will be made clear in the annotational discussion on the verses. See also *Intro.* pp. 73-85.
2. *Śabdakaustubha* (Chowkamba) p. 9:
   यद्यपीहाष्टौ पक्षा उक्तास्तथापि वाक्यस्फोटपक्षे तात्पर्यं ग्रन्थकृताम् ।

The second half of the *kārikā* describes the theory of the phoneme-*sphoṭa* in which a phoneme or phonemes, constituting either a stem or a suffix, are regarded as denotative of sense. According to the phoneme-*sphoṭa,* the forms *rāmaḥ* and *pacati* can be described as composite forms consisting of two or more morphemes. In the form *rāma-ḥ, rāma-* is a stem morpheme and the *visarga* is a case morpheme. Similarly, the verbal form *pac-a-ti* consists of three simple morphemes: i) the verbal root *pac-,* ii) the empty morpheme *-a-* (i.e *vikaraṇa*) and iii) the present tense termination *- ti.* For further explanation see Intro. pp. 74-75.

It can be pointed out in this connection that there exists a controversy[3] between the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas on the question whether the *sthānin* (prototype) or the *ādeśa* (substitute) is endowed with the denotative function. The former maintain that the substitute is endowed with the denotative function but not the prototype. The grammarians argue that, when a man hears the forms *pacati* and *rāmaḥ,* the verbal suffix *-ti* and the case termination *-ḥ* actually produce a certain apprehension in the hearer's mind. But Pāṇ. finds it convenient to give a single name for the finite suffixes of moods and tenses. Thus all the finite suffixes are symbolized by *-l-* and every nominative singular is symbolized by *-su.* The symbols *-l-* and *-su* are called *sthānins* (prototypes) and actual finite suffixes *-mi, -si, -ti* etc. and *-ḥ* etc. are the

3. *Vyutpattivāda, Lakārārthanirṇaya,* p. 54:
अत्र केचित्, तिबादिस्थानिनो लकारस्यैव लत्वजातिपुरस्कारेण कृतिवाचकता। पचतीत्यादौ लकारश्रवणेऽप्यादेशेन तिबादिना स्थानिनः स्मरणात्तत एवार्थोपस्थितिः। आदेशादेशिभावमविदुषां तु तिप्त्वादिना शक्तिभ्रमादेवार्थोपस्थितिः।

substitutes. But it must be remembered that the prototype is a grammatical fiction. It is always replaced by the substitute. On this ground the grammarians maintain that it is the substitute which is the meaning-bearing unit in the language and not the prototypes which are fictional units, as they are not actually used in the object language.

95, 4-13

TR.: Although the eight varieties of *sphoṭa* – phoneme-*sphoṭa*, word-*sphoṭa*, sentence-*sphoṭa* (which belong to the types of the particular or *vyakti-sphoṭa*), indivisible-sentence-*sphoṭa* and indivisible-word-*sphoṭa* and the types of the universal-*sphoṭa*, viz. phoneme-universal-*sphoṭa* (*varṇajātisphoṭa*), word-universal-*sphoṭa* (*padajātisphoṭa*) and the sentence-universal-*sphoṭa* (*vākyajātisphoṭa*) based upon the distinction of phonemes, words, and sentences — are established as settled doctrines and, consequently, the term *vākya* (in the verse) is meaningless and misleading, still the purpose of mentioning it (i.e. *vākya*) is to show that all the varieties of *sphoṭa* with the exception of the sentence-*sphoṭa* are unreal. This is suggested (by the author of the verse) in (the phrase), "the very essence etc." (The phrase) "the established view" (of course) refers to the view of the grammarians, the author of the *Mahābhāṣya* and others.

Now (the author of the verse intending to introduce all the varieties of *sphoṭa*) in order, first describes the phoneme-*sphoṭa* by the (use of the) phrase, "in the correct forms etc". There is a difference of opinion (between N. and V.) as to whether the (fictional) constituents (i.e. prototypes) of the correct forms are or are not conveyors of meaning. (In this

respect) a positive view is held by others[4] (i.e. Naiyāyikas); but the grammarians deny it (i.e. a denotative function to the prototypes). (The passage means that) in the correct forms *rāmaḥ* and *pacati,* etc., used in the language, only the constituents viz. *visarga, tip,* etc. are denotative of meaning, because it has been previously established that only these (i.e. constituents, *tip, ḥ,* etc.) are denotative and not (the prototypes) *-l-* etc. and *-su* etc. which are (fictional and) remembered on account of them (i.e. the actually used constituents *visarga* and *-ti*).

NOTES: The commentary *Darpaṇa* explains the word *sādhuśabdāntargatāḥ* as *sādhuśabdāntargatavarṇasmāritāḥ*: 'constituents of correct words' means (the prototypes i.e. *sthānins*) which are called to mind on account of the (actually used) constituent phonemes. If the text *sādhuśabdāntargatāḥ* is literally interpreted, it would be inconsistent with the view expressed in the following sentence of the text *vidhikoṭir anyeṣāṁ neti vaiyākaraṇānām.* As a matter of fact, the Naiyāyikas do not hold that the constituents (i.e. the substitutes) of the correct forms are denotative; and even the grammarians do not deny it. On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas maintain that the prototypes are denotative which forces the commentators to explain the word *sādhuśabdāntargatāḥ* to refer to the prototypes by the phrase *sādhuśabdāntargatavarṇasmāritāḥ.*

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4. *Darpaṇa,* p. 390:

अन्येषां नैयायिकानाम् । तैः 'ल कर्मणि' (III.iv.69) 'स्वौजसमौट्' (IV.i.2) इत्यादिविहितप्रत्ययानामेव वाचकत्वं, तिब्विसर्गादीनां त्वादेशस्मृतिद्वारा बोधकत्वमेव लिपिवदित्यभ्युपगमात् ।

96, 1-7

TR.: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 60). Some[5] (i.e. the Naiyāyikas) maintain: the suffixes—*tip* etc. which are actual constituents of linguistic expression are not denotative of meaning, (firstly, such an assumption i.e. assigning the denotative function to the substitutes) would lead to the (postulation of) multiplicity of denotative functions, because they (substitutes) are numerous and (secondly) because, in such examples as *edhāñcakre*: 'He increased', *brahma*: 'Supreme reality' etc., the *luks* (types of zero morphemes) which are (technically) regarded as (having the nature of) substitutes cannot possibly be viewed as denotative, as they are of the nature of non-existence. On the other hand, suffixes *-l-, -su,* etc., which are called to mind (on account of substitutes), are denotative of meaning. For, it is but proper to hold that *latva,* which is of the nature of the (common) attribute (belonging to all the verbal terminations), is the determining factor of denotativeness, and also, because (the prototypes *-l-* etc.) are constant (*avyabhicarita*) elements; (whereas) the substitutes, being different from one another, are mutually inconsistent (*parasparavyabhicarita*). (Moreover) the rules *laḥ karmaṇi* etc. (III. iv. 69) stand in favour (of our view). Nor do we (the Naiyāyikas) find any authoritative text (which can be cited) to prove the denotativity of substitutes. (In the following *kārikā* the author) refutes them (i.e. the views of the Naiyāyikas) with logical arguments which would strengthen his (the author's) own view.

NOTES: The Naiyāyikas[6] strongly criticise the view of the grammarians that the substitutes are endowed with denotative

5. *Darpaṇa*, p. 391: नैयायिकमतं दूषयितुमुपन्यस्यति ये त्विति ।
6. G. N. BHATTACARYA, "A study in the Dialectics of *sphoṭa*", *J. Dept. lett.*, pp. 91 ff. See also K. KUNJUNNI RAJA, *Indian Theories of Meaning*, p. 139.

function. They argue that it is more reasonable and economical to maintain that the prototype is denotative of meaning than to assign the denotative power to the suffixes which are actually used. As compared to the prototype *-l-*, which stands for all the verb terminations, the substitutes *-ti, -tas, -anti* etc. are numerous. If denotative function is assigned to the substitutes, it would lead to assumption of endless denotative functions, since the grammarians will have to make numerous statements: "the suffix *-ti* of the present indicative denotes the sense agent", "the suffix *tas* of the present indicative denotes the sense agent" and so on. On the other hand, if it is considered that a prototype is denotative of meaning, the statement: "the suffix *-l-* is denotative of agent", would be sufficient. Similarly, the Naiyāyikas argue that the grammarians' view would lead to the violation (*vyabhicāra*)[7] of the cause and effect relation between the notion of the agent (which is considered the effect) and presentment of the particular suffix (which is considered the cause of the apprehension of notion of agent). To explain more fully, the Naiyāyikas argue that denotative function is not assigned to the suffix *-ti* to convey the notion of the agent, because, when we understand the notion of the agent from the

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7. *Śāṁkarī*, p. 461:

पचति रामः इत्यादिपरिनिष्ठितप्रयोगे श्रूयमाणानां तिब्विसर्गाद्यादेशानां वाचकत्वे सति तेषां तिप्तसाद्यादेशानां भिन्नतया—तिबादेशापेक्षया तसादेशो भिन्नः तसादेशापेक्षया च तिबादेशो भिन्न इति तिप्प्रतियोगिकभेदवांस्तस् तस्प्रतियोगिकभेदवांश्च तिबित्येवं परस्परप्रतियोगिकभेदादनेकतया—कर्त्राद्यर्थज्ञानं प्रति तदर्थकतिबादेशज्ञानं तथा तदर्थकतसादेशज्ञानं च कारणमिति वक्तव्यम्। तत्र भवति, भवतः इत्युभयत्रापि कर्त्राद्यर्थज्ञानसत्त्वेऽपि भवतीत्यत्र कर्त्रर्थज्ञानकारणीभूततसादेशज्ञानं नास्ति भवत इत्यत्र च तादृशज्ञानकारणीभूततिबादेशज्ञानं नास्तीति कार्यसत्त्वेऽपि कारणाभावाद् व्यतिरेकव्यभिचारः स्पष्ट एवेति भावः।

substitutes *-tas* etc. also, we understand it without its stated cause (i.e. the suffix *-ti*). Thus the first statement: "to understand the notion of the agent the necessary cause is the usage of the suffix *-ti* of the present indicative" is violated. In other words, the distinctive causes for the understanding of the notion of the agent will be numerous in the grammarians' view. But the Naiyāyikas may state that the common attribute *latva,* which belongs to all the verb-terminations, determines the nature of the notion of the agent.

In addition to the arguments mentioned above, the Naiyāyikas point out that the grammarians will have to admit that in the examples, *edhāñcakṛe, brahma,* etc., the substitutes *luk* and *lopa* are endowed with denotative function. This is an *argumentum ad absurdum,* because the substitutes *luk* and *lopa* are of the nature of non-existence[8] (*abhāva*); and it is a matter of common sense to admit that what does not exist cannot be said to possess any meaning. The grammatical process of the derivation of the forms *edhāñcakṛe* and *brahma* is as follows:

i) *edh* + *ām* + *liṭ* (III. ii. 115, III. i. 36)
=*edh* + *ām* + *o* (*luk;* II. iv. 81)
=*edh* + *ām* + *kṛ* + *liṭ* (III. i. 40)
=*edh* + *ām* + *cakre*
=*edhāñcakṛe* (perfect. 3rd P, Sg.)

ii) *brahman* + *su* (I. ii. 45; IV. i. 2)
=*brahman* + *o* (*luk;* VII. i. 23)
=*brahma* (VIII. ii. 7, nom. sg.)

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8. *Parīkṣā*, pp. 391-92:
असंभवाच्चेति । श्रूयमाणादेशा एव वाचका इति भवत्संमतम् । तथा च प्रकृते आदेशानामश्रवणेनार्थबोधो न स्यादिति भावः । यद्यप्येधाञ्चक्रे इत्यादावप्रयुज्यमानानामादेशानां संभवति तथापि ब्रह्मेत्यादौ असंभव एव इत्याशयेन द्वितीयोपादानम ।

Further, the Naiyāyikas argue that in the rule III. iv. 69, a reference is made to the *sthānin* and not to the substitute. The rule *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ* (III. iv. 69) means: "the *-l-* suffixes are used in the sense of object (and of agent), and, after the roots of intransitive action, in the sense of impersonal action (and agent)".

96, 8-10

TR.: (*Kārikā* 60): (The substitutes are denotative of meaning) on account of their invariable nature, their usage and also the maxim: "when that alone can be the cause (sufficient to produce the effect), why think of another (cause)"? Moreover, if the *tiṅ* suffixes, and *śatṛ* as well as others (i.e. the present participial suffixes) make us remember the *laṭ* only, then consider as to why there exists (the distinction between) the denotation of the agent (by the *kṛt* suffixes) and the non-denotation of the agent (by the *tiṅ* suffixes).

NOTES: The verse brings out the grammarians' answer to the objection levelled against them by the Naiyāyikas. If the prototypes like *-l-* suffixes are denotative of meaning, there would arise some ambiguity, since different grammatical schools[9] have chosen different prototypes. We find that the prototypes are variable while the substitutes are of fixed character. For, the prototype, which is to be remembered by the

9. *Śāṁkarī*, p. 463:
तत्तद्वैयाकरणैरिति । पाणिनिकालापशाकटायनापिशलिप्रभृतिशाब्दिकैरित्यर्थः । भिन्नानामिति । सुः, सिः, रुः, लट्, कट्, अन्यैश्चान्यः कश्चनेत्यादिप्रकारेण भिन्नानां स्वस्वेच्छयोक्तत्वात् । शास्त्रप्रवर्तकाचार्याणां स्वतन्त्रेच्छत्वादिति भावः ।

substitutes such as the *visarga* in *rāmaḥ* etc., differs from one school to another, according to the method followed by the different grammatical systems. A student of the Pāṇinian grammar will take the prototype of *visarga* in *rāmaḥ* as *-su,* while the followers of the Kālāpa system will consider *-si* the prototype of *visarga.* The prototypes for which the *visarga* is substituted are variables such as *-si, -su, -ru,* according to the different methods adopted by the different grammatical systems. In the case of variable prototypes, we do not have any criterion for determining a particular prototype which alone can be taken as endowed with denotative function. This will lead either to a confusion in determining the prototype, or it would involve cumbrousness in admitting that all of the prototypes possess denotative function.

The usage of a word which determines its denotation is yet another reason put forth by the grammarians for maintaining that the substitutes are denotative of meaning. The usage points out that the substitutes are found to be used and heard in communication. They are, therefore, fit to be possessed of denotative function.

Adhering to the accepted maxim: *taddhetor eva ḳāraṇatve ḳiṁ tena*[10]: "when that alone can be the cause (sufficient to produce the effect), why think of another (cause)", the grammarians argue that, if the *-l-* suffixes are endowed with the denotative function, we might understand the meaning from the sequence of a root and a prototype form of a suffix, such as *bhū* + *l,* even if *-l-* is not replaced by any one of the substi-

10. The commentators think that the compound *taddhetu* is the genitive *tatpuruṣa* compound *tasya hetuḥ taddhetuḥ,* whereas my explanation is based on the *ḳarmadhārya* compound *saḥ hetuḥ taddhetuḥ.*

tutes. To obviate this difficulty, the Naiyāyikas say that the meaning cannot be understood until we have heard the utterance *bhavati,* wherein *-ti* is substituted for *-l-*. Thus, the Naiyāyikas admit that both the substitutes and prototypes form the cause of the cognition of denotation. Under these circumstances, the grammarians maintain that instead of assuming that both the substitutes and prototypes are causes for comprehending the meaning, it is simpler and more correct to assume that substitutes possess denotative function.

In other words, if the knowledge of denotative function assigned to the substitutes is enough to understand the meaning from them, the maxim states that it is unnecessary to conceive of both the causes (i.e. *sthānins* and *ādeśas*) for the apprehension of meaning.

Furthermore, the grammarians find another inconsistency in the Naiyāyikas' theory. The latter maintain that the *kṛt* suffixes like *śānac* and *śatṛ* in *pacamānaḥ* and *pacan* which are the substitutes of *-l-*, denote the sense of the agent, while the *tiṅ* suffixes in *pacati, pacataḥ,* which are also the substitutes (III.iv.78) of *-l-*, denote the sense of *kṛti* (effort). But this distinction intended by the Naiyāyikas would go against their own theory that the prototypes are denotative, since both the *tiṅ* and the present participial *kṛt* suffixes have the same prototype, as a result of which, it must denote the same meaning. On the other hand, this distinction intended by the Naiyāyikas can be very well brought out, only if it is admitted that the substitutes are denotative, for according to this theory, the distinction in meaning lies in the distinction of the phonetic characters of the substitutes like *-ti* or *-māna,* although they have the same prototype.

96, 11-16; 97, 1

TR.: The sense (of the verse is as follows): in accordance with the invariable (nature of substitutes), the constituents of usable forms alone are denotative and not (the prototypes) which are ficticiously called to mind (on account of) them. To explain more fully, a man who has no knowledge of *-l-* (suffixes), understands the meaning from *pacati* etc. and, therefore, (*-l-* suffixes) are not denotative. It should not be argued that they (non-grammarians) apprehend the meaning from the *-tiṅ* suffixes (even if they are ignorant of the *-l-* suffixes) through the erroneous knowledge of the denotative function (assigned) to the verbal endings. For there is no valid reason to prove the erroneous nature of it (i.e. the knowledge of denotative function assigned to the *tiṅ* suffixes). (Moreover the Nyāya view appears to be unsound), because the grammarians of different schools accept different prototypes as suited to their subjective thinking; and, accordingly, this (assigning the denotative function to prototypes) would lead to the confusion (*vyavasthānāpatti*) as to which of these prototypes is denotative and which is not. If all the prototypes are assumed to have denotative function, this would involve cumbrousness and violation (of the semantic law). On the other hand, it would be appropriate to maintain that the substitutes are denotative, since they are the constituents of usable forms and are of fixed character, and (thus the grammarians' view) is much simpler, as it does not involve the recollection of prototypes.

NOTES: *Śaṅtibhrama*: The Naiyāyikas hold the view that through erroneous impressions the substitutes are regarded as denotative. But this is wrong, since in all cases of erroneous knowledge mistaken cognition is supplanted by the subsequent

valid knowledge; but the apprehension of meaning from the substitutes is never contradicted by the subsequent experience.

Vyabhicāra[11]: If the prototypes are regarded as denotative, it would lead to the fault of *vyabhicāra;* because the statement,– "to understand the notion of singularity from the nominative symbol *-ḥ,* the knowledge of the prototype *-su* is the necessary cause", – is violated, since from the prototype *-si* accepted by the followers of the Kālāpa system, the notion of singularity is understood, and thus, it cannot be proved that knowledge of *-su,* for the understanding of the notion of singularity from the nominative suffix *-ḥ,* is the necessary cause. (See also notes to the introduction of the verse 60).

Lāghava: The Naiyāyikas claim that to them is given the credit of the economy, by assuming that the prototypes are endowed with denotative function, but not the substitutes which are numerous. The grammarians say that Nyāya theory is also liable to this charge, for, the prototypes are also numerous like *-si, -su* or *-ru,* while the substitute *-ḥ* in the nominative singular is one. Moreover, the grammarians' theory is simpler than that of the Naiyāyikas, because the former do not assume that the prototypes which are fictional have denotative function. For further explanation see notes on page 118.

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11. *Kāśikā,* p. 575:

तथा च यद्भूयादेशानां वाचकत्वपरित्यागस्तौ दोषौ स्थानिनो वाचकत्वपक्षेऽपि दुष्परिहरावेवेत्यर्थः । आदेशानां तिबादीनामाधिक्यात् तत्पक्षापेक्षयात्र पक्षे बहुगौरवमित्यनुशयान आह—तथा चेति ।

तथा च गौरवादिदोषस्य तत्परिहारस्य चोभयोः साम्येऽपि आदेशिस्मरणकल्पनाविरहप्रयुक्तलाघवसहकृतप्रयोगनैयत्यमेवादेशानां वाचकत्वे विनिगमकमिति अखण्डलार्थः ।

97, 1-3

TR.: (The author of the *kārikā*) gives another ground (for establishing that substitutes have denotative function) in the words 'usages' etc. The usage is considered to be the most important of the means through which the denotative function of a word is apprehended; and the usage (is made up of the elements like) the *tiṅ* suffixes etc. alone which are actually heard and hence they (substitutes) alone are considered to be denotative. This is the meaning (of the passage).

NOTES: *Śaktigrāhakeṣu mukhyaḥ*: The denotative function of a word is learnt by a child in various ways of which *vyavahāra* (communication by usage) is considered the most important. The eight ways of learning the denotative function are enumerated by Sanskrit philosophers in the following verse.

śaktigrahaṁ vyākaraṇopamāna-
kośāptavākyād vyavahārataś ca /
vākyasya śeṣād vivṛter vadanti
sāṁnidhyataḥ siddhapadasya vṛddhāḥ //

(*siddhāntamuktāvalī*, *śabdakhaṇḍa*, under the verse 81):

The denotative function of word is apprehended in any one of the following six ways: i) grammar, ii) comparison, iii) dictionary, iv) statement of a trustworthy person, v) usage, vi) context, vii) explanation through a synonymous word, and viii) contiguity of known words.

97, 3-9

TR.: Furthermore, "on account of the maxim: 'when that alone can be the cause (sufficient to produce the effect), why think of another (cause)' etc.". If the *-l-* suffix is denotative,

it would be possible to have the apprehension of a meaning from *bhū* + *l* also. If you maintain that for such an apprehension the sequence of phonemes also (in a particular order) is (considered an additional) cause, then let (such a sequence) alone, which is thus indispensable (for the apprehension of a meaning), have the power of denotation. Otherwise, we shall have to assume both—the denotativeness of the *-l-* suffixes and the causality of the sequence of phonemes (used in the language for apprehension of meaning); accordingly, this would involve cumbrousness. Thus the idea (of the passage is): In the absence of any argument in favour of any one of the two alternatives—viz. whether the sequence of such phonemes (building up the stems and suffixes as used in the language), or the phonemes uttered in a particular order, (are possessed of the denotative power)—, it stands established that the phonemes (constituting the stems and suffixes) used (actually in the language) are denotative.

NOTES: Since no one understands the meaning from *bhū* + *-l-*, the Naiyāyikas are compelled to admit that the particular order of phonemes like *bhav* + *a* + *ti* is also the cause of the knowledge of denotation. But the Naiyāyikas claim that the grammarians are also liable to this charge, because, common people do not understand the sense even from *bhū* + *ti* which is a unit undergoing grammatical operations. Consequently, the grammarians also will have to admit that, in addition to *bhū* + *ti*, the sequence of phonemes like *bhavati* in the finished form is also the cause of the knowledge of denoted meaning, and, thus, to the grammarians either, the credit of economy cannot be given.

Another problem the grammarians must solve in this connection is whether the phonemes in a given sequence are denotative, or a sequence of phonemes is denotative. KB does

not answer the question, but simply says that the grammarians maintain that the suffixes and the stems (in prototype form), while undergoing a grammatical process like *bhū* + *l,* are not denotative; but the substitutes, as constituents of completed form, are denotative. And thus the question of assigning the denotative power to *bhu* + *ti* which is in the form of process does not arise. But the Naiyāyikas cannot hold the opinion that the prototypes as the constituents of completed form are denotative, because prototypes by definition are never used and are always replaced by the substitutes.

Harivallabha,[12] in his commentary, the *Darpaṇa,* holds the view that, if the sequence of phonemes (*varṇasamabhivyāhāra*) be regarded as denotative of meaning, then the delimiting property of denotativeness (*vācakatva*) would reside in the phonemes which are many. On the other hand, if the phonemes, building up the sequence in the form of a stem or a suffix, are regarded as denotative, the delimiting property of denotativeness will reside in the sequence which is a single unit. And thus, he demonstrates that between the two alternatives, the view that phonemes in a given sequence (*samabhivyāhṛtavarṇa*) are denotative, is more reasonable than the other which involves cumbrousness.

97, 9-15

TR: Moreover, if the *-l-* suffixes (i.e. the prototypes) are regarded as denotative, the theory—which you accept as establish-

12. *Darpaṇa,* p. 395:

न च वर्णानां बाहुल्यमेव विनिगमकम् । उक्तानुपूर्व्यास्तदनुगमकत्वात् । किं च समभिव्याहारस्य वाचकत्वे तद्घटकनानावर्णानामवच्छेदकतायां गौरवम् । वर्णानां वाचकत्वे तूक्तानुपूर्व्या एकस्या एव तत्त्वमिति लाघवस्य एव विनिगमकत्वमिति भावः ।

ed viz. "the verb-ending suffixes are denotative of exertion, while the *kṛt* suffixes are denotative of agent",—would not hold good. With this argument in view, (the author of the *kārikā*) says: "moreover etc." The passage means that, if the substitutes are regarded as denotative of meaning, then only the distinction—that the *tiṅ* suffixes are denotative of exertion, whereas the suffixes *māna* etc. (of present participles) are denotative of agent—can be justified.

Nor should it be maintained on the authority of the rule *kartari kṛt* (III. iv. 67) that, in the case of *śānac* (present participle suffix) etc., the exertion (*kṛti*) is the meaning of the (prototype) *-l-* suffix and the substratum (of exertion i.e. agent) is the meaning of *śānac* (substitute). For the expectancy raised (with reference to the meaning of *śānac*) is already satisfied by the meaning of prototypes, and, accordingly, the rule *kartari kṛt* (III. iv. 67) cannot be employed. If this is not admitted, (the rule *kartari kṛt*) would also be applicable in the case of *ghañ* and other suffixes.

NOTES: According to the Naiyāyikas, the *-l-* suffixes denote the sense *kṛti* (exertion). The term *-l-* stands for the verb-ending suffixes, *-ti, -si, -mi* etc., as well as for the participial suffixes *śatṛ, śānac* etc. Thus the prototype *-l-* is common both to the verbs *pacati, pacataḥ* etc. and participles *pacan, pacamānaḥ* etc. At this point, the grammarians object that, if the Naiyāyikas admit that the *-l-* suffix is denotative of *kṛti*, then it would be wrong to maintain that *śatṛ* and *śānac* denote the sense agent (*kartṛ*), while the *tiṅ* suffixes denote *kṛti*; because in both the cases the prototype *-l-* is the same.

To obviate this difficulty, the Naiyāyikas maintain that, in the case of participles such as *pacan* and *pacamānaḥ*, the *-l-* suffix denotes the sense *kṛti* as in the verb *pacati*, but the sense

'substratum' is denoted by the suffix *śānac* on the authority of the rule *kartari kṛt* (III. iv. 67) which means: the *kṛt* suffixes are used in the sense of agent which is the substratum of action. The words *pacan* and *pacamānaḥ* are paraphrased as *pākānukūlaviklittyāśrayaḥ*: "a substratum of exertion favourable for the softening of rice". Both the active and the middle present participles are derived by adding the present indicative suffix *laṭ* to the root form.

The grammarians contend that it is wrong to say that the rule *kartari kṛt* operates to determine the meaning of the present participle suffixes, when the meaning of its prototype-form is already determined[13] by another rule. In other words, in the present participial forms *pacan* and *pacamānaḥ*, the meaning of *-l-* suffix is already determined by the rule *laḥ karmaṇi* (III. iv. 69) and, accordingly, the rule *kartari kṛt* would not be applicable. If this is not admitted, then the rule *kartari kṛt* will also be applicable in the case of *kṛt* suffixes like *ghañ*, in spite of the fact that its meaning (frozen or substantivated action = *siddhakriyā*) is already settled by the rule *bhāve* (III. iii. 18). Moreover, this is the usual principle accepted by all, viz. the substitute always denotes the same meaning which is assigned to its prototype-form and not any other which has no connection with the meaning of the prototype.

98, 1-2

TR: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 61). (The Naiyāyikas argue that) the suffix *śānac* must denote the sense 'agent' in accordance

13. *Prabhā*, p. 464:
निराकाङ्क्षतयेति—'यदर्थाभिधानसमर्थः स तस्यादेशः' इत्यभियुक्तोक्त्या 'स्थानेऽन्तरतमः' इति परिभाषया च कर्त्रर्थकलकारस्थाने कर्त्रर्थकः शानजादेशः कर्मार्थकलकारस्थाने कर्मार्थक इत्येवमादेशवाच्यार्थविषयाकाङ्क्षाया निवृत्त्या 'कर्तरि कृत्' इत्यस्य अनुपस्थितिरेवेति भावः।

with the syntactic agreement between *'Devadatta'* and 'cooking' in the phrase *devadattaḥ pacamānaḥ*. To meet this objection, the following *kāriḳā* is given.

NOTES: The collocation *devadattaḥ pacamānaḥ* is paraphrased as *vartamānakālikaviḳlittyanukūlakṛtyāśrayābhinnaḥ devadattaḥ*: "Devadatta, non-different from the substratum of effort, favourable to the softening of rice of the present time". The Naiyāyikas feel that this paraphrase is a sufficient proof to show that the word *pacamānaḥ*, by one of its parts *śānac*, denotes the sense viz. 'agent' which stands in syntactic agreement (*sāmānādhikaraṇya*) with the nominative form.

98, 3-4

TR: (*Kāriḳā* 61). Nominal nature (*nāmatva*) clearly belongs to the verbs ending in the suffixes *tarap* etc., just as it does to the (words ending in the) *kṛt* suffixes. Therefore, it should be considered that the relation of non-difference between the two nominal stem-notions is equally held also (in the case of verbs ending in *tarap* etc.).

NOTES: A Sanskrit term for syntactic agreement is *abhedānvaya*: "an agreement of non-difference". The semantic rule *nāmārthayor abhedānvayaḥ* maintains that the two nominal-stem-notions (*nāmārthau*) are related to each other by syntactic agreement. The Naiyāyikas maintain that, on the basis of the above mentioned semantic law, the word *pacamānaḥ* : 'a person cooking' must denote the same object viz. 'agent' which is denoted by *devadattaḥ* in the phrase *devadattaḥ pacamānaḥ*.

To refute this theory, the counter argument is put forth by the grammarians as follows: The word *nāman*, in the semantic rule *nāmārthayor abhedānvayaḥ*, stands for any word, capable of

being appended by the case terminations; accordingly, the word 'noun' includes nouns, adjectives and indeclinables etc. Now the grammarians maintain that in *pacatitarāṁ maitraḥ*: "Maitra cooks more skilfully", and in *pacatikalpaṁ maitraḥ*: "Maitra cooks somewhat less skilfully", we see the syntactic agreement between *maitra* on the one hand and *pacatikalpam* and *pacatitarām* on the other, which is approved by the semantic law stated above.

It should be noted that, in accordance with the Pāṇinian grammatical theory, forms like *pacatitarām* are considered as nouns, and the comparative suffix *tarām* involves the elision of the nominative case-ending suffix *-su* (II. iv. 82). KB, a true traditional grammarian as he is, has chosen deliberately forms like *pacatitarām* and *pacatikalpam* which can be brought under the category of nouns, instead of *pacati maitraḥ;* because the rule *nāmārthayor abhedānvayaḥ* does not maintain that the meaning of a verb is connected with the meaning of a noun by the relation of non-difference.

The semantic paraphrase[14] of *pacatitarāṁ maitraḥ* is *atiśayitavikḷittyanukūlakṛtyāśrayābhinnaḥ devadattaḥ* : "Devadatta non-different from the substratum of effort, favourable to the softening of rice, in the skill of a higher degree". The semantic paraphrase of the sentence *pacatikalpaṁ maitraḥ* is *īṣadasamāpta-vikḷittyanukūlakṛtyāśrayābhinnaḥ devadattaḥ* : "Devadatta non-different from the substratum of effort, favourable to the softening of rice-grains, in the skill of a lesser degree".

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14. *Kāśikā*, pp. 576-77:
पचतितरां मैत्र इत्यत्रातिशयितविक्लित्त्यनुकूलक्रियानुकूलभावनाया नामार्थत्वेन मैत्रेण सहाभेदान्वयासंभवात् । एवं पचतिकल्पं मैत्र इत्यत्रेषदसमाप्ततथाविधक्रियानुकूलभावनाया नामार्थत्वेन मैत्रेण सहाभेदान्वयासंभवात् कर्त्राख्यातस्य कर्तृधाचकत्वं स्यात् । तच्च परमतेऽनिष्टमिति भावः ।

In the above mentioned collocations the syntactic agreement which exists between *pacatitarām* and *maitraḥ*, and *pacatikalpam* and *maitraḥ* as revealed in the semantic paraphrase, will be impossible, unless it is assumed that the meaning 'agent' is denoted by the *tiṅ* suffixes. If the semantic agreement is the criterion for the denotation of agent in the case of *śatṛ* and *śānac* etc., the same would lead to the denotation of agent by the *tiṅ* suffixes too. But the Naiyāyikas do not admit that the *tiṅ* suffixes denote 'agent'.

98, 5-10

TR: The meaning (of the *kāriṇā*) is as follows: In *pacatitarāṁ maitraḥ* : "Maitra cooks with the skill of a higher degree", and in *pacatikalpaṁ maitraḥ* : "Maitra cooks with the skill of a lesser degree" etc., there lies the possibility of syntactic agreement between *maitra* and *pacatitarām,* and *maitra* and *pacatikalpam;* because the meaning conveyed by them (i.e. *pacatitarām* and *pacatikalpam*) is regarded as the meaning of nouns, and, accordingly, this would lead to the denotation of agent.

(Objection): if it is argued that in accordance with the syntactic agreement (between *devadatta* and *pacatikalpam* etc.) in the forms *pacatikalpam* etc., the secondary function (i.e. *lakṣaṇā*) is resorted to for understanding and the notion of agent, we reply: the same (i.e. secondary function) would be taken in *pacamānaḥ* also. For the sake of brevity (Pāṇini has taught) the rule *laḥ karmaṇi* etc., having fictitiously assumed that the artificial *-l-* suffixes are denotative of agent etc. This has been already discussed.

Here ends the discussion on the phoneme-*sphoṭa* (a section) in the chapter on the *sphoṭa.*

NOTES: The Naiyāyikas admit that in the phrases *pacatitarāṁ maitraḥ* and *pacatiḳalpaṁ maitraḥ*, both the words *pacatitarām* and *pacatiḳalpam* stand in syntactic agreement; but they say that the syntactic agreement does not necessarily result from the denotation of agent by the *tiṅ* suffixes, but the apprehension of agent is conveyed by the secondary function. In other words, in the above mentioned cases, the apprehension of agent comes through the *laḳṣaṇā* (the secondary function) and not through the *śaḳyārtha* (the primary sense).

The grammarians raise the point that, if the syntactic agreement between *pacatitarām* and *maitra* is justified through the apprehension of the agent furnished by the secondary function, let it also be justified in *pacamānaḥ* by the secondary function.

The Naiyāyikas further argue that the rule III. iv. 69 teaches that the *-l-* suffixes are used in the sense of (agent and) object, and, after (the root of) intransitive verbs, in the sense of impersonal action and (agent). But there is no authoritative rule of Pāṇ. which can be cited to prove that the *tiṅ* suffixes, which are the substitutes of *-l-*, are denotative. To refute this objection raised by the Naiyāyikas, the grammarians say: Let us admit that Pāṇini is the authority, but he requires interpretation. The grammarians say that the *sūtra* III.iv.69, concerning *-l-* suffixes, is possible only, because the denotations—agent and object—belong to the *tiṅ* suffixes. The denotation of the *-l-* suffixes is really a fiction. The *tiṅ* suffixes produce a certain apprehension in the hearer's mind. But Pāṇ. finds it convenient, for the sake of brevity, to teach that *-l-* suffixes are denotative. This is a grammatical fiction, although a very useful one. This fiction, which is found in Pāṇini's grammar, is possible only, because of the reality of the denotative nature which belongs to the substitutes *-mi, -si, -ti,* etc.

98, 11

TR: (*Kārikā* 62). If the substitutes are denotative, word-*sphoṭa* is thereby clearly established.

NOTES: In the last section dealing with the phoneme-*sphoṭa*, it has been pointed out that the stems and suffixes which are combinations of phonemes are denotative. By establishing this, we are justified in assuming that a word, which is viewed as a combination of stem and suffixe, is also denotative of meaning.

98, 12-16; 99, 1

TR: (The author of the *kārikā*) says here,—by the words 'now etc.',—that "if it is established that the substitutes are denotatives, thereby the word-*sphoṭa* is also established." The term 'substitutes' means "the *tiṅ* suffixes and *visarga* etc." What is meant by this passage is: When the denotativity of the phonemes in a sequence is established, the denotativity of a word having the form of a combination of such phonemes, is (as good as) established. (For, an assumption of) the recollection of meaning from each phoneme is contrary to (our common) experience. And if each phoneme is regarded as being possessed of a meaning, there would arise the contingency of (assuming) each phoneme to be a nominal stem and, accordingly, the phoneme *-n-* in *dhanam*: 'wealth' and *vanam*: 'forest', would be elided by the rule *nalopaḥ prātipadikāntasya* (VIII.ii.7).

NOTES: If each phoneme in a term like *gauḥ* is considered to be denotative of meaning 'cow', we would understand this meaning from each phoneme; accordingly, it would be useless to utter phonemes other than the first, because already the sense 'cow' is conveyed by the first phoneme.

The term *prātipadika* technically refers to a meaningful unit other than a root, verb and suffix (cf. I.ii.45). If the phoneme is supposed to denote the meaning, the phoneme *-n-* in *dhanam* etc. being a meaningful unit, would be considered as a *prātipadika*. Thus, it would take the nominative singular ending *-su* (IV.i.2) which would be elided (VI.i.68) as shown below:

* *dhana* + *am* (where -n will be *prātipadika*; I.ii.45).
* = *dha* + *n* + *su* + *a* + *am* (IV.i.2).
* = *dha* + *n* + *o*+*am* (VI.i.68, and VI.i.107).
* = *dha* + o + o + *am* (VIII.ii.7).

This is, of course, not desired.

The rule *nalopaḥ prātipadikāntasya* (VIII. ii. 7) means that the phoneme *-n,* occurring at the end of a nominal stem, is elided when it is a (a final phoneme of) a *pada* (finished word).

99, 1-6

This is stated to refute an altogether different[15] point of view maintained by the followers of the phoneme-*sphoṭa* theory (which is as follows): The last phoneme is endowed with the denotative function, because there is no evidence to prove that the denotative function resides in the (meaning-bearing

15. *Prabhā*, p. 468:
प्रकृतेः प्रत्ययादेश्च चरमवर्ण एव वाचकत्वं, न तु वर्णसमुदाये । अयमेव वर्ण-स्फोट इति यत्केषांचिद्वर्णस्फोटवादिनां मतं, तद्दूषणायोक्तम् । समुदायवाच-कत्वसमर्थनेन चरमवर्णस्य वाचकत्वं दूषितं यथा स्यात्तथोक्तमित्यर्थः । इदं च न स्फोटरहस्यवादिनां मतमिति सूचनायैव केषांचिदित्युक्तम् । तत्त्वविदां तु प्रकृतिप्रत्ययात्मकसमुदायाभिव्यङ्ग्यस्य तद्रूपापन्नस्य स्फोटस्य एव वर्ण-स्फोटत्वमिति । प्रकृतिप्रत्यययोरेव वाचकत्वं न तु चरमवर्णयोः ।

unit of combination of phonemes as a) whole (*vyāsajjyavṛtti* i.e. a whole whose parts cannot be separated from the meaning point of view). However, the impressions—produced by the (auditory) perception of each preceding phoneme (presented to the mind of the listener) along with the last phoneme — are helpful in giving rise to the comprehension of the meaning; and, therefore, the comprehension of the meaning does not arise from the utterance of the (last) phoneme only. However, (if the view mentioned above is admitted) there would arise the contingency of apprehension of meaning —when it is intended to make a statement 'there is Rāma'— (even) when the utterance of the (final phoneme) *a* (took place) after (the interval of) half an hour following (the utterance of) phonemes *r-ā-m*. And, therefore, it is only appropriate to hold that such a sequence ($r + a + m + a$) as a whole is the delimiting property of denotativeness.

NOTES: KB's intention in introducing this discussion here is to make clear whether the individual phonemes in a word are endowed with the denotative function or not. According to his interpretation of the phoneme-*sphoṭa*, a sequence of phonemes in the form of stems and of suffixes is denotative, but each single phoneme of a stem and a suffix is not denotative. However, if the stem or suffix consists of only a single phoneme, as the monosyllabic root *i* 'to go' or the patronymic suffix *a* in *aupagava*, it is also meaningful. But some of the exponents of the phoneme-*sphoṭa* theory formulate a different point of view: the auditory perception of the last phoneme of each word is endowed with denotative function, and it conveys the notion of the object to the listener, provided the last phoneme is aided by the impressions of the previous phonemes. According to this view, the meaning is conveyed by the last

phoneme[16] only, and the impressions of the individual phonemes constituting a word are helpful to produce only the simultaneous recollection of the phonemes heard.

KB. criticizes this view on the ground that the condition, 'the perception of the final phoneme accompanied by the impressions of the previous phonemes', cannot be interpreted to mean that the perception of the uninterrupted sequence of phonemes, in the time-series-pattern, is a necessary cause for the apprehension of meaning. And it becomes a difficult question to answer as to why the meaning is not understood, even if the phonemes are uttered in different periods of time, for, according to this view, the simultaneous recollection of the sequence of phonemes cannot be specified as a condition of the understanding of the meaning from a word. And thus, if the last phoneme is supposed to possess the denotative function, then the final phoneme *a* in *rāma* uttered half an hour later, following the utterance of the first three phonemes *r- -ā-* and *-m-*, would convey the meaning, because the impression of the previous phonemes[17] together with the auditory perception of the last phoneme may still exist in the mind of the listener.

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16. K. A. Subrahmania IYER, "The Doctrine of *sphoṭa*", *JGRI*, Vol. 5, pp. 125-26. See also Gaurinath ŚASTRI, *The Philosophy of word and Meaning*, pp. 123-24.

17. *Śāṁkarī*, p. 476:
रामोऽस्तीति नैरन्तर्येणोक्ते तस्माद्रामकर्तृका सत्ता इत्यर्थबोधो जायत इति अनुभवसिद्धं, तत्र राम् इति मान्तमुच्चार्य तदनन्तरं घटिकादिकालं यापयित्वा ओकार उच्चार्यमाणे सति व्यवहितोच्चारणादप्यर्थबोधो भाव्यः, तत्र पूर्वोक्तस्य रामित्युच्चारणानुभवजन्यसंस्कारस्य विद्यमानत्वात्, परं तु तादृशव्यवहितोच्चारणाल्लोकानामर्थबोधो नैव जायते इति हेतोरित्यर्थः।

99, 7-8

TR: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 63). Here (the author of the *kārikā)* introduces the view of those who maintain that a finished word, technically defined as a word ending in case terminations or verb-ending suffixes, is the conveyor of meaning.

NOTES: According to the rule *suptiṅantaṁ padam* (I.iv.14), that which ends in *sup* (in a declension) or in *tiṅ* (in a verbal inflexion) is called a *pada*. According to the theory of the word-*sphoṭa*, the smallest significant segment in the language is a finished word i.e. a *pada*. This theory of the *padasphoṭa* holds that stems and suffixes are not meaningful units. The reason for this will be made clear in the following *kārikā*.

99, 9-10

TR: *(Kārikā* 63). In (the forms) *ghaṭena* etc. division into stem-portion etc. is not (firmly) settled. Here also a confusion arises (about the stem-portion and the suffix-portion) as is seen (i.e. known to exist) in the forms *vas* and *nas* (the accusative optional plural of *yuṣmad* and *asmad*).

NOTES: In such forms as *ghaṭena* (the instrumental singular of *ghaṭa)* it is very difficult to determine precisely which portion of the term *ghaṭena* represents the stem and which portion the suffix. There is no fixed criterion which would enable us to determine '*ghaṭe*' is the 'base' and '*na*' is the 'suffix'; or '*ghaṭ*' is the 'base' and '*ena*' is the 'suffix'. A grammarian who is thoroughly acquainted with Pāṇini and Patañjali may assert here that in the finished word *ghaṭena, ghaṭa* is the stem-portion, and *-ina* is the suffix-portion on the authority of the rule (*ṭāṅasiṅasām inātsyāḥ* VII.i.12) which means that the suffixes *ṭā* (instrumental sg.) *ṅasi* (the ablative sg.) and *ṅas* (the geni-

tive sg.) appended to the nominal-stem ending in *a,* are substituted by *ina, āt* and *sya* respectively. But even he, in spite of his extensive study of Sanskrit grammar, will find it difficult to posit the division between the stem-portion and the suffix-portion in the accusative optional plural *vaḥ* and *naḥ* of the personal pronouns *yuṣmad* and *asmad;* because the substitutes *vas* and *nas* replace both the stem and the case-ending. Therefore, the exponent of the word-*sphoṭa* argues that a *pada* or finished word, as a single entity, conveys the meaning, because the division of words into component parts does not arise at all from the point of view of a listener.

99, 11-16

TR: In the form *ghaṭena* etc., the division (into stems and suffixes), such as *ghaṭe* as the stem and *na* as the suffix, or *ghaṭ* as the stem and *ena* as the suffix, cannot be considered as denotative, because it is impossible to know particularly (how much) portion is the stem and (how much portion) the suffix, if the maxim—"all (the substitutes) are the substitutes for the whole"—is accepted. (With respect to the argument) that the grammarians can correctly ascertain this division, (the author of the *kārikā)* gives the answer by way of a parallel instance in the words *vasnasau* etc. Since the rule *bahuvacanasya vasnasau* (VIII.i.21) prescribes the substitutes in the place of the whole (stem and suffix), it is not possible to divide them (i.e. the forms *vaḥ* and *naḥ* into stem and suffix).

NOTES: One cannot add augments to the suffixes or replace the part of stem or of suffix by the substitute; because, according to the grammarians, the words and phonemes are eternal and unchangeable. Therefore, prescription of the augment like *iṭ* by *ārdhadhātukasyeḍ valādeḥ* (VII.ii.35) means that, in place of the notion of the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix, beginning with any con-

sonant other than *y* and void of *iṭ*, one forms the notion of the *ārdhadhātuka* suffix accompanied by *iṭ*. Similarly, in the case of the substitutes, our notions are changed and not the forms of words which are eternal and unchangeable. Thus the rule *er uḥ* (III.iv.86) does not mean that *-u* is substituted in the imperative for *-i*, but simply means: the notion of the imperative accompanied by *-i* is changed into the notion of the imperative accompanied by *-u*. In other words, instead of the notion *bhavati*, the notion *bhavatu* is formed. Thus, the maxim: *sarve sarvapadādeśāḥ*[18] means, the whole new word *bhavatu* which results from substitution, is the substitute for the whole prototype-form *bhavati* in the imperative.

According to this maxim, every substitute replaces the prototype-form taken as a whole, i.e. made up of both the stem and the suffix, and it is very difficult to find out how much portion of the substitute represents the stem and how much the suffix; for example, the substitutes *vas* and *nas* replace both the stem and suffix, i.e. *yuṣmad* + *śas*, and *asmad* + *śas* respectively. Similarly, the substitute *-ina* does not replace *ṭā* (i.e. *ā*) of the instrumental singular, but the form *ghaṭena* replaces the prototype-form *ghaṭa* + *ṭā* (instrumental sg.) taken as a whole. Now in the substitute-form *ghaṭena*, it is very difficult to determine the stem and suffix portions with exactitude.

The rule *bahuvacanasya vasnasau* (VIII.i.21) means that the forms *vas* and *nas* are the substitutes for the genitive and accusative plural of *yuṣmad* and *asmad* respectively, when a word precedes them; and the substitute-forms (*vas* and *nas*) are unaccented.

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18. *Mbh.* on Pāṇ I. i. 56:
पचतु पचन्तु...इमेप्यादेशाः । कथम् । आदिश्यते यः स आदेशः । इमे चाप्यादिश्यन्ते । See also *Mbh.* on Pāṇini, I. i. 20: सर्वे सर्वपदादेशा दाक्षीपुत्रस्य पाणिनेः । ...अनागमकानां सागमका (आदेशाः) ।

100, 1-4

TR: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 64). Here it is maintained (by the author of the *kārikā*) that the sentence which is a collection of words ending in case terminations and verbal terminations, is also endowed with it (i.e. denotative function).

(*Kārikā* 64). Having considered (the phrase) *hare'va*: "O Hari, protect (me)" etc. recognise the sentence-*sphoṭa* (different from the word-*sphoṭa*). If it is argued that the denotative power (*saṁbandha* i.e. *śakti*, residing in a sentence) cannot be taken to convey the relational meaning (*artha*), in the specific form, then the same (objection) might be raised (about the denotative power of) words. If it is argued that (the relational meaning) is assigned to the words through the analytical (or mental) approach, then the same (argument) should be (extended) to the sentence.

NOTES: Now the author of the *kārikā* points out that the sentence as a single unit communicates our ideas to others. The whole sentence taken as one indivisible single unit conveys meaning; accordingly, it is endowed with the denotative function (*abhidhā*). It has already been shown in the previous *kārikā* that the division of words into stems and suffixes cannot be made in some cases like *vaḥ* and *naḥ*. Adverting to the same problem, the exponent[19] of the sentence-*sphoṭa* theory maintains that the division of the sentence into *padas* is also difficult in some cases like *hare'va*: "O Hari, protect (me)" etc. In this expression, the vowel *e* of *hare* and *a* of *ava* have undergone the euphonic combination. In cases like the above-mentioned, we understand the meaning from the sentence, even if we fail to recognise exactly the isolated consti-

19. Bishnupāda BHATTACARYA, *A study in language and meaning*, p. 12.

tuents *hare* and *ava,* due to the ignorance of the laws of euphonic combination. This leads to the conclusion that sentence as an indivisible single unit conveys meaning. Therefore, the grammarians assume that the denotative function *(abhidhā)* belongs to the sentence as a whole.

The next two lines serve as an answer to the Nyāya and Mīmāṁsā objections. The Naiyāyikas[20] uphold that words denote isolated meanings and the relational meaning is communicated by the *tātparya* function or *saṁsargamaryādā.* According to them, the individual words convey their own meaning through the primary function (*abhidhā*) and the syntactically unified meaning is conveyed by virtue of the *tātparya*[22] function (purport of words).

The Bhāṭṭa school of the Mīmāṁsakas maintains that words denote isolated meanings, and syntactically related meaning is conveyed by the secondary function *(lakṣaṇā).* The Naiyāyikas postulate a different capacity for the syntactic meaning, namely *tātparya,*[23] whereas the Bhāṭṭas admit that the secondary

20. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī, Śabdakhaṇḍa,* Verse 84:
यत्पदेन विना यस्याननुभावकता भवेत् ।
आकाङ्क्षा वक्तुरिच्छा तु तात्पर्यं परिकीर्तितम् ॥

21. The capacity of words for conveying syntactic relation is called *tātparyaśakti* by the old school of the Naiyāyikas, whereas the new school calls it as *saṁsargamaryādā.*

22. *Sāhityadarpaṇa,* II.20, *NSP.* by P. V. KANE:
तात्पर्याख्यां वृत्तिमाहुः पदार्थान्वयबोधने ।
तात्पर्यार्थं तदर्थं च वाक्यं तद्बोधकं परे ॥

23. *Śāstradīpikā, NSP.* p. 154: पदाभिहितैः पदार्थैः लक्षणया वाक्यार्थः प्रतीयते । See also Kumārilabhaṭṭa वाक्यार्थो लक्ष्यमाणो हि सर्वत्रैवेति नः स्थितिः । Also *Mānameyodaya,* Adyar, p. 94: वयं तु पदार्था लक्षणयैव वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्तीति ब्रूमः ।

function of words comes into play to convey the syntactic meaning, when the primary function of words fails to convey the syntactically unified meaning. The Bhāṭṭa school and the Nyāya school differ from each other in accepting the different mediums through which the syntactic meaning is conveyed. Both the schools admit that the sentence-meaning is over and above the primary meaning of words. The sentence meaning, according to both the schools, is a concatenation of word-meanings wherein the connection between the word-meanings is shown by a function different from the *abhidhā*. The sentence-meaning is not the direct denotation of the constituent terms, but it is attained by virtue of secondary function or *tātparya* function of words. This theory is known as *abhihitānvayavāda:* 'the theory of mutual relation of primary word-meanings'. This theory is based on the statement of Śabara[24] who clearly mentions that the comprehension of a syntactic meaning is possible only after the individual meanings of words are conveyed (by *abhidhā*). For instance, in the phrase *śukḷā gauḥ*: 'white cow', the words *śukḷā* and *gauḥ* denote their individual meanings, but the relation of the non-difference *(abhedānvaya)* which is pointed out in the semantic paraphrase *śukḷābhinnā gauḥ:* 'a cow non-different from white', becomes a part of the sentence-meaning. Here the term 'sentence' also stands for the phrase conveying a syntactically complete idea. In other words, the relational meaning *abheda* is not the word-meaning in the primary sense.

24. *Śābarabhāṣya*, 1.1.25:
पदानि हि स्वं स्वमर्थमभिधाय निवृत्तव्यापाराणि । अथेदानीं पदार्था अवगताः सन्तो वाक्यार्थं गमयन्ति । See also *Mānameyodaya*, p. 94: पदानां पदार्थबोधोपक्षीणत्वाद् व्यवहितत्वाच्च पदार्था एव स्वसंसर्गरूपं वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्तीत्ययं तावत् तार्किकादिसाधारणः पक्षः । वयं तु पदार्था लक्षणयैव वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्तीति ब्रूमः ।

However, the *vākyaśakti*[25] theory of the grammarians assumes that the entire sentence is an indivisible unit, and its meaning is also an undivided whole which has no parts. According to this theory, the individual words have no independent existence of their own, apart from their occurrence in a sentence. The *vākyaśaktivādin* insists that the sentence is a single undivided utterance and its division into words and again into roots and suffixes is a grammatical fiction. He maintains that the primary unit of language is the sentence, but words and their meanings are unreal abstractions[26]. Therefore, there does not exist a word-meaning which is different from the sentence-meaning. For example, when the sentence *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* is paraphrased as *nīlābhinno ghaṭaḥ:* 'A jar non-different from the blue thing', the meaning 'non-different' is also the outcome of the sentence-meaning, as the meaning 'jar' and 'blue'. In other words, the sentence *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* is an undivided utterance and the sense *nīlābhinno ghaṭaḥ* cognized from it, is also unitary. As such the division of sentence into words and their meanings is purely fictional.

Against the *vākyaśaktivāda,* the Nyāya and the Bhāṭṭa school of the *Mīmāṁsā* argue that every one feels that *śābdabodha*

25. *VP,* 11. 34:

संप्रत्ययप्रमाणत्वात्पदार्थास्तित्वकल्पने ।
पदार्थाभ्युच्चये त्यागादानर्थक्यं प्रसज्जते ।।

Also Puṇyarāja, p. 83 (Benares edn.), on the same verse: यदि पदार्थसंप्रत्ययः प्रमाणं पदपदार्थसत्तायामुच्यते तदा देवदत्त गामभ्याज शुक्लां दण्डेनेत्यस्मिन् वाक्ये पूर्वपूर्वपदार्थानामुत्तरोत्तरपदार्थाभ्युच्चये स्वार्थत्यागात्तत्तत्पदोपादानस्य आनर्थक्यं प्रसज्जते । ततश्चानर्थकस्योच्चारणवैफल्याद् उच्चारिताद्वा तस्माच्छब्दमात्रात्पदार्थप्रत्ययस्यानुपपत्तेः, किंनिबन्धना वाक्यार्थप्रतीतिः स्यादिति यत्किंचिदेतत् ।

26. R. C. PANDEYA, *The Problems of meaning in Indian Philosophy,* p. 78.

(verbal cognition of the propositional meaning) is something new, and it cannot be grasped by the denotative function in its entire aspect prior to the verbal knowledge, like the meaning of the individual words. The knowledge of the denotative function acts as an instrument of verbal cognition. The relation between the meanings is not antecedently known by the primary function of words. The sentence-meaning is over and above the word-meanings and the integral meaning of the sentence is known at the time of the verbal cognition. But if it is held that the denotative function of a sentence conveys the whole integral meaning in one sweep (i.e. the meaning of the component words along with their mutual relation) then the propositional[27] meaning known through the *śābdabodha* (verbal cognition) will be identical with the denoted sense of the sentence, because the syntactic meaning also becomes the word-meaning, as it is antecedently known in the *vākyaśaktivāda* view. In other words, what *vākyārthajñāna* makes known, is already known through *vākyaśaktijñāna.*

To this objection the grammarians answer: No doubt *vākyaśakti* conveys the syntactic meaning, but this meaning conveyed by it is only of a general nature, and the exact particular relation which is unknown through the *vākyaśakti* is made known

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27. Jayantabhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī*, pp. 356-57; also *Śāṁkarī*, pp. 485-6:

अयं भावः । यथा घटपटादयः पदार्थाः पूर्वसिद्धाः न त्वपूर्वाः, अतस्तेषु घटादिपदानां शक्तिग्रहो युक्तः । किं तु वाक्यार्थो न तथा पूर्वसिद्धः, अपि त्वपूर्वः । तथा हि वाक्यार्थो नाम पदार्थसंसर्गः...संबन्धस्य पदानुपस्थितत्वान्न तत्र वाक्यार्थबोधात्प्राक् शक्तिग्रहः संभवति ।

in the *vākyārthajñāna.* To be explicit, *vākyaśakti*[28] conveys the general and unspecified relation and specified relation is understood from the *śābdabodha,* e.g., the denotative function of the sentence *gām ānaya:* "Fetch a cow", conveys the general sense *go'nvitakarmatvānvitā'nayanānvitā bhāvanā:* "'productive operation' construed with (the result viz.) 'bringing' which is construed with 'objecthood' which (in its turn) is construed with 'cow' ". But the semantic paraphrase (i.e. verbal cognition) of this sentence will be *ekatvāvacchinnago'bhinnakarmaniṣṭhā'nayanānukūlā bhāvanā:* "'productive operation' favourable to (the result viz.) 'bringing' which resides in the object nondifferent from 'cow', limited by 'singularity'". Thus, in the verbal cognition, the relations: (i) 'limited', (ii) 'nondifference' and (iii) 'favourable to', etc. are specified.

The grammarians further say that the difficulty raised against the adherents of the *vākyaśaktivāda* by the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas can be well advanced against the Prābhākara school which holds the view that the words denote the related meaning. The grammarians' theory of the *vākyaśaktivāda,* and the *anvitābhidhānavāda* theory of the Prābhākaras do not appear to be materially different from each other. The Prābhākaras hold that the words denote the related meaning, and thus the relation is also supposed to be communicated by the denotative function of a word. According to the Prābhākaras also, the relational meaning[29] denoted by a word is of a widely

28. Nāgeśa. *Sphoṭavāda,* pp. 29-30:
वाक्यशक्तिग्रहोऽपि कस्यचिद्विशिष्यैव, कस्यचित्कारकत्वादि जानतः प्रागुक्तरीत्यैव सामान्यतः, कस्यचित्प्रकारान्तरेणैव इत्यनियत एव ।

29. Jayantabhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī,* pp. 370-71:
अन्ये मन्यन्ते सामान्येनान्विताभिधानं विशेषतश्चाभिहितान्वय इति, गोशब्दो हि स्वार्थमनवगतविशेषगुणक्रियासामान्यान्वितमभिधत्ते तावतान्विताभिधा-

general nature. Thus, these two theories correspond to each other. The difference between the two theories lies in their conception of the medium of conveying the syntactic relation. The *vākyaśaktivāda* maintains that the sentence is possessed of the denotative function, and it conveys the syntactic meaning through the *abhidhā*, while the *anvitābhidhānavāda*[30] maintains that word has a capacity to convey the relational meaning. Both the theories agree in so far as the denotative function conveys the syntactic sense in a general nature, and specific relation is understood from the *vākyārthajñāna*. The grammarians assume that the sentence is a unit of expression, and repudiate the isolation of words and their meanings. The Prābhākaras[31] do not deny the word-meaning, but maintain that the words, besides their individual meanings, also denote the concepts as related to one another. Therefore, the author of the *kārikā* says: "If it is argued that (denotative function of a sentence) cannot be taken to convey the relational meaning in a specific form, the same might be said about the theory (of the Prābhākaras) which holds that denotative function of a word (conveys related meaning in a general way)".

Now the third line of the *kārikā* is an answer to the objection raised by the Prābhākaras, who claim that meaning exists in

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नम्, शुक्लादिगुणविशेषसंबन्धस्तु पदान्तरादवगम्यते सोऽयं विशेषोऽभिहितान्वय इत्येतदपि तादृगेव । Also p. 367: तदेवमवयवकार्योपलंभान्न वैयाकरणवन्निमित्तान्यपि निह्नुमहे कृत्स्नफलसिद्धयवधिव्यापारपरिनिश्चयाच्च नान्यमीमांसकवच्छुद्धपदार्थाभिधानम् उपयच्छामहे इति ।

30. *Ibid;* p. 369:
न हि भवतामनपेक्षितपदार्थ एव वैयाकरणानामिव वाक्यार्थप्रत्ययः तदसौ यावानावापोद्वापपर्यालोचनया गोपदस्यार्थो निर्धार्यते तावानेव संघातकार्येऽपि व्याप्रियमाणस्य तस्यार्थः ।

31. *Gaurinath* SHASTRI, *Op cit,*. pp. 173-85:

words[32] which are fragments of a sentence. Meaning is assigned to the words on the basis of the practical behaviour of people. They claim that when a child hears *gām ānaya:* "Bring a cow", *aśvam ānaya:* "Bring a horse", *gāṁ naya*: "Drive a cow", and *aśvaṁ naya:* "Drive a horse"; it learns the meaning of the component words by the method of contrast and agreement (*āvāpodvāpa*). Thus, the procedure of understanding the word-meanings is to set side by side the sentences in which only one word is different. In this way a child identifies and isolates the forms like *gām* and *aśvam*, and meaning is assigned to the word-isolates. The Prābhākaras hold that by a close inspection of the contrast and agreement of the component words we comprehend the isolated meanings of the words later on. First the words convey the meaning related to one another, but it does not mean that the isolated word-meaning is never comprehended. By the method of insertion and extraction (*āvāpodvāpa*), the meaning is assigned to the words and not to the sentence. Thus the analytical approach insists that an individual word is endowed with a meaning, and it is the unit of language, although it does denote the concept as related to another word. The whole discussion serves the purpose of showing that meaning exists in a word and not in a sentence which goes against the *vākyaśakti* theory of the grammarians.

The exponent of the *vākyaśaktivāda* answers to the above theory by pointing out that, although a child in a later stage

32. Nāgeśa *op. cit.*, pp. 14-15:
वृद्धव्यवहारात्प्रथमतो विशिष्टे वाक्यार्थत्वग्रहेऽपि आवापोद्वापाभ्यां पदानां पदार्थेषु शक्तिकल्पनाद्वाक्यस्य परिशेषेण संसर्ग एव तत्सिद्धिः ।
This passage, according to Nāgeśa intends to support the *vākyārtha* theory, but it very well justifies the analytical approach of the Prābhākaras also in assigning the meaning to the isolated words.

identifies and isolates the words in a sentence, still, being ignorant of grammatical analysis, it understands the meaning from a sentence[33] as a whole. The *vākyaśaktivādin* claims that the activity of the people is occasioned by the apprehension of a sentence, and, therefore, it must be admitted that meaning exists in a sentence, and it is endowed with a denotative function. According to the grammarians, a sentence is indivisible[34] and its import is also indivisible. It is a fact that the grammarians classify words into grammatical and logical categories, but this is considered a grammatical fiction.

Prof. J. BROUGH[35] thinks that the theory of indivisibility of sentence is somewhat similar to the theory proposed by the Gestalt school of psychology. The Gestalt theory maintains that the elements do not exist prior to the whole, or separately from the whole. In the grammatical context, according to this theory, the sentence is an undivided unit, and the consti-

33. Nāgeśa, op. cit., p. 24:
समुदाये व्युत्पन्नानां तत एव बोधस्यानुभविकत्वाद् व्यवहाराधीनप्रथमव्युत्पत्त्या समुदाये विशिष्टनिरूपिताया एव शक्तेः ग्रहाच्च । न चावापोद्वापाभ्यामवयवशक्तिनिर्णयेन तस्या अप्रामाणिकत्वमिति वाच्यम्, असंजातविरोधित्वेनोत्तरकालस्यैव तत्त्वकल्पनात् । हरेऽव इत्यादौ तदावश्यकत्वाच्च ।

34. VP, II. 60 and 88:
प्रतिवर्णमसंवेद्यः पदार्थप्रत्ययो यथा ।
पदेष्वेवमसंवेद्यं वाक्यार्थस्य निरूपणम् ॥
अविभक्तेऽपि वाक्यार्थे शक्तिभेदादपोद्धृते ।
वाक्यान्तरविभागेन यथोक्तं न विरुध्यते ॥
also Gaurināth SHASTRI, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-96.

35. "Some Indian theories of meaning", *TPS.*, 1953, p. 163; see also K. Kunjunni RAJA, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-35. For further explanation see, S. S. Suryanarayana SHASTRI's "Vācaspati's Criticism of *Sphoṭavāda*" JORM, Vol. VI, p. 314.

tuents derive their separate character from the whole through the grammatical process of analysis. This *vākyaśaktivāda* theory is based on the operational approach as opposed to the analytical approach of language. Since the sentence as a whole is operated in communication, it is regarded as a conveyor of meaning. Thus the author of the *kārikā* says: "If it is argued that (the relational meaning) is assigned to the words through the analytical approach, then the same argument should be (extended) to the sentence."

100, 5-9

TR: In (the sentences) *hare'va* "O Hari, protect (me)" and *viṣṇo'va:* "O Viṣṇu, protect (me)", when the single substitution (viz. *-e* or *-o*) replaces (the two vowels *e+a* or *o+a* by one vowel) on the basis of the rule *eṅaḥ padāntād ati* (VI.i.109) it would not be very easy to know the division (of the sentence into words). Although we have no knowledge of each (component) word[36] (of the sentence severally), still we do have a verbal knowledge (from the whole sentence) through the knowledge of the denotative function residing in the whole (sentence). Therefore, it would be necessary to assume that the denotative function resides even in the whole (sentence rather than in each single word). In the same manner, since (the meaning of the whole word) is apprehended through the knowledge (of the denotative function) of the whole (word),—even if the (division of words into its constituent parts, that is) the stem and suffix is not known dis-

36. Nāgeśa, *op. cit.*, p. 10:

एवं हरेऽव विष्णोऽव इत्यादौ प्रागुक्तरीत्या पदयोः स्पष्टमज्ञानेऽपि समुदायशक्त्या बोधात्समुदायस्यैव विशिष्टवाक्यार्थे शक्तिरिति वाक्यस्फोटः ।

See also Bishnupada BHATTACARYA, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

tinctly,—it would be quite necessary to assign the denotative function to them (i.e. the whole undivided words) also, (rather than to the stems and suffixes severally). This is the meaning of the (passage).

NOTES: The rule *eṅaḥ padāntād ati* (VI.i.109) means that the single vowel *-e* or *-o* is substituted in place of *-e* or *-o* occurring as a word final, when a short vowel *a* follows it; e.g. *hare* + *ava=hare'va, viṣṇo+ava=viṣṇo'va.*

100, 9-13

TR: Really speaking, just as we comprehend the meaning of words from the words, so also we do comprehend the meaning of a sentence from the sentence; consequently, just as the denotative function (conveying) the sense of the word is assigned to the words, so also the denotative function conveying the sense of a sentence should be assigned to the sentence (as a whole). Thus the word-*sphoṭa* and the sentence-*sphoṭa* are established. If this is not admitted, one might understand the sense from (the unconnected words such as) jar, objecthood, bringing, effort etc., even though one is not trained (to know the meaning) that way. But (it is observed) that the verbal knowledge does not arise (from the unconnected words) even if the intention of the speaker is known and (the same) meanings are represented (by the unconnected words), as they are represented by (the sentence) *ghaṭam ānaya:* "Bring a jar".

NOTES: If it is supposed that the denotative function resides in isolated words and not in the sentence, the layman who is aware of the intention of the speaker *(tātparyajñāna)* might understand the meaning from the unconnected words; *ghaṭaḥ:* 'jar', *karmatvam:* 'objecthood', *ānayanam:* 'bringing' and

kṛtiḥ: 'effort', as he understands the meaning from the sentence *ghaṭam ānaya,* because the amount of information furnished by the unconnected words is practically the same as it is furnished by the parts of the sentence *ghaṭa, am, ā, nay, a.* But it is experienced that a layman cannot grasp the meaning from unconnected words which do not form an organised sentence. Now, if it is held that the sentence as a whole is denotative of meaning, this difficulty does not arise, since the unconnected words, mentioned above, do not form an organised sentence.

The expression *tādṛśavyutpattirahitasya*[37]: "to him who is not trained in apprehending the meaning that way" is purposely used by KB. For, the modern Naīyāyikas use a peculiar language for a philosophical discussion from which a layman cannot understand the meaning. Thus, KB half-jokingly remarks that the modern Naiyāyikas who are trained in this peculiar fashion may understand the sense from the unconnected words mentioned above, but a layman cannot.

100, 13-15; 101, 1

TR: (Objection:) It is argued that in this very case (i.e. above mentioned case), a verbal cognition (of the action of bringing of which a jar is the object) arises only if a person knows the following cause-effect statement: "in order to have a verbal knowledge of the action of bringing of which a jar is the object, the necessary cause is the juxtaposition of the case-termination denotative of the sense of object *(karmakāraka)* appended to the nominal stem denotative of the sense 'jar', and, in addition to it, juxtaposition of the root accompanied with the verb ending suffixes". (Thus) the knowledge of that (cause-effect-relation) also becomes the cause (of such a verbal

37. Nāgeśa, *op. cit.*, p. 16:

अत एव घटः कर्मत्वमानयनं कृतिरित्यादितो विपरीतव्युत्पन्नस्य बोधः।

knowledge). (Answer:) If you say so, then (nothing but) the theory of the sentence-*sphoṭa* is established.

NOTES: This cause-effect statement mentioned in the text tells us that the words convey the meaning only when they are organised in a sentence-form like *ghaṭam ānaya.*

101, 1-4

TR: For, just as you assume (the following) cause-effect statement[37a]—"in order to have a verbal knowledge of the meaning (jar) from the word *ghaṭa*, the necessary cause is the knowledge of the denotative function of a word which is of the nature of conveying (the meaning 'jar')", — so also we assume (the following) cause-effect statement — "in order to have a verbal knowledge of the meaning of a particular sentence, the necessary cause is the knowledge of the denotative function residing in a sentence, which is of the nature of conveying (the meaning of) a sentence which consists of words in juxtaposition".

NOTES: According to the Naiyāyikas and the Bhāṭṭas, a word[38] is denotative of meaning, and is endowed with the denotative function. The grammarians on the other hand, maintain the view that the isolated words lack unity of meaning when they do not constitute a sentence. A word being a part of the whole sentence presents always the partial meaning. Therefore, the words cannot have the individual[39] meaning which can be divorced from the sentence-meaning. That is to say, words have

37a. *Ibid.*, p. 19:

पदज्ञानकारणत्वरूपपदशक्तिज्ञानस्येव समुदायज्ञानकारणत्वरूपवाक्यशक्तिज्ञानस्य हेतुतायास्त्वयाभ्युपगमात् ।

38. S. Kuppusvami SHASTRI, *A primer of Indian logic*, p. 258.

39. Gaurinath SHASTRI. *op. cit.*, p. 244.

meaning only if they form a part of an organised sentence and are always mutually related to one another in sentence. Thus the separate existence[40] of words apart from the sentence is fictional and illusory. Accordingly, this leads to the theory that the sentence alone is endowed with the denotative function, and it only is capable of conveying the meaning for the purposes of communication.

101, 4-6

TR: Being the communicative power *(śaktitva)* means nothing but being the cause of the communicative knowledge embodied[41] in a sound-unit (either a word or a sentence), when it (sound-unit) happens to be the content of the knowledge (in the form : such and such a word conveys such and such a meaning) which (knowledge of communicative function) causes the presentment (remembrance) of the meaning. This is the proper view, because, for the sake of simplicity, (the following cause-effect statement) is established: "in order to have any kind of verbal knowledge, the necessary cause is the knowledge of the denotative function residing (in the object to be denoted) by the relation of the container and the content". This is discussed in great detail in (my) *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa.*

NOTES: In simple language, the definition of *śakti*, according to KB, is the capacity of words to convey the meaning. The word *śabda* in the phrase *śabdavṛttijñānakāraṇatva* excludes the knowledge of objects which may convey some idea through their perception. In other words, the knowledge which is ob-

40. *VP.*, 2. 16:
अशब्दो यदि वाक्यार्थः पदार्थोऽपि तथा भवेत् ।

41. *Parīkṣā*, pp. 403-4:
अत्र शब्दपदं बोधात्मकशब्दपरम् । शब्दनिष्ठं यज्ज्ञानकारणत्वं तस्यैवेत्यर्थः ।

tained through perception is different from the verbal knowledge. Words lead to the verbal knowledge when they are uttered. The phrase *śabdavṛttijñānaviṣaya* in the definition, indicates that the word, unless it is uttered in the articulated form, does not convey the meaning. Verbal knowledge arises from the uttered word only. The phrase *arthopasthāpaka*[42] in the definition indicates that the words and objects are related to each other. When we understand the relation existing between the objects and the words, we understand the meaning. Thus the communicative power of words means the knowledge of the relation of the uttered words to the objects meant by them.

The knowledge of a sound which makes us acquainted with the linguistic meaning is two-fold. It is the knowledge of the denotative power either of words or of sentences. The Naiyāyikas maintain that as soon as the word is uttered, a listener grasps its meaning. On the contrary, no one understands the full meaning of the sentence, unless he first understands the meaning of the constituent words. Therefore, the Naiyāyikas assume that the words have only denotative power. As opposed to this, the *vākyaśaktivāda* put forth by the grammarians, maintains that the words have meaning in a sentence only. Even the isolated utterance of the word *ghaṭaḥ* conveys the sense, "there is a jar" which is considered the sentence-meaning. Therefore, the grammarians maintain that the denotative function, be-

42. ATHALYE, *Tarkasaṁgraha*, p. 333: "It is probably to aviod this controversy that our author gives another and a better definition of शक्ति in the commentary, अर्थस्मृत्यनुकूलः पदपदार्थसंबन्धः शक्तिः। "Power is the relation of a word and an object, that always serves to revive the memory of that object (whenever the word is spoken)".

longing to the whole sentence like *nīlo ghaṭaḥ*, conveys the sense: "There is a jar which is non-different from a blue object". The Nyāya[43] system maintains that in the phrase *nīlo ghaṭaḥ*, the words *nīla*: 'blue' and *ghaṭa*: 'jar' convey their individual meanings separately, and the relational meaning (non-difference here) which is a new element that appears in the verbal cognition, is produced by the *tātparya*[44] function or *saṁsargamaryādā*. In other words, relational meaning is not the contribution of words. But, according to the *vākyaśaktivāda*, the meaning, which is designated as relational meaning *(saṁsargārtha)* in the Nyāya system, becomes the denoted meaning *(vācyārtha)* of a sentence. Furthermore, the meaning 'non-difference' which is conveyed by the sentence *nīlo ghaṭaḥ (asti)* paraphrased as *nīlābhinno ghaṭaḥ (asti)* is denoted by the suffix *ḥ* (originally *su*) appended to the adjective *nīla*. Thus, in accordance with this view, relation also becomes a word. Consequently, all meanings become word-meanings,[45] and, as a result, there remains no distinction between the word-meaning and the syntactic meaning, since both these merge in the sentence-meaning.

Now the grammarians argue that they make a single statement to represent the cause-effect relation between the verbal knowledge and the knowledge of the denotative function, viz.,

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43. *Vyutpattivāda*, Chowkhamba, 1933 p. 1:
शाब्दबोधे चैकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थान्वयः संसर्गमर्यादया भासते। See also p. 23: भेदोऽभावश्च विशेषणविभक्तेरर्थः। विशिष्टलाभस्त्वाकाङ्क्षादिवशात्।
44. *Sāhityadarpaṇa*, *loc. cit*; see also K. Kunjunni RAJA, *op. cit.*, p. 209.
45. R. C. PANDEYA, *op. cit.*, p. 150. see also p. 23.

"for the understanding of verbal meaning, the necessary cause is the knowledge of denotative function which (knowledge) is related to its contents (i.e. the meaning) by the relation of the container and the content (*viṣayatāsaṁbandha*[46])".

To understand this relation, we must know two aspects of knowledge: On the one hand, knowledge is related to its contents and on the other, it is a quality which is supposed to inhere in the soul. If we choose to consider the knowledge in its first aspect, we may say that the knowledge of the denotative function and of the verbal cognition, are correlated to their contents by *viṣayatāsaṁbandha* (the container and content relation). On the other hand, if we consider the knowledge in its second aspect, we may say that the knowledge of denotative function and of verbal cognition coexist in the soul by the relation of inherence.

To make it clear, this idea is exemplified as follows: From the phrase *nīlo ghaṭaḥ* the verbal knowledge will be *nīlābhinno ghaṭaḥ*[47]: 'a jar non-different from blue'. This verbal knowledge is the effect, and it is related to its contents (i) *nīla* (ii) *abhinna* and (iii) *ghaṭa* by the relation of the container and the content. When we make a cause-effect statement, the relation — by which the cause (here, the knowledge of the denotative function) is connected to its contents and the relation by which the effect (here, the verbal knowledge) is connected to its con-

46. This translation of the term *viṣayatā-saṁbandha* has been adopted by INGALLS in his Materials for the study of Navya-*Nyāya-Logic*, pp. 77-78.

47. *Vyutpattivāda*, *op. cit.*, p. 21:
अभेद एव वा विशेषणविभक्तेरर्थः । अभेदस्य संसर्गमर्यादया भानं तु समास-स्थले एव । see also p. 37: अभेदस्तादात्म्यम् । तच्च स्ववृत्त्यसाधारणो धर्मः । असाधारण्यं च एकमात्रवृत्तित्वम् ।

tents — must be the same. Here both the knowledges (i.e. the knowledge of the denotative function and of the verbal knowledge) are correlated to their contents by the relation of *viṣayatāsaṁbandha.*

According to the grammarians, the whole sentence-meaning is the content of the knowledge of the denotative function belonging to a sentence, and it is also the content[48] of the verbal knowledge (i.e. the import of the proposition); thus they can make a single statement — "whatever be the content of the knowledge of denotative function, it becomes the content of the verbal knowledge". In other words, it is the meaning of a sentence, and not of the words, that is the immediate antecedent of verbal knowledge. The grammarians' theory does not require to postulate extra-denotative function for syntactic meaning, because, according to their theory of the *vākyaśaktivāda*, the syntactical meaning does not exist separately from the word-meaning.

Against this, the Naiyāyikas, who advocate the *padaśakti* theory, maintain that the meaning of a word is conveyed by the denotative function of words; and for the understanding of relational meanings, they postulate another power called *tātparyaśakti* or *saṁsargamaryādā*. In the Nyāya view, the intention of the speaker plays an important role in conveying the syntactic meaning. In the phrase *nīlo ghaṭaḥ*, the relational

48. *Prabhā*, p. 478:
स्वविषयवृत्तिनिरूपकत्वसंबन्धेन वृत्तिज्ञानं शाब्दबोधे कारणम् । स्वं वृत्तिज्ञानं तद्विषयो वृत्तिस्तन्निरूपकत्वमर्थे इति पूर्वोक्तकारणतावच्छेदकसंबन्धेन वृत्तिज्ञानमप्यर्थे कार्यतावच्छेदकविषयतासंबन्धेन शाब्दबोधोऽपि तत्रैवेति शाब्दबोधरूपकार्यस्य वृत्तिज्ञानरूपकारणस्य च सामानाधिकरण्यनियमः संगच्छते ।

meaning, 'non-difference' is not denoted by the suffix *ḥ* appended to the word *nīla*, but it is indicated by the intention of the speaker.

Now KB argues that the Naiyāyikas cannot make a single[49] statement: "whatever be the content of the denotative function, it is the content of the verbal cognition", because according to them, the relational meaning (non-difference) which is understood in the verbal knowledge *nīlābhinno ghaṭaḥ*, cannot be the content of the knowledge of denotative functions of the words *nīla* and *ghaṭa*. In other words, relational meaning is the *śābdabodhaviṣaya*: 'the content of verbal knowledge', but it is not *vṛttijñānaviṣaya*: 'the content of the knowledge of denotative function'. Thus, instead of one single statement, the Naiyāyikas will have to make two statements:—

(i) "In order to have the knowledge of a syntactic meaning appearing in the verbal knowledge, the necessary cause is the knowledge of the *tātparya* function or *saṁsargamaryādā*" and (ii) "In order to have the knowledge of denoted meaning which appears in the verbal knowledge, the necessary cause is the knowledge of denotative function residing in a word".

101, 6-11

TR: (*Objection:*) The meaning of a sentence being something new (i.e. different from the meaning of the individual words),

49. *Darpaṇa*, p. 404:
अन्यथा घटपदशक्तिमविदुषस्तत्पदज्ञानवतो घटमानयेति वाक्यार्थबोधापत्त्या घटशाब्दबोधे घटार्थकपदवृत्तिज्ञानजन्योपस्थितित्वेन हेतुता वाच्येत्यर्थभेदेनानन्तकार्यकारणभावकल्पने गौरवम् । अस्मन्मते तु विषयतासंबन्धेन घटवृत्तिज्ञानजन्योपस्थितेरसत्त्वान्न शाब्दे तस्य भानम् इत्येक एव कार्यकारणभावः कल्प्यत इति लाघवादित्यर्थः ।

how can the denotative function (of a sentence) be known[50] (prior to the verbal knowledge of the proposition)? To meet this objection (the author of the *kārikā*) says: '(relational) meaning' etc. (The phrase) 'of a sentence' is to be supplied. If it is argued that the denotative function of a sentence cannot be known (antecedently) to convey the relational meaning, we say that (the apprehension of) it (i.e. relational meaning) is equally impossible in the case of those who hold the view that the denotative function of a word has the capacity to convey the relational meaning (as a part of the sentence meaning).

If you advance the theory of the 'lame' denotative function which serves the purpose when it (*śakti*) is known so far as the meanings of words are concerned and unknown so far as the constructional meaning is concerned, we also may accept the similar theory that the denotative function serves our purpose when it is unknown so far as the (relational meaning of) a sentence is concerned.

NOTES: *Apūrva*: The Naiyāyikas argue that the meaning of a sentence cannot be comprehended prior to the verbal knowledge *(śābdabodha)*. The verbal knowledge not only points out the meaning of the individual words, but also the new element in the form of relational meaning, which cannot be the contribution of the constituent[51] words of the sentence. Thus, according to the Naiyāyikas, the meaning of a word is cognized prior to the verbal knowledge of a sentence, and the relational mean-

50. *Parīkṣā*, p. 406:
शाब्दबोधात्प्रागनुपस्थितत्वात् ।

51. Gadādhara, *Vyutpattivāda*, *op. cit.*, p. 1:
शाब्दबोधे चैकपदार्थेऽपरपदार्थान्वयः संसर्गमर्यादया भासते ।

ing is cognized only at the time of the verbal knowledge. Therefore the Naiyāyikas claim that the sentence conveys some new meaning which is not merely a sum total of word-meanings. But, in the view of the *vākyaśaktivāda*, sentences are considered primary units of language, and words have no importance. In this view, we cannot make the distinction of the word-meanings and sentence-meaning. Every meaning that appears in the verbal knowledge is the contribution of a sentence, and it is only known through the denotative function of a sentence. The Naiyāyikas, therefore, raise the objection against the *vākyaśaktivāda* that, at this rate, the meaning of a sentence cannot be unknown[52] even before the verbal cognition has taken place in the mind. In other words, in the view of the *vākyaśakti* theory, the distinction between the meanings obtained through the *vākyaśaktijñāna* and meaning cognized through *vākyaśābdabodha* can no longer remain distinct.

The grammarians' answer to this charge lies in their adherence to the Prābhākara theory of *anvitābhidhānavāda.*[53] According to the Prābhākaras, a word being a part of the sentence always denotes the meaning as related to the meanings of other words. In conformity with this view, a word not only denotes its meaning but also its relation to the other word-meanings. A word has not an independent meaning, when it is separated from the sentence. Thus the Prābhākaras maintain that the relational meaning is also the denoted meaning

52. Nāgeśa, *Sphoṭavāda* p. 52:
अत एव अपूर्वो वाक्यार्थः इति प्रवादः संगच्छते । अपूर्वत्वं च शाब्दबोधप्राक्क्षणवृत्तितज्जनकशब्दजन्यवृत्त्यविषयत्वमित्याहुः ।

53. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 364:
यदि वाक्यस्य वाक्यार्थे व्युत्पत्तिस्तदन्विताभिधानम् । पदस्य पदार्थे व्युत्पत्तावभिहितान्वय इति ।

of a word. They contend that the word denotes the meaning *itarapadārthānvita*: 'meaning related to the meanings of other words'. But this related meaning of a word is known in a general way, and the definite relationship between the meanings of the words, in their precise form, is clearly brought out at the time of verbal knowledge. Now the grammarians, arguing on the same line, maintain that the denotative function of a sentence denotes the meaning of the individual words distinctly and their relation, in a general way, along with the other word-meanings. That is to say, the precise relation between the various word-meanings is cognized at the time of verbal knowledge alone. And, thus, in the grammarians' view, the distinction — between the meanings obtained through the *vākyaśaktijñāna* and the *śābdabodha* — remains intact. To put it particularly, the precise relation which is unknown through the *vākyaśakti* is made known through the *śābdabodha*. For further explanation see pp. 145-50.

Kubjaśaktivāda[54]: 'the theory of 'lame' denotative function'. The theory intends to point out that just as a hump-backed person cannot undertake any business which needs to be performed by his 'deformed limbs', but may actively engage himself in the acts that can be performed by his 'undeformed limbs' like the eyes etc., in the same way, the denotative func-

54. *Śāṁkarī*, p. 487:

क्वचिदंशे ज्ञाता शक्तिः कारणं क्वचिदंशे तु अज्ञाता कारणम् इत्येवं यो वादः स एव कुब्जशक्तिवाद इति भावः । तथा च कुब्जशक्तिवादानुसारेण पदार्थांशे व्यक्त्यंशे, पदशक्तिर्ज्ञाता पदार्थानां पूर्वं सिद्धत्वाच्छाब्दबोधात्प्रागुपस्थितत्वात् तत्र शक्तिग्रहसंभवाज्ज्ञाता उपयुज्यते । अन्वयांशे तु वाक्यार्थरूपान्वयांशस्य शाब्दबोधात्प्रागनुपस्थितत्वादज्ञातैव उपयुज्यते इत्युच्यते चेद्वाक्यशक्तिवादिनो ममापि वाक्यस्य शक्तिरज्ञातैव वाक्यार्थे संसर्गरूपे उपयुज्यते इति समः कुब्जशक्तिवादाङ्गीकारः।

tion of words is 'lame' or 'deformed' so far as it cannot convey the relational meaning in a specific form, but it is 'undeformed' so far as it can convey the word-meaning in a specific form. This is the view of the Prābhākaras.

101, 12-16

TR: (If it is argued —) that watching the usage and activity *(vyavahāra)* of the elderly persons, just as one (through the mental process) comes to know it (denotative function of a word) which conveys the notion of word-meaning, so also does one come to know the *vākyārtha* (the relational meaning)—then to this (the author of the *kārikā)* gives the reply, by the phrase 'through mental process' etc., that this equally holds good (in the case of a sentence too). The word *lakṣaṇa* means the mind (because, it is the mind) by which (something) is indicated i.e. implied. The word *api* is to be placed after the word *pada*. The phrase *vākye'pi*: 'about the sentence also' is to be supplied. If it is held that, even in the case of words, one comes to know (their denotative function) through mental process, let the same be true of the sentence as well. Really speaking, it should be taken into consideration, that, in the first place, it (i.e. the denotative function) residing in the whole of sentence alone, is apprehended to convey the entire meaning (of the sentence), and, subsequently, it (denotative function) residing in each word severally, is understood through (the process of) agreement and contrast (*āvāpodvāpa*, to convey the meaning of individual words).

NOTES: The Prābhākaras maintain that, when a child[55] hears the usage *gām ānaya*: 'bring a cow' and observes the activity

55. *Ṛjuvimalā* on *Bṛhatī*, p. 397:
वृद्धव्यवहारव्युत्पत्तावेव केवलेन पदार्थेन व्यवहाराभावात्, अन्वित एव पदार्थे पदानां व्युत्पत्तिः। also p. 291: पदान्येवान्विताभिधायीनि वाक्यम्। पदार्था एवान्विता अभिधीयमाना वाक्यार्थः।

of elderly persons, it understands, at this stage, the meaning of the whole injunctive sentence as such, which involves a visible reaction on the part of the listeners. Later on, when a child hears someone saying *aśvam ānaya*: 'Bring a horse' and observes the activity of bringing a horse, it compares and contrasts the two sentences *gām ānaya* and *aśvam ānaya* with each other. By the process of contrast and agreement (*āvāpodvāpa*) it comprehends the denotation of the individual words. Thus, the Prābhākaras contend that the meaning of words is always comprehended through the injunctive sentences which involve some act to be done. In other words, comprehension of the denotation of the words is achieved by the mental process of agreement and contrast. Accordingly, the word *gām*, in view of the Prābhākaras, does not simply mean 'cow', but 'cow' as related to the action of bringing. This leads to the theory that words not only convey their individual meanings but also their syntactic relation to the other word-meanings. From this it is clear that the Prābhākaras deny the sentence alone as the sole conveyor of the meaning. Against this theory, the grammarians maintain on the basis of the sentences mentioned above, that a child, at first, understands the meaning from the sentence alone. Since the whole sentence is operated in the communication, the grammarians have a reason to believe that the denotative function embodied in the whole sentence conveys the meaning. In short, a sentence is a single undivided utterance, and it does not admit of the division of a sentence into words, stems, suffixes and phonemes.

102, 1-5

TR: (Introduction to the *ḥārikā* 65). Now (the author of the verse) maintains that this (the view put forth by the gram-

marians) is the view which is adopted by the Mīmāṁsakas[56] and some of the Vedāntins.

(Kārikā 65). The followers of the Bhāṭṭa school, who maintain that the relational meaning (*vākyārtha*) is in all cases conveyed by the secondary function, also thus declare that (secondary function) *lakṣaṇā* is operated in apprehending (the verbal knowledge of a sentence).

The word *Bhāṭṭa* (in the *kārikā)* stands also for his (i.e. Bhāṭṭa's) followers: Vācaspati, Kalpataru and others. This (i.e. the meaning of the verse) is clear.

NOTES: The followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and some Vedāntins maintain that the syntactic relation between the word-meanings is to be conveyed through the secondary function (*lakṣaṇā*), because syntactic meaning varies from sentence to sentence, and it cannot be of a fixed character. Accordingly, they put forth the idea that words convey their individual meanings through *abhidhā*, but when the denotative function fails to convey the syntactically unified meaning, the secondary function comes into play, and conveys the connected unified meaning of a sentence. The Prābhākara school differs from the Bhāṭṭa school in maintaining the fact that the denotative function is capable of conveying the connected notion of the word-meanings.

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56. Kumārila quoted in *Tattvabindu*, Annamalai University, p. 153: वाक्यार्थो लक्ष्यमाणो हि सर्वत्रैवेति नः स्मृतः। See also *ibid.*, p. 131: लभ्यते च समभिव्याहारान्यथानुपपत्त्या पदानामन्वितार्थपराणां स्वाभिधेयार्थरूपसमवेतान्वितावस्थाप्रत्यायनं लक्षणा।

The Naiyāyikas hold that the meanings of words are known through *abhidhā*, and through the medium of word-meanings, the sentence-meaning is apprehended with the help of the laws of syntactical meaning like *tātparya*[57] (intention of the speaker) or *saṁsargamaryādā* (a particular juxtaposition of words). But if this view is accepted, the meaning conveyed by a sentence cannot be a *śābda*[58] (verbal) meaning, because it does not arise from the sentence through *vṛtti* (either *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*). Similarly, the view of the Prābhākaras is also unacceptable to the grammarians, because, although the former maintain that the denotative function of words conveys word-meanings as related to other words, still the cognition of unified meaning, which follows the cognition of relation between the word-meanings, cannot be said to have arisen directly from *vṛtti (abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā)*. To put it differently, the Prābhākaras admit that the denotation of relation by words is of a widely general nature and the specific relation is ascertained inde-

57. *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 371:

इयं वाचोयुक्तिः पदान्यन्वितं प्रत्याययन्ति नान्वितमभिदधति, नाभिधात्री शक्तिरन्वितविषया किं तु अन्वयव्यतिरेकावगतनिष्कृष्टस्वार्थविषयैव, तात्पर्यशक्तिस्तु तेषामन्वितावगमपर्यन्ता...।

Ibid., p. 367:

अशाब्दत्वं च वाक्यार्थप्रतीतेरित्थमापतेत् ।
व्यवधानमयुक्तं च साक्षाच्छब्दत्वसंभवे ।

58. *Mānameyodaya, op. cit.*, p. 94:

वयं तु पदार्था लक्षणयैव वाक्यार्थं बोधयन्तीति ब्रूमः । वाच्यार्थानुपपत्त्या हि लक्षणा भवति । अत्र च पदैः स्मार्यमाणा गवादिपदार्था यद्यन्योन्यान्वयं विना सामान्यरूपा एवावतिष्ठेरन् तर्हि पदानां व्युत्पत्तिसमयावधृतम् एकविशिष्टार्थबोधतात्पर्यं विरुध्येत इति सामान्यरूपस्य वाच्यस्यानुपपत्तेः अन्योन्यान्वयरूपे विशेषे एव पदार्थाः पर्यवस्यन्ति ।

pendently in the verbal cognition. Thus, the specific relation is understood only from the sentence. Such a relation which appears in the verbal cognition is not an outcome of the denotative function, and, accordingly, it becomes *aśābda*, because it is not shared by *vṛtti (abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā)*. However, according to the grammarians, the question of division of sentence-meaning into word-meaning and syntactic meaning does not arise, because their theory maintains the indivisibility of sentence-meaning conveyed by the indivisible speech-unit. The grammarians, on the other hand, agree partially with the Bhāṭṭa school, insofar as they maintain that a unified sentence-meaning is verbal. According to the Bhāṭṭas, the cognition of unified meaning becomes *śābda* as it is conveyed by *lakṣaṇā*. With regard to this view, a distinction is to be sought between the grammarians and the *Bhāṭṭas*: The former maintain that the denotative function of a sentence conveys unified meaning of a sentence, while, according to the latter, the secondary function conveys syntactically unified meaning.

To prove that sentence-meaning is known through the sentence-function, but not from the function of individual words, KB cites an example in the *Bhūṣaṇa* (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, p. 240), *haridrāyāṁ nadyāṁ ghoṣaḥ*[59]: "A hamlet (is situated) on (the bank of) the river Haridrā". A person, who listens to this sentence, understands the sentence-meaning even if he is unaware of the meaning of the individual word

59. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, p. 240:

प्रागविज्ञातहरिद्रानामकनदीविशेषेण हरिद्रायां नद्यां घोष इति श्रुते वाक्ये नदीपदसमभिव्याहारेण तदानीमेव हरिद्राशब्दस्य नदीविशेषशक्तिग्रहेण नदीलिङ्गात् तत्संबन्धित्वेनावगततीरप्रत्ययवदिति परिमलोक्तरीत्या वाच्यं समं तर्ह्यस्माकमपि ।

haridrā, because he can guess that Haridrā is the name of a river, through the proximity of the known word *nadī* in the same sentence. This proves that the sentence-meaning is apprehended even if one of the word-meanings is unknown to us. Thus the meaning of a sentence is not necessarily apprehended from a knowledge of the word-meanings.

102, 5-10

TR: (Objection:) The said two views (word-*sphoṭa* and sentence-*sphoṭa*) are improper, because the cognition (i.e. auditory perception) of a word, which is an aggregate of phonemes, either uttered or manifested, is not possible, since the simultaneous production or manifestation (of all phonemes, pronounced in succession) is impossible (to account for). Accordingly, it becomes utterly impossible to have a cognition of a sentence which is of the nature of aggregate of these (words).

(Answer:) This (objection) is unfounded. For, at the time of the perception of succeeding phonemes, the phoneme (in question) appears to be accompanied by the preceding phoneme which presents itself (to the mind, in the form of its impression), owing to its relation of immediate subsequent occurrence with reference to it. Similarly, at the time of the perception of the phoneme (i.e. the third phoneme) subsequent to it (i.e. the second phoneme), it (the third phoneme) appears to be accompanied by that (the second) phoneme in combination (with the first phoneme) presented (to the memory). In this manner, it is easy to cognize even a sentence as a word which consists of such a sequence of phonemes.

NOTES: There are primarily two sets of views regarding the nature of word and sentence: divisibility and indivisibility. Of these two views, the *sakhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and *sakhaṇḍavākya-*

sphoṭa, which are introduced in the last *kārikā,* admit the divisibility of words into phonemes, and divisibility of a sentence into words. The views, *akhaṇḍapadasphoṭa* and *akhaṇḍavākya-sphoṭa* which KB will introduce in he next *kārikā,* maintain indivisibility of words and sentences.

At this stage the *pūrvapakṣin* raises an objection in determining the nature of the terms 'word' and 'sentence'. If word is defined as a sequence of phonemes, then the *pūrvapakṣin* points out that the word could not be apprehended by the auditory perception as a single unit. A word consists of a succession of phonemes. No one can pronounce all phonemes simultaneously, as, for instance, in the word *gauḥ,* we cannot have simultaneity of the phoneme *g-* with the phonemes *-au-* and *-ḥ,* since at the time when *ḥ* is uttered, the phonemes *g* and *au* are non-existent. Since the phonemes which build up the word do not co-exist, we cannot maintain the single apprehension of a word as a unit.

KB answers the objection by assuming the theory[60] of association. This theory maintains that each succeeding sound progressively reveals the sub-structure of a word in the form of a certain sequence, and all these substructures directly or indirectly reveal the word which is an aggregate of phonemes. Although the phonemes are momentary and perishable, yet each phoneme leaves its impression on the mind of a listener. As soon as the second phoneme is uttered, the listener recollects the impression of the previous phoneme and combines

60. *Sphoṭavāda,* p. 68:
also K. K. RAJA, *op. cit.,* p. 134: 'The *sphoṭa theory* itself presupposes something like this as the means of revealing the *sphoṭa,* namely a comprehensive cognition of the letters in their proper order'.

that with the subsequent phoneme. For further explanation see introduction, pp. 69-70.

102, 11-13

TR: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 66). Now (the author of the verse) introduces the view of the indivisibility (of words and sentence in the following *kārikā*).

(Kārikā 66). There are no phonemes in the words, and (there are) no parts in the phonemes. There is no absolute and clear-cut separation of words from sentence.

NOTES: The verse is taken from the *Vākyapadīya* (1.73). Now the author of the verse explains the conception of the indivisible word-*sphoṭa* and the indivisible sentence-*sphoṭa*. When these views are acknowledged, neither the sentence nor the words admit of any division. According to the view of the indivisible word-*sphoṭa*, the word conveys one single undivided idea, and the division of words into stems and suffixes is a grammatical fiction. The view of indivisible sentence-*sphoṭa* puts forth the theory that the division of sentences into words is logically impossible, because, for the purpose of communication, the sentence as a whole conveys the unity of meaning, and thus, we cannot reduce sentence to words. In other words, while apprehending the meaning from a sentence, the listener does not grasp the division of sentence into smaller constituents.

The verse means that if a phoneme occurring in different words is regarded as the same phoneme and that a word occurring in different sentences is regarded as the same word, then the words and sentences would not be over and above the phonemes and words. The verse tells us that the phonemes do not form part of the word because they do not co-exist.

The word is without sequence of phonemes and the sentence is bereft of the sequence of words, even if they are cognized as having the sequence of phonemes and words. In other words, the sequence of phonemes and words is not to be identified with the meaning-bearing nature of a word and a sentence.

102, 14-16; 103, 1-6

TR: "There are no phonemes in (the words) *pacati* etc." And therefore the term (*pada*) cannot be defined as an 'aggregate of phonemes' is (the implication) to be supplied. (To support this, the author of the verse) furnishes the analogical instances by the words "in the phonemes etc." As in the phonemes *e, o, ḷ* and *ṛ*, though the parts (*a, i, l, r*) are separately cognized, they are not regarded as (separate parts of the phonemes; in the same manner, word should not be considered as divisible into stems and suffixes). The reading *iva* (instead of *na* in the verse) is found in some (texts, which means that there are no phonemes in words just as there are no parts in phonemes). (The author of the verse says that) the same is true of the sentence also, in the words, "from sentence etc." There is no separation, i.e. isolation, of the words either, from the sentence. The sense of (the passage) is as follows: (Both) the word and the sentence are indivisible, and cannot be viewed as an aggregation of phonemes, because there is no evidence to assume the infinity of phonemes.

The diversity in the knowledge such as 'this is the phoneme *k*', 'this is he phoneme *g*', can be justified simply by assuming a diversity in the delimiting property of production (*utpatti*) or revelation (*abhivyakti*) of various phonemes, residing in the conjunction of the wind (generally) accepted as giving rise to the various sounds. It is clearly stated in the section dealing

with *Devatās (Devatādhikaraṇa)* in the Bhāmatī[61] that 'the shrillness etc. residing in the wind are superimposed upon the phonemes'.

NOTES: KB, in this passage, opens the topic of the indivisibility of words and sentences. He points out that, in reality, diphthongs such as *e* and *o*, and central vowels *ṛ* and *ḷ* are indivisible entities, i.e. single phonemes, but they are split into two phonemes to enable the beginner to understand a proper approach to phonetic study. Similarly, a sentence cannot be said to be divided into words, stems, suffixes and phonemes. KB goes on to show that the idea of sequence of phonemes, which is associated with the concept of words and sentences, is mere delusion engendered by sounds through which a word or a sentence appears to have been revealed. The notion of a word as an aggregation of phonemes is purely fictional, since it is dependent on the perception of sounds. Furthermore, he thinks that the conception of the diversity in the phonemes is also delusion caused by the sound-producing air-movements through which phonemes appear to have been revealed. KB says that when the breath-wind comes into contact with the different vocal organs, it assumes the form of different phonemes. The diversity belonging to the air-movements (*vāyusaṁyoga*) which come into contact with the different articulatory points, is superimposed upon sounds[62] which are the modifications of airy substance. The internal air striking against the different vocal organs assumes the shape[63] of dif-

61. *Bhāmatī* on the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 1. 3. 28:

62. *VP.*, 1-107
वायोरणूनां ज्ञानस्य शब्दत्वापत्तिरिष्यते ।

63. *Śābarabhāṣya*, pp. 90-91:
तथा च शिक्षाकारा आहुर्वायुरापद्यते शब्दताम् ।

ferent sounds, and this explains the cognitions: 'This is the phoneme *k*', 'This is the phoneme *g*'. The properties of air-substance are invariably felt to be associated with the phonemes perceived by the auditory organs. The distinctive existence of phonemes apart from the sound-producing air-movements is not admitted. KB conclusively says that it is undoubtedly a mistake to split up words into so many phonemes, because phonemes are fictional. In reality the words and sentences are unitary and indivisible. Physical qualities[64] of the articulate speech cannot be actual words or sentences.

103, 6-8

TR: (Question:) Then why should the conjunction of air-waves itself (with the points of articulation) not be (assumed as) denotative of meaning?

(Answer:) This is wrong. Because it is established on the basis of valid experience that the phonemes *k* etc. which are apprehended through the (auditory) perception, are denotative of meaning.

64. Alan GARDINER, *The theory of speech and language*, p. 70: "It (word) is, in fact, something relatively permanent, widespread, and capable of being possessed in common by a multitude of individuals. All these considerations prove, beyond possibility of contradiction, that words transcend, and are altogether less evanescent entities than, the sounds which issue from a speaker's mouth and vanish into nothingness soon after they have reached the listener's ear. As words exist in the possession of every individual, they are physical entities, comprising on the one hand an area of meaning, and on the other hand the image of the particular sound susceptible of being physically reproduced whenever wanted".

NOTES: In the previous passage, it has been shown that the phonemes are not different from one another, but they appear to be different on account of the medium through which they are revealed. Now the *pūrvapakṣin* raises the following question: Instead of assuming that the fictional phonemes are denotative, why are not the sound-producing movements themselves considered to be denotative? KB answers this question by reasoning out that the valid experience shows that the listener recognizes the sound by saying 'This is the same phoneme *k*'. This recognition clearly identifies the two or more different phonemes *k* uttered by different people at different periods of time. The auditory perception of the phonemes experienced by people cannot be ascribed to the sound-producing movements[65], which are beyond the sense-organs. In other words, the speaker makes sound-producing movements; and from them, the listener perceives the phonemes. The inner effort which produces sounds, is different from the auditory perception of the outer phonemes. The listener identifies the outer phonemes, and not the inner sound-producing movements, which are beyond the sense-organs.

103, 8-9

TR: Since we cannot otherwise account for the (conception of) denotation (by a single entity), and since we have a cognition 'this is the same phoneme *g*' 'this is the same word', 'this is the same sentence', the *sphoṭa* is established as an indivisible (single unit).

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65. *Darpaṇa*, pp. 412-13:
अयमाशयः । कादिवर्णानामुक्तसंयोगात्मकत्वे अतीन्द्रियतापत्तिः । न च सेष्टा अनुभवविरोधात् । न चोक्तकत्वस्य अतीन्द्रियधर्मत्वेन कथं साक्षात्कारविषयत्वमिति वाच्यम् । सुरभिचन्दनम् इति प्रतीतौ चक्षुरयोग्यस्यापि सौरभादेः चाक्षुषविषयत्ववत्तस्यापि श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वसंभवात् ।

NOTES: KB points out: everyone feels that a phoneme or a word or a sentence is a single entity; and this unitary experience cannot be justified unless we postulate the indivisibility of phoneme-*sphoṭa*, word-*sphoṭa* and sentence-*sphoṭa*.

To support this, KB furnishes instances of recognition (*pratyabhijñā*) *so'yaṁ gakārah*: 'This is the same phonemes g', *tad eve'daṁ padam*: 'This is the same word', *tad eve'daṁ vākyam*: 'This is the same sentence'. The first instance points out that the phoneme-*sphoṭa* remains the same, although it is distinctively revealed by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. In other words, from the point of view of the phoneme-*sphoṭa*, the individual peculiarities of utterances do not render the phoneme different. This experience shows that the phoneme *g* is a single entity and gives a unitary character to the phoneme *g*. Similarly, the experience 'this is one word', or 'this is one sentence', cannot be attributed to the phonemes, or stems or suffixes or words, because the notion of unitariness cannot present the different objects as its content. By the phrase *vācakatvānyathānupapattyā* KB suggests that we cannot attribute this unitary perception to the collective notion of the phonemes in a single memory. The perceptive experience shows that the word *gauḥ* is a single[66] entity, and it corresponds to the unity of meaning. It is not possible to argue that this unitary experience is based on the single memory of all the phonemes combined together, because non-meaningful phonemes cannot give rise to a meaning even when they are put together in a single memory. Simi-

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66. *Tattvabindu*, p. 23:
सार्वजनीनमपि पदमिति वाक्यमिति चैकविषयमनुभवमपजानीते स इत्थं शिक्षणीयः । also *Sarvadarśanasaṁgraha*, p. 299: प्रत्यक्षमेवात्र प्रमाणम् गौरित्येकं पदमिति नानावर्णातिरिक्तैकपदावगतेस्सार्वजनीनत्वात् ।

larly, the recognition, 'this is the same sentence' presents the unitary character of a sentence. The spoken sentence is always a single entity apart from the different words or phonemes which appear to be cognized as constituents of it. The unitary perception of word or of sentence experienced by common people is considered to be the fundamental argument in establishing the *sphoṭa*-theory by the grammarians.

103, 9-11

TR: Hereby is discarded the view: the phonemes, which are actually heard, are denotative, because in the word *gauḥ* etc. we do not perceive the *sphoṭa* (as a single entity) different from (the phonemes) *g-au-visarga* (i.e. *ḥ*). Because (we admit that) they (phonemes) are not different from the *sphoṭa*.

NOTES: In the previous passage, KB has maintained that the *sphoṭa* as an indivisible unit revealed by the sound-producing movements of air, is denotative of meaning. Now he maintains the view that sounds perceived by the listeners are non-different from the *sphoṭa*. The grammarians maintain that the *sphoṭa* is increasingly and progressively revealed by the sounds. When a man utters a syllable *gha* with the intention of saying *ghaṭa*, the first syllable vaguely suggests the notion of the word *ghaṭa*. When the last syllable *ṭa* is uttered the idea of the *sphoṭa* word is distinctly revealed. Consequently, KB maintains that the perception of the *sphoṭa*-entity is not different from the perception of sounds. The *sphoṭa* is cognized in the form of the distinctive sounds *g-h-a-ṭ-a*. He says that the object of cognition is the indivisible word-*sphoṭa*, but its form is nothing else than the phonemes auditorily perceived. The commentators explain the text by the phrase *vyañjakavāyusaṁyogagatagatvādinā sphoṭasyaiva bhānāt*: 'nothing but *sphoṭa* is apprehended through the distinct (perception of the) phonemes *g* etc. revealed by

the air-movements'. The phonemes[67] perceived by the auditory organs are non-different from the *sphoṭa*. What KB means to say is that the auditory impression of the phonemes is not different from the perception of the *sphoṭa*, although he recognizes the difference in the articulated speech and the perception of the *sphoṭa*. In other words, phonemes grasped by the listeners have no separate existence from the indivisible *sphoṭa*-entity.

To put it differently, the sound manifesting the phoneme *g* is different from the *sphoṭa* word *gauḥ* manifested by the sounds produced by the air that strikes against the various places of articulation. Yet the phoneme *g* manifested by sound is identified with the phoneme *g* which appears to be the part of indivisible *sphoṭa* word. The difference between the phoneme *g* conceived as a part of the *sphoṭa* and the individual phoneme *g* is not noticed separately, because they are identified owing to their resemblance with one another. This confusion arises because the air-movements which progressively reveal the *sphoṭa* word *gauḥ* appear similar to the air-movements which manifest the individual phonemes *g*, *au*, and *ḥ*. Owing to this confusion, the *sphoṭa* which is partless appears to have parts. In reality, the individual phonemes are not conceived to be different from the partless *sphoṭa* progressively revealed.

103, 12-18 ·

TR: The (following) statements of Kaiyaṭa do not carry much weight: "If each phoneme is (assumed to be) denotative of

67. KB's conception of the *varṇa* is analogous to the conception of the phonemes. The word *varṇa* refers to the auditory impression of the articulated speech. cf. *sphoṭavāda*, pp. 74-75:
ननु वर्णसत्त्वे मानाभावः वक्ष्यमाणरीत्यानुभवेन च वर्णस्थले ध्वनीनामावश्यकत्वेन तैरेव स्फोटाभिव्यक्तिसंभवे ध्वनिस्फोटयोर्मध्ये वर्णाङ्गीकारे गौरवादिति चेद् भवन्तु त एव वर्णाः ।

meaning, there would arise the apprehension of meaning from each phoneme. The cognition of aggregation (of phonemes which you assume as denotative of meaning) is not at all possible (to account for), because (there can be no such aggregation of) phonemes (as they are) either uttered quickly in a sequence or revealed so. If it is argued that there is a possibility of cognition of all phonemes simultaneously in the form of a collective notion, with the help of the impressions (produced by) the cognition of each preceding phoneme, then, (we say) it (a cognition thus arising) would be identical in the words like *nadī* and *dīna; rāja* and *jarā;* and *saro* and *raso* (which would lead to an undesirable result). Therefore, the indivisible *sphoṭa* itself revealed by the sounds is to be considered as denotative". (The view put forth by Kaiyaṭa is wrong, because,) the possibility of cognition of a word has been already justified. Moreover, this theory also involves the (choice between the two) alternatives viz., whether the phonemes reveal the *sphoṭa* singly or collectively.

NOTES: Kaiyaṭa raises the question whether the sense arises from a sound-series or from a word as a single unit. It cannot be maintained that each phoneme conveys the meaning individually, because in that case, the first phoneme of the word *gauḥ* would convey the notion of cow, and the remaining phonemes would be meaningless. It would not be helpful to say that the combination of phonemes conveys the meaning collectively, because we do not pronounce all the phonemes of a word simultaneously. The phonemes perish as soon as they are produced or revealed by air-waves. Thus simultaneity of phonemes in a word is impossible to account for. Kaiyaṭa maintains further that it cannot be said that, although the phonemes of a word are momentary, yet each phoneme leaves its impression on the mind of a listener, and as soon as the last phoneme is uttered,

it gives rise to the collective remembrance of all phonemes in a single memory, because, if it were so, we will not be able to distinguish the words *nadī* and *dīna;* and *rāja* and *jarā.* The collective remembrance caused by the impressions of phonemes does not represent the idea of sequence, and unless it is assumed that sequence also reflects in memory, difference between the words *rāja* and *jarā* etc. would be unaccountable. In the above mentioned pairs, the constituent phonemes are the same, and thus, collective remembrance of phonemes in a single memory will be identical. Difference of sequence does not make any difference in the collective remembrance of phonemes in a single memory. It is on account of these reasons, Kaiyaṭa says, that the grammarians assume that the *sphoṭa*-word is a single indivisible entity which is revealed by sounds.

KB criticises Kaiyaṭa's view because he has already proved that at the time of cognition of the last phoneme, a sequence of preceding phonemes also appears in the cognition, because the cognition of the succeeding phoneme appears to be associated with the knowledge of the interrelation[68] of preceding phonemes also.

And finally, KB says that Kaiyaṭa's theory is not immune from the charges that are levelled against those who do not accept the *sphoṭa.* The same difficulty can be raised against Kaiyaṭa's view which he has put forth to establish the *sphoṭa*

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68. *Nyāyamañjarī,* p. 345:
अथवा क्रमोपलब्धेष्वपि वर्णेषु मानसमनुव्यवसायरूपमखिलवर्णविषयं संकलनाज्ञानं यदुपजायते तदर्थप्रत्यायनाङ्गं भविष्यति, दृश्यते च विनश्वरेष्वपि पदार्थान्तरेषु युगपदनुव्यवसायो मानसः शतमाम्राणि भक्षितवान् देवदत्त इति...स चायं संकलनाप्रत्ययः स्मर्यमाणानुभूयमानप्राक्तनान्त्यवर्णविषयतया सदसद्वर्णगोचरश्चित्ररूप उपेयते...।

theory. KB points out that Kaiyaṭa cannot maintain that each sound reveals the whole *sphoṭa*, because if it were so, the succeeding sounds will be useless appendages. It cannot be maintained that *sphoṭa* is revealed by the phonemes collectively, because, according to Kaiyaṭa, the combination of perishable phonemes or the idea of sequence cannot be reflected in a single memory. Therefore, KB says that the main reason for accepting the *sphoṭa* theory is not unaccountability of the idea of sequence, but the experience that the word *gauḥ* is single and unitary.

103, 18; 104, 1-8

TR: (Objection:) But this difficulty arises even if your view is accepted, because there remains the possibility of raising the alternatives viz. whether the conjunctions of air-waves (with the points of articulation) necessary for the production of various phonemes, reveal (the *sphoṭa*) individually or collectively.

(Answer:) The conjunctions of the air-waves (with the points of articulations) taken individually reveal (the *sphoṭa*); but some of them reveal the phoneme *g,* some reveal *au;* and some reveal the *visarga* (i.e. *ḥ*). And in this way they reveal (the phonemes) in various forms, and, hence, the acceptance of the non-difference of phonemes from the *sphoṭa* also is justified.

And thus, the (syllable) *ṭa* is cognized as being associated with the (syllable) *gha* owing to (its) relation of immediate subsequent occurrence (with respect to the syllable *gha*). Accordingly, there remains no controversy in holding that such a cognition of the word (in the form of cognition of association of the phonemes in sequence) acts as the cause (of cognition of the meaning). However, the immediate subsequent occurrence (of the phoneme *b* with respect to the phoneme *a*)

should be assumed to mean that it (the phoneme *b*) becomes the object of the knowledge (associated with the moment) of coming into existence, which (moment) corresponds to the moment of the knowledge of duration (of the phoneme *a*). That is why the old Naiyāyikas say that the sequence (of the syllables *gha* and *ṭa*) means that (the syllable *ṭa*) becomes the object of the knowledge which comes after the knowledge of (the syllable) *gha*. And thus there remains no fault.

NOTES: Now the *pūrvapakṣin* raises the same difficulty against KB's explanation of the *sphoṭa*-theory, which the opponent has to confront. Do the sound-producing air-waves individually or collectively reveal *sphoṭa*? It cannot be held that the sound-producing air-waves reveal *sphoṭa* individually; because, if it were so, any particular sound-producing air-wave would be enough to reveal *sphoṭa* and the remaining airwaves would be redundant. It cannot be argued that the sound-producing air-waves reveal *sphoṭa* collectively, because the air-waves are momentary, and each air-wave perishes as soon as the succeeding air-wave comes into existence. In this manner, it is impossible to explain the collection of air-waves.

KB meets this objection by saying that the sound-producing movements reveal *sphoṭa* individually. A single air-wave for instance, in the word *gauḥ*, reveals *sphoṭa* through the medium of the sound *g*, another air-wave reveals *sphoṭa* through the medium of sound-*au;* and the third one reveals *sphoṭa* through the medium of *visarga*. Thus *sphoṭa* is more and more clearly revealed with each of the succeeding air-waves. To put it differently, *sphoṭa* is not clearly revealed in its entirety by the individual air-waves, until the last sound is revealed. In other words, each air-wave reveals the same *sphoṭa* through the medium of three different sounds (in the word *gauḥ*), and these

three different sounds (perceived auditorily) are considered non-different from the *sphoṭa*-word *gauḥ*. In this manner, KB says that the *sphoṭa* word *gauḥ* is revealed by each individual air-wave through the medium of the order of sounds *g- au -ḥ*. *Svajñānādhikaraṇakṣaṇotpattikajñānaviṣayatvam*: According to the Naiyāyikas, any knowledge lasts for three moments[69] only. The time associated with the *utpatti* or coming into existence of knowledge is represented as the first moment. The time associated with the *sthiti* or the duration of knowledge is represented as the second moment. The time associated with the cessation of knowledge is represented as the third moment. For instance, the knowledge of the phoneme *p* in the word *paṭa* comes into existence at the first moment. At the second moment, two things happen: the knowledge of the phoneme *a* in the word *paṭa* comes into existence (i.e. *utpattikṣaṇa* of the knowledge of *a*), and the knowledge of the phoneme *p* in the word *paṭa* continues to exist (i.e. the *sthitikṣaṇa* of the knowledge of *p*). Thus the *sthitikṣaṇa* of the knowledge of the first phoneme and *utpattikṣaṇa* of the knowledge of the second phoneme coincide with each other. In other words, the phoneme *a* following the phoneme *p*, means that they both become the content of knowledge simultaneously[70]. The first phoneme becomes the content of the knowledge associated with the *sthitikṣaṇa*, while the second becomes the content of knowledge which is associated with the *utpattikṣaṇa*.

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69. *Nyāyakośa*, p. 253:
क्षणिकत्वं तृतीयक्षणवृत्तिध्वंसप्रतियोगित्वम् । ... योग्यविभुविशेषगुणानां ज्ञानादीनामपेक्षाबुद्धिव्यतिरिक्तानां क्षणिकत्वम् । ... तथा च प्रथमक्षण उत्पद्यते द्वितीयक्षणे तिष्ठति तृतीयक्षणे नश्यतीति तात्पर्यम् ।

70. *Śāṁkarī*, p. 496:
तथा चाव्यवहितोत्तरत्वं ज्ञान एव न तूत्पत्तौ । सर्वत्राव्यहितोत्तरत्वस्य ज्ञान एव प्रतीतेरिति भावः ।

The whole preceding paragraph intends to answer the following objection: The relation of immediate subsequence cannot be maintained between the two phonemes, because the first has died out when the second has come into existence. The relation of priority and posteriority arises only when two things exist simultaneously. There cannot be any combination of what is non-existent with what exists.

KB answers this objection by assuming that the combination of non-simultaneous things is possible in the cognition. Thus the combination can be maintained between two phonemes, because at the time of the knowledge of the *utpatti* of the second phoneme, the knowledge of the *sthiti* of the first phoneme has not died out. To indicate this, KB has defined the relation of immediate subsequence and this he does in a complicated way.

104, 8-16

TR: By this[71] (the following) view of *Parimala* is discarded. (*Parimala* raises the question) whether (the conception of) the *sphoṭa*-word in the case of synonyms is identical or different. The first alternative is untenable, because it would lead to the contingency of verbal cognition from the word *ḳalaśa* etc., even if one happens to know the denotative function of the word *ghaṭa* only. Nor would it do to say that the knowledge of the denotative function (taken with reference to the word), revealed by the (phonetic shape of) synonym A, causes the notion of meaning (only) if (the phonetic shape of) the synonym A is revealed through the auditory perception. (For), if it were so, then it would be (more) appropriate to say that

71. *Darpaṇa*, p. 417:
एतेनेति आनुपूर्व्यवच्छिन्नवर्णात्मकस्फोटस्य वाचकत्वव्यवस्थापननेत्यर्थः ।

the knowledge of the denotative function taken with reference to each synonym is the cause (of the verbal cognition), because (in any way, for verbal cognition) the knowledge of denotative function with reference to (the phonetic shape of) each synonym is indispensable. In that case, it would be simpler to make the causal statement with reference to the knowledge of denotative function (of a synonym rather than that of *sphoṭa*). For, otherwise[72], it would be cumbrous to make (the causal statement) depending upon the knowledge of denotative function, (taken with reference to the *sphoṭa* word) revealed by (the phonetic shape of) the particular synonym.

Nor is the second alternative (tenable), because assumption of denotative function as belonging to the fixed (order of) phonemes appears to be more simple, when it is compared with the (assumption of) denotative function as belonging to the numerous *(sphoṭa)* words (revealed by the fixed order of phonemes).

(Answer:) (The view of *Parimala* is as good as refuted by the above arguments, because,) in case of synonyms, the acceptance of different denotative functions is approved by all. And it has already been established that the sequence is the delimiting property of it (i.e. of the denotativeness of word.)

NOTES: The question is raised by *Parimala* whether the *sphoṭa* revealed by the synonyms *ghaṭa* and *ḳalaśa*, is identical or different. According to the grammarians, the *sphoṭa* word is indivisible, and it is something over and above the phonemes. Accordingly, the *sphoṭa* words cannot be said to have phonetic shapes. Thus the *sphoṭa* character of the word cannot be rendered different through the differences in the phonetic shapes of words.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 418:
अन्यथेति उक्तिवैचित्र्यमेतत् ।

The *sphoṭa* character of the synonyms like *ghaṭa* and *ḳalaśa* cannot be distinguished semantically either, because the meaning conveyed by these words is identical. If the *sphoṭa* character of the synonyms *ghaṭa* and *ḳalaśa* is assumed as identical, a man who is aware of the convention of the word *ghaṭa* but is ignorant of the convention of the word *ḳalaśa* will understand the meaning from the *sphoṭa* character of the word *ḳalaśa* which is identical with the *sphoṭa* character of the word *ghaṭa*, revealed by the phonetic shape of the word *g-h-a-ṭ-a*.

To get rid of this difficulty, the grammarians will have to maintain that the difference in the phonetic shapes (i.e. the revealing sounds of the *sphoṭa*) causes the difference in the revealed *sphoṭa*. The knowledge of the convention must be separately grasped in the case of the different *sphoṭas*, although they may convey the same meaning. When this is maintained, the *sphoṭa* word revealed by the phonetic shape *g-h-a-ṭ-a* becomes different from the *sphoṭa* word revealed by the phonetic shape *ḳ-a-l-a-ś-a*. Now there remains no possibility of the verbal cognition from the *sphoṭa* word *ḳalaśa* when one knows the convention of the word *ghaṭa* alone, because the two *sphoṭa* words are different, and the knowledge of the denotative function must be grasped separately with reference to each *sphoṭa* word. Against this answer the Naiyāyikas point out that the grammarians' theory involves cumbrousness, because they assume that the denotative functions must be separately grasped with reference to the different *sphoṭa* words which are considered different owing to the differences in the phonetic shapes of the revealing sounds. In other words, to make differences in the denotative functions of the synonymous words, the grammarians will have to maintain differences in the *sphoṭa* words as well as in the phonetic shapes of the revealing sounds of the *sphoṭa* words. Now the Naiyāyikas argue that their theory is

simpler, because, according to them, the difference in the denotative functions is caused by the differences in the phonetic shapes of the words directly.

To this KB answers by saying that, according to the grammarians also, the knowledge of the denotative function must be grasped separately with reference to the different *sphoṭas*, but the phonetic character of a word auditorily perceived is identical[73] with its *sphoṭa* character. In other words, KB says that even the grammarians do not maintain difference between two things: the difference in the *sphoṭa* word and the difference in the phonetic shapes. For, the difference in the phonetic character of a word is identical with the difference in the *sphoṭa* character of the same. To put it differently, the cognition through which phonemes appear to be received is identical with the cognition through which *sphoṭa* appears to be received.

104, 16-18

TR: In the *Śabdakaustubha*[74], on the other hand, it is stated that, since with reference to a series of phonemes we have the

73. *Prabhā*, p. 501:
अयं भावः । वर्णाः पर्यायाश्च स्फोटातिरिक्ताः । ते स्फोटाभिव्यञ्जका इति यदि वैयाकरणाभिमतमभविष्यत्तदा पर्यायस्थलेष्वेक एव स्फोटो नाना वा इत्यादिपूर्वोक्तदूषणावकाशोऽभविष्यत् । तदेव तु नास्ति किं तु आरोपितकत्वादिविशिष्टाः स्फोटा एव वर्णाः पर्यायाश्चेति स्फोटास्वीकर्तृणामनन्तवर्णादिस्वीकर्तृणां परेषां मत इव पर्यायस्थलेऽपि समान एव कार्यकारणभावः । इयानेव विशेषो यदतिरिक्तवर्णवादिनये स्वरूपतो भिन्न एव पर्यायः स्फोटास्वीकर्तृमते तु स्फोटस्य ऐक्येऽपि भिन्नभिन्नपर्यायरूपरूषितत्वेनौपाधिकः स्फोटभेदः पर्यायानतिरिक्त इति नास्ति कार्यकारणभावे वैषम्यम् ।

74. *Śabdakaustubha*, Chowkhamba, 1933, p. 7:
एकः पटः इतिवदेकं पदं वाक्यं वेत्यबाधितप्रतीतेर्वर्णातिरिक्तमेव पद वाक्यं वा अखण्डं वर्णव्यङ्ग्यम् ।

perception '(this is a) word', the *sphoṭa* should certainly be considered different from the phonemes; (for), otherwise it would be impossible to establish that the jar is different from the potsherds.

NOTES: Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita maintains that people feel that a jar is a single entity different from the parts (potsherds). From the expression *kapāle ghaṭaḥ*[74]: 'A jar (resting) on the potsherds', we understand that the jar is the superstratum *(ādheya)* and the potsherds are the substratum (*adhikaraṇa*). The relation of substratum and superstratum[75] exists between two different things. A superstratum *(ādheya)* is always different from the substratum *(adhikaraṇa)*. When we say that a jar rests on the potsherds, we assume that a jar is different from them. Similarly, from the expression *varṇamālāyāṁ padam*: 'A word (is cognized) in the string of phonemes', Bhaṭṭoji says that people feel that the *sphoṭa* must be different from the aggregation of the phonemes, as there exists a relation of *ādhārādheyabhāva* between the phonemes and the *sphoṭa*. The cognition of the *sphoṭa* is based upon the perception of the phonemes, but the *sphoṭa* is not identical with the aggregation of the phonemes. It is something over and above the phonemes. By the word *tu* KB indicates that he disagrees with the view of Bhaṭṭoji[76], because, according to him, the cognition of phonemes is not conceived to be different from that of *sphoṭa*.

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75. *Prabhā*, p. 504:

अयं तदाशयः । वर्णसमूहात्मकपदस्यैव स्फोटरूपत्वे वर्णमालापदयोर्भेदाभावाद् आधाराधेयभावो न स्यात् । चैत्रे चैत्र इति व्यवहारादर्शनेनाधाराधेयभावस्य परस्परभेदनियतत्वात् । अभेदेऽपि आधाराधेयभावस्वीकारे कपाले घट इति प्रतीत्या नैयायिकैः साधितं घटस्य कपालातिरिक्तत्वं विरुद्धचेतेत्याह ।

76. Actually Bhaṭṭoji does not say that the phonemes are different from the *sphoṭa*, what he means is that the *pada* is perceived as a whole and not as a collection of phonemes; cf.

105, 1-4

TR: (Introduction to the verse 67) (objection:) In that case, the science (of grammar) would be rendered unauthoritative (i.e. meaningless), because the word is (said to be) an indivisible unit; while the science (of grammar) only aims at teaching the formation of words (as derived) from the stems and suffixes. (The author) meets this objection (in the following verse).

(*Kārikā* 67). Therefore, for the understanding of what is to be known (i.e. formation of words), the device (i.e. grammatical analysis) is resorted to just as the five sheaths (by the Vedāntins). The means are (many and therefore) not fixed.

or

Therefore, this device (i.e. grammatical analysis) is resorted to as the five sheaths (by the Vēdāntins). The means which serve the purpose of understanding the object (to be known) are not fixed.

NOTES: I have given the two explanations of this verse because the word *upeyapratipattyartha* can be construed with the first half of the verse also as suggested by KB. In that case the construction will be: *kalpanā eṣā upeyapratipattyarthā samāśritā.* It can be alternatively construed with the following word *upāyāḥ.* In that case, the word *upeyapratipattyarthā(ḥ)* will be the nominative plural.

105, 5-8

TR: (The first half of the verse) forms a (complete) construction ending with the word *upeyapratipattyarthā.* The sense of (the

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एकं पदमेकं वाक्यमिह वर्णमालायां पदमिह पदमालायां वाक्यमित्यादिप्रतीतेः। *Vaiyākaraṇamatonmajjana,* quoted by K. P. TRIVEDI, in his notes on the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa,* p. 722. See also *Śabdakaustubha,* p. 7.

verse) is as follows: Just as in the *Bhṛguvallī* (N. of the third *Vallī* in *TUP.*), the five sheaths *anna* 'matter', *prāṇa*: 'life', *manas*: 'mind', *vijñāna*: 'intelligence' and *ānanda*: 'bliss' are described (as the means of the) knowledge of the pure Brahman or just as in the *Ānandavallī* (the 2nd section of *TUP.*) the five sheaths are described (as the means of) the knowledge of the real *puccha-Brahman,* so also the treatment of the stem-suffix (analysis) etc. is intended for the knowledge of the real *sphoṭa* word.

NOTES: In the *Bhṛguvallī*, it is mentioned that, once Bhṛgu, son of Varuṇa, approached his father Vāruṇa and asked him what *Brahman* is. His father explained *anna* (matter) is the *Brahman.* Bhṛgu again approached his father for an investigation of the ultimate reality, feeling that matter cannot be the supreme reality, because it is created and destroyed. Then his father taught him that life (*prāṇa*) is *Brahman.* Bhṛgu was not satisfied with this answer even, because he found that *prāṇa* (life) is also perishable. Bhṛgu approached his father again and received the instruction from his father that *manas* (mind) is the *Brahman.* Bhṛgu again found it as an inadequate explanation, because mind is also perishable and, accordingly, it cannot represent all aspects of the supreme reality. With dissatisfaction, Bhṛgu approached his father for the fourth time, and he was instructed that intelligence (*vijñāna*) is *Brahman.* But Bhṛgu soon realised that intelligence cannot be the ultimate reality, since it does not account for all aspects of consciousness and intelligence also is perishable. Then, finally, Bhṛgu was taught that *ānanda* (bliss) is the *Brahman.* Thus on each occasion it is pointed out that the absolute *Brahman* is something different from the one with which it is identified, and Bhṛgu was upled step by step from a lower reality to a higher reality, and finally Bhṛgu has formed the idea about the real nature of the *Brahman.*

Similarly, the science of grammar teaches the eight varieties of the *sphoṭa* step by step and finally introduces the ultimate reality of the indivisible sentence-*sphoṭa*. In other words, just as the knowledge of the five sheaths in the Vedānta is a means for the attainment of the knowledge of the ultimate reality, the *Brahman,* so also the teaching of the eight divisions of *sphoṭa* is a practical device for comprehending the ultimate knowledge of the real *akhaṇḍa-vākya-sphoṭa.*

KB, however, suggests by the words *yathā vā* that he is not satisfied by the analogy of the *Pañcakośas* mentioned in the *Bhṛguvallī,* because the fifth *kośa, ānanda,* (bliss) is not a means for the knowledge of the ultimate reality but *ānanda* itself is considered to be the *Brahman,* and, accordingly, *ānanda* cannot be a *kośa* for the knowledge of the *Brahman.* Therefore KB has suggested that the *Ānandavallī* is referred to by the word *pañcakośa* and not the *Bhṛguvallī.* In the *Ānandavallī,* the same five *kośas* are mentioned, but *ānanda* is not considered here as the ultimate reality, but as a means for the knowledge of the ultimate reality. In the *Ānandavallī,* the sentence *Brahma puccham pratiṣṭhā* describes the nature of the ultimate reality, and *puccha* is equated with the *Brahman.* The word *puccha,* according to *Śaṁkara*[77], is not taken in the primary sense 'tail' but it means *ādhāra*: 'foundation'. Thus the sentence means the Brahman is the foundation of everything.

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77. *Śāṁkarabhāṣya* on the *Taittirīyopaniṣad, NSP* p. 69:
एवं च कामोपशमोत्कर्षापेक्षया शतगुणोत्तरोत्तरोत्कर्ष आनन्दस्य वक्ष्यते। एवं चोत्कृष्यमाणस्यानन्दस्यात्मनः परमार्थब्रह्मविज्ञानापेक्षया ब्रह्म परमेव यत्प्रकृतं सत्यज्ञानानन्तलक्षणं यस्य च प्रतिपत्त्यर्थं पञ्च अन्नादिमयाः कोशा उपन्यस्ताः । यच्च तेभ्योऽभ्यन्तरं येन च ते सर्वं आत्मवन्तस्तद्ब्रह्म पुच्छं प्रतिष्ठा ।

The term *Pañcakośa* means the five bodies or sheaths as a means for the knowledge of the ultimate reality. They are enumerated as i) *annamayakośa* ii) *prāṇamayakośa* iii) *manomayakośa* iv) *vijñānamayokośa* and v) *ānandamayakośa.* These *kośas* represent material, vital, mental, intellectual and spiritual aspects of this universe. See RADHAKRISNAN's *Principal Upaniṣads,* p. 546.

105, 8-10; 106, 1-12

TR: *Objection*: The *sphoṭa* word (which is claimed as) an object of direct perception can possibly be grasped even through auditory perception etc. and, hence, the science (of grammar) cannot be (considered) a means of (the realisation of) the *sphoṭa* (word). To meet this objection, (the author of the verse) says 'means' etc. Because one means does not render another means ineffective. Accordingly, the knowledge derived from the study of the science of grammar is conceived as a distinguished means (for grasping the *sphoṭa* word) just as (the knowledge) derived from the (recitation of) the *mantra* text is conceived as the distinguished means for the remembrance of the things (to be performed), or, just as (the knowledge) derived from the *Vedānta(śāstra)* is considered to be the distinguished means for the knowledge of the *Brahman.* Moreover, the knowledge (of the *Sphoṭa-Brahman*) is useful for the purification of the body, just as the sacrifices are useful for the purification of the heart; and it (the knowledge of the *Sphoṭa-Brahman*) directly or indirectly leads to heaven and final emancipation. Thus it has been stated in the *Vākyapadīya* (1. 14; 16; 17ab): It (the study of grammar is) the gateway of salvation. (It is) the remedy for (all) the impurities of speech. (It is) the holiest of all the (branches of) sciences and (it) shines brightly over (all) the sciences. This is the first foot-hold of the ladder leading to salvation. This is the (most) straight royal road of (all) the roads

which lead to salvation. Here he, who has gone beyond delusion, perceives the very essence (of unadulterated *Vāc*).

But how could the imaginary device of the stem-and-suffix-analysis lead to the realisation of the *sphoṭa*? Such a question is baseless. As will be mentioned later on, this (device) cannot be proved to be (totally) unreal. The word *ādi* (*pañcakośādi*) stands for the *rekhāgavayanyāya* (the maxim of a wild cow represented in painting).

NOTES: The maxim *rekhāgavayanyāya* is used to illustrate that one reaches the final goal by following a false device, e.g., one understands the *gavaya* (wild cow) by means of the unreal lines of the painting of *gavaya*.

It is argued by the *pūrvapakṣin* that, if the grammarians maintain that the *vākyasphoṭa* alone is real, how can they be justified in analysing the sentence into different words and words into stems and suffixes? To this the grammarians answer that the acceptance of the *padasphoṭa* and the *varṇasphoṭa* is undoubtedly a fiction, inasmuch as there is no separate existence of words apart from the sentence of which they are considered to be the parts. This device, although unreal from the point of view of the ultimate reality, is still helpful to discipline our mind. The study of the grammatical science enables us to realise the ultimate reality[78] through an unreal or illusory analysis of words. From the standpoint of the ultimate reality the *vākyasphoṭa* or the *Śabda-Brahman* is the ultimate truth, but *padasphoṭa* and the *varṇasphoṭa* are maintained, because they are viewed as means to the realisation of the ultimate principle.

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78. *VP.*, 2. 238:

उपाया: शिक्षमाणानां बालानामुपलालना: ।
असत्ये वर्त्मनि स्थित्वा तत: सत्यं समीहते ॥

106, 13-15

TR: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 68). (Objection:) But since *sphoṭa* word and the universal characters of phonemes are permanent, it cannot be said that the phoneme *k* is produced. (Furthermore), if the universal character residing in the air-conjunction is (assumed as being) perceived (while perceiving) the *sphoṭa,* the knowledge of the phoneme *k* etc. will (have to be condemned as) delusive. (To meet this objection) the author says (in the following verse):

NOTES: If the phonemes *k*, *g* etc. which manifest the *sphoṭa* are considered non-different from the *sphoṭa,* we cannot account for the knowledge *ḳaḳāra utpannaḥ*: 'the phoneme *k* is produced', because the conception of *sphoṭa* and phonemes does not admit their production and destruction. In fact, to account for the recognition *so'yaṁ gaḳāraḥ*: 'this is the same phoneme *g*', we must admit that the phonemes represent the permanent class-character of varied individual sounds.

To get out of this difficulty, it is maintained by the *siddhāntin* that the recognition *so'yaṁ gaḳāraḥ* does not follow from the sameness of the phoneme *g,* but it refers to the class[79] of similar air-movements which produce the sounds. In other words, the above-mentioned recognition represents the sameness of air-contact with the tongue, the throat, etc., while the cognition *ḳaḳāra utpannaḥ*

79. Bertrand RUSSELL, *An inquiry into meaning and truth*, p. 24: "The spoken word "dog" is not a single entity: it is a class of similar movements of the tongue, throat, and larynx. Just as jumping is one class of bodily movements, and walking another, so the uttered word "dog" is a universal just as a dog is universal." Quoted by K. K. RAJA, *Indian theories of meaning*, p. 115. See also p. 137.

represents the particular member which varies in individual pronunciation. Now the *pūrvapakṣin* points out that such a philosophical attitude would not solve our problems. If we admit that the phonemes are nothing but the phonational act of the articulatory organs, the cognition *kakāraḥ*: 'the phoneme *k*', would be regarded as illusory, because it would refer to the distinctive sound-producing air-movement which strikes against the points of articulation. Such a philosophical approach refuses to admit that the phoneme *k* is a separate phonemic entity; and it would lead to the conclusion that perception of the phoneme *k* apart from the sound-producing air-wave, is erroneous.

106, 16-17

TR: (*Kārikā* 68). That unreal properties (in an object) can serve as limiting adjuncts, is admitted even by others (i.e. Vedāntins). And others (i.e. the Mīmāṁsakas) also admit that (the qualities such as) accentedness, longness etc. (actually) belonging to others (i.e. the sound-producing air-waves) reside in the phonemes.

NOTES: The followers of the Vedānta[80] system assume that the reddishness which appears to be present in the crystal, belongs in reality to the crimson flower. Nevertheless, when the crimson flower is placed near the crystal, the reddishness appearing in it serves to distinguish it from the other non-red crystals.

In other words, reddishness is *kalpita*: 'unreal' in the crystal; nevertheless it serves as the distinctive mark (*upādhi*). Adhering

80. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Adyar p. 49:
अत एव इन्द्रियसंनिकृष्टतया जपाकुसुमगतलौहित्यस्य स्फटिके भानसंभवान्न स्फटिकेऽनिर्वचनीयलौहित्योत्पत्तिः ।

to the same argument, the Mīmāṁsakas also maintain that the different attributes (*upādhi*) such as shortness (*hrasvatva*), longness (*dīrghatva*), graveness (*anudāttatva*) belong in reality to the sound producing air-waves, though they are superimposed[81] on the phonemes. These superimposed qualities serve to distinguish one phoneme from the others. Arguing on the same lines, the grammarians maintain that the *k-ness* (*katva*) etc. which belong to the air-waves appear to be superimposed on the phoneme revealed by the air-wave. Similarly, the production[82] and destruction are properties of air-waves, but they are felt to be associated with the phoneme *k*. In this manner, the cognition *kakāra utpannaḥ*: 'the letter *k* is produced' is justified.

107, 1-4

TR: (The author of the verse) shows an instance (where unreal factors) have been admitted (as limiting adjuncts, by others) in the words "accentedness, longness" etc. The word 'etc'. includes production and destruction. The acuteness etc. do not reside in the phoneme, because it (the phoneme) is one and imperishable. And that (viz. oneness and imperishability) arises from the recognition, 'this is the same phoneme'. It should not be argued that it (recognition) refers to the absence of the difference (between g^1 and g^2), the counter-

81. *Sphoṭavāda, Upodghāta*, p. 6:
शब्दो द्विविधः ध्वनिर्वर्णश्च । तत्र ध्वनिर्वायुगुणो वर्णव्यञ्जकः । वर्णस्तु द्रव्यं ध्वनिव्यङ्ग्यम् । तारत्वादिकं ध्वनिधर्मो वर्णेष्वारोप्यते इति केचित् ।

82. Roman JAKOBSON, *Fundamentals of Language*, p. 9:
"The speaker has learned to make sound-producing airmovements in such a way that the distinctive features are present in the sound-waves, and the listener has learned to extract them from these waves".

positivity of which is limited by the generic relation (*gatva*), because it would be inappropriate to forsake the nondifferential cognition of the individuals which is (actually) felt (as real), unless its (invalidity is proved) by sublation.

NOTES: The grammarians maintain that the phoneme *g* in *gaṇa* and *gati* is the same and permanent, because we have the recognition '*so'yaṁ gakārah*': "This is the same phoneme *g*". This recognition referring to the sameness of the individual phoneme *g* forces one to accept the permanency of phonemes.

However, the Naiyāyikas disagree with the grammarians and maintain that the cognition '*so'yaṁ gakārah*' does not follow from the non-difference of the individuals, but from the sameness of the universal character of the individuals. This simple meaning is expressed by KB in Nyāya terminology. It means that, although the two phonemes g^1 and g^2 are different from each other, still they are considered to be the same, and can be grouped under the universal character *gatva*: 'g-ness'. In the technical[83] language, when we wish to specify that there is absence of difference *(bhedābhāva)* between g^1 and g^2, the limiting relation of absential adjuncts *(abhāvīya-pratiyogitā)* must be expressed in all logical statements, for there is no absence, the counterpositive (*pratiyogin*) of which can be considered in all relations. In the present case the counterpositive is limited, according to the Naiyāyikas, by a generic relation *gatva*. In other words, the non-difference between g^1 and g^2 is generic non-difference and not individual non-difference: *gatvāvacchinnapratiyogitākabhedābhāva* and not *gavyaktivāvacchinnapratiyogitākabhedābhāva*.

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83. For further examples of this type, see INGALL's *Materials for the study of Navya-Nyāya logic*, pp. 55-58.

To this the grammarians reply that the recognition *so'yaṁ gakāraḥ* does not follow from the knowledge of the two individuals as related to the same class, but it refers to the sameness[84] of the individual phoneme *g* pronounced at different times and by different individuals. If this recognition is held to be erroneous, it will be supplanted by the true knowledge later on. In the case of illusion, the subsequent knowledge alters our misperception. If someone mistakes a piece of rope for a snake, the subsequent knowledge points out that a piece of rope is misperceived as a snake. In the present case the non-differential cognition of individuals, arisen from recognition, is not sublated.

107, 4-12

TR: Nor should it be argued that the cognition of coming into existence would sublate (the notion of permanency and the non-difference of phonemes), because origination, which means coming into existence of something non-existent prior to (its effection), is never experienced as valid with reference to phonemes. Hence we have a cognition (represented in the usage:) "He pronounces an (external) phoneme but he does not produce it". (A phoneme) being pronounced means: (it) being rendered the object of manifestation caused by the conjunction (of air-waves) with the (points of articulation such as), palate, lip etc. Moreover[85], we can justify (the notion of origination) even by assuming

84. *Darpaṇa*, p. 427:
व्यक्त्यभेदे प्रतीतिर्बाधिका इत्यर्थः ।

85. *Kāśikā*, p. 599:
अनुभवेति । उत्पन्नो गकार इत्यस्य त्वभिव्यक्तो गकार इति तात्पर्यम् । ननूत्पन्नो घट इतिवदुत्पन्नो गकार इति प्रतीतेः प्रागसत्त्वविशिष्टसत्त्वरूपो-

that origination etc., which are actually confined to the revealing (internal) sound, appear to be indirectly related to the (external) phonemes, and, therefore, it (the cognition of origination) does not prove that (external) phonemes are different from (the internal air-waves). And since it is assumed that (the production) indirectly refers to the (external) phonemes, it (the cognition of origination of phonemes) cannot be said to be erroneous. The only point that remains unanswered so far, is that this cognition would be erroneous, as far as its direct relation (to the external phonemes is concerned). But even that would be similar to your acceptance of erroneousness (of the recognition) viz. 'this is the same phoneme', as far as the non-difference of individual (sounds is concerned). But the simplicity in my view excels (that of yours), because I do not have to assume the additional phonemic entities (different from the internal sound) and their prior and posterior absences.

NOTES: KB holds that the external phonemes received by the listener's ears are eternal and are identified with the *sphoṭa* word. The recognition *(pratyabhijñā) so'yaṁ gakāraḥ* also maintains that the auditory impression of the two individual phonemes g^1 and g^2 is the same. The Naiyāyikas controvert the grammarians' theory by pointing out the fact that, if the phonemes are permanent, how could it be justified to make a statement like *gakāra utpannaḥ*, because the phonemes are not subjected to the origination. To this the grammarians answer that the cognition *gakāra utpannaḥ* refers to the internal air issued forth from the speaker's mouth, which strikes against the different vocal organs. This internal air which appears and vanishes is identified with the auditory image of the phoneme *g*. Appear-

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त्पत्तिरेव विषयो वाच्यः समानाकारप्रतीत्योर्विभिन्नविषयत्वस्य अनुचितत्वादित्याशङ्क्याह किं चेति ।

ance and disappearance are the properties of the internal air, but they are felt to be associated with the external phonemes. The cognition *gaḳāra utpannaḥ* is erroneous as far as it refers to the external phoneme *g*.

On the other hand, the Naiyāyikas maintain that the cognition *so'yaṁ gaḳāraḥ* which points out the sameness of the phonemes g^1 and g^2 is considered erroneous as far as it refers to the sameness of the two individuals. Thus the Naiyāyikas consider that the cognition of appearance and disappearance is valid, while the cognition of identity between the two individuals is invalid or erroneous.

The controversial point between the grammarians and the Naiyāyikas is whether the vocal organs actually produce a sound or make it manifest. The question has a far-reaching effect on the problem of eternity and perishableness of sounds. The term *utpatti* presupposes the previous nonexistence of a thing (*prāgabhāva*) and the destruction after its effection (*dhvaṁsa*). The term *abhivyakti* refers to the manifestation or bringing into light of something which has already existed. If we speak of the phonemes received by the listener as *utpanna,* it means that they are actually brought into existence and they are destroyed after a short interval. If we state that the phonemes are *abhivyakta*: 'manifested', it means that they are already existent and only rendered perceptible by the phonational act of the vocal organs. Therefore, the term production (*utpatti*) refers to the things which are perishable and producible. On the other hand, the term manifestation refers only to the imperishable entities. Therefore, KB argues that the grammarians' theory is simpler because they assume that the external phoneme is made manifest through the contact of the internal air with the vocal organs, and it is never actually produced. On the other hand,

the Naiyāyikas assume that the phonemes are produced. Therefore, KB claims that this theory involves the postulation of an infinite number of phonemic entities, their absence prior to their production (*prāgabhāva*) and their absence posterior to to their pronunciation (*dhvaṁsa*).

Thus the grammarians assume that the cognition *gakāra utannaḥ* refers to the phonational act and not to the audition of the phonemes. The internal air, forming contact with the vocal organs, appears and vanishes, but it does not mean that the external phoneme which is resulted from the phonational act, is also liable to production and destruction. The auditory image of sound is only manifested by the phonational act. In short, according to the grammarians, the phrase *gakāra utpannaḥ* refers to the emitted sound while *so'yaṁ gakāraḥ* refers to the identification of the sound-properties received by a listener. The first (emitted sound) is called *dhvani,* and the second (sound received by the listener's ear) is called *varṇa.* The first is *vyañjaka*: 'revealing' and the second is *vyāṅgya*: 'to be revealed'. Therefore, KB makes clear the meaning of the word *uccarita.*[86] It means: the sound manifested to the listener's ears through the phonational act.

107, 12-16; 108, 1

TR: (Objection:) Nor should it be argued that there is no evidence for (assuming) the existence of (the perception of) sound at the time of (perception of) phonemes. Nor further that there is impossibility of its (sound's) existence, because of the absence of conch etc. that produce it.

86. It also indicates that the grammarians consider that language is mainly auditory system useful for the purposes of communication.

(Reply:) While pronouncing the phonemes *k* and others, if the tongue happens to fall at a slight distance from the respective points of articulations, it is experienced that the phonemes are not produced, but only sound (or noise) is produced. Therefore, it is assumed that, when the current of air forming the conjunction with the throat strikes against the tongue, sound is produced (whether articulate or inarticulate, it is immaterial). Since that (conjunction of air-waves with the points of articulation) exists even at the place of the origination of the phonemes, surely your assumption of (the law of) preventer and prevented (i.e. the articulatory process of the production of phonemes prevents the realisation of the sound, and thereby the production of inarticulate sound is prevented) would be baseless; and thus there would be complexity, on the contrary.

NOTES: The Naiyāyikas maintain that *śabda*[87] is twofold: inarticulate and articulate. The inarticulate sound is other than the spoken form of language. For instance, the sound of a drum[88] is an inarticulate sound. It is called *saṁyogajaśabda*, because it

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87. *Tarkasaṁgraha, Athalye's* 2nd ed., p. 21:
श्रोत्रग्राह्यो गुणः शब्दः । आकाशमात्रवृत्तिः । द्विविधो ध्वन्यात्मको वर्णात्मकश्चेति । ध्वन्यात्मको भेर्यादौ वर्णात्मकः संस्कृतभाषादिरूपः ।

88. *Siddhāntamuktāvalī*, Verses 164-68:
शब्दो ध्वनिश्च वर्णश्च मृदङ्गादिभवो ध्वनिः ।। 164.
कण्ठसंयोगादिजन्या वर्णास्ते कादयो मताः ।
सर्वः शब्दो नभोवृत्तिः श्रोत्रोत्पन्नस्तु गृह्यते ।। 165.
उत्पन्नः को विनष्टः क इति बुद्धेरनित्यता ।
सोऽयं क इति बुद्धिस्तु साजात्यमवलम्बते ।। 167.
तदेवौषधमित्यादौ सजातीयेऽपि दर्शनात् ।
तस्मादनित्या एवेति वर्णाः सर्वे मतं हि नः ।। 168.

is produced by the contact of the stick or hand with the drum. The sounds like *k* etc. which are produced by the conjunction of the throat etc. with the air-stream are regarded as articulate. Thus the Naiyāyikas consider that the spoken form of a language, which is used effectively for the communication, consists only of the *varṇas*, and the term *dhvani* is restricted to the inarticulate form of the language.

KB argues that this division is not based on any solid reasoning, because the machinery that operates for the effection of *dhvani* or *varṇa* is alike. Both the terms *dhvani* and *varṇa* refer to the *saṁyogajaśabda* (sound produced by conjunction). The inarticulate sound coming from the drum is produced through the conjunction of the stick with a drum. And the articulate sound of the spoken language is also produced through the conjunction of the internal air-stream with the points of articulation. In the case of the articulate and inarticulate sounds the process is the same. To prove this, KB adduces an instance: when a speaker sends out a breath-stream with a desire to utter the articulate form of speech and if his tongue happens to fall at a slight distance from the respective position of the points of articulation, inarticulate sound is produced, and the normal articulate form of speech is not received by a listener. From this we infer that, whenever breath-wind passes through the organs of utterance, sound (*dhvani*) is always produced which might be either articulate or inarticulate. On the other hand, if the Naiyāyikas maintain that *dhvani* is not produced at all when the listener receives the articulate form of speech, they will have to make a statement that the auditory perception of phonemes acts as preventive (*pratibandhaka*) of the cognition of sound. But such a statement involves unnecessary complexity; moreover, it goes against our experience. In short, KB thinks that the term *dhvani* has wider connotation, and it

stands for the articulate as well as the inarticulate form of speech. The Naiyāyikas consider that the term *dhvani* is restricted to the inarticulate form of sound and the term *varṇa* for the spoken form of utterance.

108, 1-4

TR: And thus, it would be improper to hold that (the properties) accentedness, graveness, shortness, longness etc. also do not reside in the phonemes (received by a listener), because they are mutually inconsistent. This is their[89] (Mīmāṁsakaṣ') opinion also. Thus the procedure adopted by others[90] (i.e. by the Mīmāṁsakaṣ) too, (for the justification of) the cognition of origination of sounds and their validity is similar to ours. This is the answer returned[91] in the same coin.

NOTES: The grammarians assume that the sound[92] is the property of ether. The production etc. belong to the sound-producing internal air, which passes through the vocal organs and vanishes when it is issued forth from the speaker's mouth. The auditory[93] perception of the sound is not supposed to

89. *Darpaṇa*, p. 429:
तेषामिति वर्णनित्यतावादिनां मीमांसकानामित्यर्थः ।

90. *Parīkṣā*, p. 429:
परेषां वर्णनित्यतावादिनां मीमांसकानामित्यर्थः ।

91. *Darpaṇa*, p. 429:
प्रतिबन्द्यैवेति । पराभिमतसमाधेयमुत्तरं प्रतिबन्दिस्तया इत्यर्थः । तथा च तत्र मीमांसकैरुत्पत्त्यादिप्रतीतेः प्रमात्वे यः समाधिराश्रितः स एव अस्माभिरप्यनुसर्तव्य इति भावः ।

92. See notes 62 and 63:

93. *Sphoṭavāda, Upodghāta*, p. 6:
तारत्वादिकं ध्वनिधर्मो वर्णेष्वारोप्यत इति केचित् । परे तु तद्वर्णधर्म एव । तदाश्रयत्वादपि वर्णानां द्रव्यत्वमिति वदन्ति । य एव गकारो देवदत्तेन तारो गृह्यते स एव यज्ञदत्तेन मन्द्रो गृह्यत इति तारत्वमन्द्रत्वादीनामबितथत्वाद-विरोध इति तेषाम् आशय इति ।

be associated with the physical qualities of the sound. The properties like length, pitch, raisedness etc. which are invariably associated with the articulate sound, are not considered the properties of the sound received by the listener. That is why we have the following cognition: "The phoneme received as a high-pitched sound by Devadatta appears to be a lowpitched sound to Yajñadatta". The grammarians argue that this is not only their view but it is shared by the Mīmāṁsakas also. They also hold that the pitch, length, etc. are the properties of the uttered sound and not of the sound received by the listener; because the received sound is permanent, and cannot be supposed to have contradictory properties, shortness, length, pitch etc., which would make the phonemes perishable. Similarly the cognition *kakāraḥ utpannaḥ*:[94] 'The phoneme *k* is pro-

94. The distinction between *dhvani* and *varṇa* is neither clearly brought out nor it is well defined. It seems to me that the term *dhvani* refers to the articulate or inarticulate sound whereas the term *varṇa* refers to the auditory impression of the articulate sound. (See *Sphoṭavāda*, *Upodghāta*, p. 6:)

शब्दो द्विविधः ध्वनिर्वर्णश्च। तत्र ध्वनिर्वायुगुणो वर्णव्यञ्जकः *Ibid.*, p. 2: तत्र जैमिनीयाः श्रोत्रग्राह्याः वर्णा एव शब्दः। तेषामेव च वाचकत्वम्। ते च कण्ठताल्वाद्यभिघातव्यङ्ग्याः इति सङ्गिरन्ते।

Throughout this pssage KB's phrases *varṇotpatteḥ* and *dhvanyutpatteḥ* are misleading. According to the commentators, the arguement is not concerned with the case of the origination of phonemes or sounds, but it refers to the case of the auditory perception of the phonemes and inarticulate sounds. Therefore, Bhairavamiśra renders the phrase *varṇotpattisthale* by the words *varṇābhiyaktisthale* in the commentary *Parīkṣā*. (See also *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, p. 256, Bombay Sanskrit Prakrit series) The same remark is made by the commentary *Prabhā*, p. 516. ध्वन्युत्पत्तेरिति। ध्वनेः श्रावणप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वेन तद्गतोत्पत्तेरपि श्रावणप्रत्यक्षविषयत्वमित्यभिप्रायेणेदम्।

duced', also refers, according to the Mīmāṁsakas, to the articulate sound and not to the permanent phonemes[95] received by the listener's ears. Finally, KB says that the objection raised by the Naiyāyikas against the grammarians' theory can equally be raised against the Mīmāṁsakas' theory of the permanence of phonemes, and they also will have to give the same reply.

108, 5-8

TR: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 69). Thus the individual (concept of) *sphoṭa* is fivefold. (The author now) describes the concept of universal *sphoṭa* word.
(*Kārikā* 69). Simplicity is observed (in assigning the meaning to) the universal nature of the denoter just as it is seen (in conveying) the universal nature of the denoted (sense). Alternatively let the difference be related to the associative elements, like loudness or lowness of phonemes (which are caused by the distinctive properties of the articulated sounds).

NOTES: Bhaṭṭoji Dīkṣita, in his *Śabdakaustubha* (Chowkhamba, p. 7) ascribes this verse to Bopadeva, without mentioning the work's name. According to Bopadeva, the word represents the denoted sense in a varied character. He follows the Mīmāṁ-

An attempt has been made by the Naiyāyikas to keep the phonemic entity outside the sphere of the *dhvani* (noise or inarticulate speech). A rejoinder points out that the conception of phoneme cannot be confined to the auditory perception of articulate speech void of sound elements, because the sound-producing airmovements invariably emit sound, articulate or inarticulate, received by the listeners.

95. *Prakaraṇapañcikā*, p. 87 (Chowkhamba):
कः शब्दोऽभिमतः ? वर्णाः, तेषामेव श्रोत्रग्राह्यत्वात् ।

sakaṣ'[96] view that the term *gauḥ* refers to cows, bulls, sometimes to a particular individual. These meanings fall under one category, i.e. the universal concept of *gauḥ* which comprises a host of varied individuals. If it is assumed that a word conveys a particular individual, there would be no limitations of denotations of the term *gauḥ*, because individuals are countless. Thus it is impossible to understand the meaning of 'cow' with respect to all the particular cows. Following the same line, Bopadeva argues that the universal nature of the word *gauḥ* which represents class of individual words is considered to be denotative. The word *gauḥ* is a class which comprises a host of varied[97] utterances by different individuals. Thus, the universal concept of the word *gauḥ* renders the individual peculiarities of the utterance non-distinctive in the process of communication. On the other hand, if the individual utterance *gauḥ* representing all the individual peculiarities is regarded as denotative of meaning 'cow', the listener will not be able to understand the same meaning when the word *gauḥ* is uttered by the different individuals in different accents. This would lead to the assumption of the multiplicity of the denotative functions corresponding to the differences in the utterance of the word *gauḥ*. Therefore, it is assumed that the universal word into which all the different

96. *Tantravārttika on Jaimini-sūtra*, I.iii.33:
आनन्त्यव्यभिचाराभ्यां शक्त्यनेकत्वदोषतः ।
संदेहाच्चरमज्ञानाच्चित्रबुद्धेरभेदतः ।।
अन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यामेकरूपप्रतीतित ।
आकृतेः प्रथमं ज्ञाने तस्या एवाभिधेयता ।।

97. Colin CHERRY, *On Human Communication*, p. 268:
"By 'Word-concept' here is meant not individual word-events, spoken with varied accents and tones, but the universal, the class into which an ensemble of word-events is grouped".

spoken words with varied accents and tones are ensembled, is denotative of meaning. This is called the class-concept of the *sphoṭa* word.

In the second half of the verse, Bopadeva says that there are no different individual words which might be grouped into a single class. Herein he represents the *vyaktisphoṭa* view, and denies the plurality of the individual words. If this view is admitted, then there would be only one individual word *gauḥ*. Although it is one, it appears to be associated with the individual speech-habits, and assumes different forms. For instance, the phoneme *a* assumes different forms when it is uttered in varied intonations by different individuals. But the manifested phonemes and words remain undifferentiated, that is to say, they are not affected by the individual idiosyncracies of a person who makes an utterance. Thus, according to the *vyaktisphoṭa* view, the auditory impression of the word *gauḥ* remains the same.

To explain this, the author of the verse furnishes the analogical instance: The loudness, length and lowness etc. are the properties of the articulate sound but not of the *sphoṭa* word. It is the articulate sound that usually appears to be long or short, but the *sphoṭa* word remains entirely unchanged. Therefore, *varṇavyakti* or *padavyakti* is one, but it appears divergent due to the variation in the articulate sounds of different individuals.

108, 9-14

TR: The sense of the verse is as follows: the phonemes (*g* etc. delimited by *g*-ness etc.) must be accepted, (otherwise) just as (on hearing the phoneme *g* again) we say 'this is the same phoneme *g*' in accordance with the manner mentioned above,

so also we might say that the phoneme *h* perceived (by us) is identical with the phoneme *g* (which was perceived before), because (the indivisible) *sphoṭa* (revealed by the various phonemes) is the same. And thus, the cognition: "this is phoneme *g*, not *h* (which is regarded as valid)", would not arise. Further one may ask: "should *g*-ness be accepted as residing in the *sphoṭa* or not?". If the first (alternative) is accepted, then let the same *g*-ness be identical with *g*, because (the Mīmāṁsakas) who maintain the permanence of words do not accept *g*-ness (other than the individual *g*), and thus, there would be prolixity in assuming another *sphoṭa* (because the phonemes themselves appearing in a single memory impression can denote the sense). If the second (alternative, that *g*-ness does not reside in the *sphoṭa* word is accepted), then the validity of cognition of the phoneme *g* etc. will be irreconcilable (with the *sphoṭa* perception).

NOTES: If the grammarians maintain that the *sphoṭa* word is indivisible, the difference in the phonemes would be irrelevant to the auditory perception of the *sphoṭa*. Accordingly, while perceiving the word *gūhati*, if one makes a statement: "the phoneme *g* which is perceived by the ear, is different from the phoneme *h*", it would be considered invalid. Similarly, the cognition: "the phoneme *g* received by the listener's ear is identical with the phoneme *h*", would be regarded as valid, because the phonemes remain irrelevant in the perception of the *sphoṭa* word. Difference in the auditory perception of phonemes cannot be assigned to the *sphoṭa* word, because the *sphoṭa* is indivisible. Therefore, the grammarians assume that the difference in the articulated sound causes the difference in the phonemes.

Now the question arises whether the *sphoṭa* word conveying the meaning remains indifferent to the differences in the

phonemes or not. The grammarians cannot say that the perception of the *sphoṭa* word renders the phonemes irrelevant, because they maintain that the auditory perception of the phonemes progressively reveals[98] the *sphoṭa* word. If it is assumed on the other hand, that the phonemes are relevant in the perception of *sphoṭa,* still the grammarians will not escape from the difficulties stated above because they cannot assume that the phonemes received by the listener's ear are identical with the *sphoṭa.* If their perception is regarded as identical, the *sphoṭa* word will no longer be different from the conception[99] of the phonemes. In fact, the Mīmāṁsakas do not assume that the *sphoṭa* entity is different from the permanent phonemes. Furthermore, the *sphoṭa* word cannot be identified with the constituent phonemes, because such a view would make the *sphoṭa* word perishable and would also go against the unitary conception of the *sphoṭa.* Nor do the grammarians hold that the *sphoṭa* word remains indifferent to the cognition of the single phoneme, because, in that case the cognition — "the *sphoṭa* word *gauḥ* which is delimited by the auditory perception of the phoneme *g - au - ḥ*" —would be regarded as invalid[100].

KB has already given the final answer to the question raised above. His conclusion is that the phonemes received by the listener's ear reveal the *sphoṭa* word. The *sphoṭa* word reveals its existence through the medium of the auditory perception

98. *Sphoṭavāda, Upodghāta,* p. 14:
कण्ठतालवाद्यभिघातजन्या हि वर्णाः स्फोटं व्यञ्जयन्ति ।

99. *Kāśikā,* p. 602:
अतिरिक्तस्फोटेति । गत्वाद्यतिरिक्तस्फोटकल्पने इत्यर्थः ।

100. *Darpaṇa,* p. 433:
विरोध इति । गादिप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिरित्यर्थः । गत्वस्य अन्यधर्मस्य स्फोटावृत्तित्वेन तद्विशिष्टविषयकप्रतीत्यनुपपत्तिः ।

of the phonemes. The cognition of the phonemes is considered as identical[101] with the *sphoṭa* word. In the cognition of the *sphoṭa* the phonemes are not irrelevant because they are not different from the *sphoṭa*. The phonemes and *sphoṭa* are intimately related to each other, but differences pertaining to the phonemes are falsely attributed to the *sphoṭa* as *gatvāvacchinnaḥ sphoṭaḥ*: '*sphoṭa* delimited by *g*-ness'. The phonemes are not taken as the meaning-bearing unit of the language, but they are considered to be only the means of revealing the *sphoṭa* word. The phonemes, when revealed by the utterance, cause a vague cognition of the indivisible *sphoṭa*. We undoubtedly cognise the individual phonemes, when we perceive or cognise the indivisible single *sphoṭa*. In other words, the phonemic entity isolated from other members of the series, is distinct from the *sphoṭa,* but each phonemic entity forming the member of the series manifests *sphoṭa*. Every phonemic entity when it forms part of the series represents the *sphoṭa* in itself. The *sphoṭa,* as a whole, is indivisible into isolated phonemic entities. To put it differently, when the indivisible word is manifested by the sounds, the phonemes appear to be cognised as a part of the word owing to hearer's incapacity to perceive the word without perceiving the sequence of phonemes.

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101. *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra,* pp. 589-90:

एतेन गौरित्यादौ गकारौकारविसर्गादिव्यतिरेकेण स्फोटाननुभवाच्छ्रूयमाण वर्णानामेव वाचकत्वमित्यपास्तम् । तेषां स्फोटातिरिक्तत्वाभावात् । Also *Sphoṭavāda, op. cit.*, p. 82: 'शृणोमि' इत्याद्यनुभवेन स्फोटस्यावश्यकत्वाच्च । वायुसंयोगाश्च केचन कत्वेन, केचन गत्वेन, केचन हत्वेनेत्यनेकैः प्रकारैरभिव्यञ्जकाः । तत्तद्वायुसंयोगाभिव्यक्तानां परम्परया तत्तद्वैजात्याक्रान्तानां स्फोटानामभिव्यक्तेः क्षणिकत्वेऽपि पूर्वपूर्वसंस्कारसहकृतश्रोत्रेणाव्यवहितोत्तरत्वसंबन्धेन घत्वेनाभिव्यक्तस्फोटवत्वं टत्वेनाभिव्यक्तस्फोटे गृह्यते ।

108, 14; 109, 1-3

TR: It should not be argued that (the *sphoṭa* word) so apprehended (as associated with the phonemes *g* and *ḥ*) can be explained through the superimposition of differences belonging either to the articulated sounds or to the (internal) air-conjunction, because it would be inappropriate to condemn (the auditory perception of the phonemes in the cognition of *sphoṭa*) as erroneous in the absence of any sublating factor (i.e. a subsequent sublating cognition), or let the air-stream (forming) conjunction (with the vocal organs) be the phoneme *g*. If it is argued that this would lead to the fault of imperceptibility (the *atīndriyatva* of the phonemes), then the reply would be that (the perceptibility of the phoneme *g*) will be justified as that of the properties (of air). Thus the assumption of *sphoṭa* (different from the phonemes) is redundant.

NOTES: The passage intends to point out that the perception of the *sphoṭa* word cannot render the phonemes irrelevant, because one cannot remain indifferent to the differences of phonemes when one thinks of the cognition of the word. Actually, we have the perception *gatvavān śabdaḥ*: 'the word contains the phoneme *g*'. It cannot be maintained that *g*-ness, although it is wrongly felt to be associated with the *sphoṭa* word, is actually the property either of the air-stream or of the articulated sound. In other words, *g*-ness in the *sphoṭa* word is a misperception or an illusory experience. In this way we cannot simply condemn the cognition of phonemes in the perception of the *sphoṭa* word as a misperception. If this is so, why should we consider this misperception to be consistently uniform and irreversible? Every illusory perception has some conditions and features; for instance, a piece of rope does not invariably give rise to the illusion of a snake. It is also a fact that not all the persons have the same

illusion regarding a particular object. Moreover, the subsequent knowledge sublates the misperception of a snake on a piece of rope. The perception of phonemes cannot be considered as belonging to the illusory experience, since it is not subsequently sublated by a true knowledge. The phrase *gatvavān sphoṭaḥ śrutaḥ* refers to the cognition of the individual phoneme *g* along with the perception of the *sphoṭa*. We cannot set aside this experience by simply saying that *gatva,* which appears in the *sphoṭa* is nothing but the air-quality, because, if the words or phonemes are considered as products of air-streams, they will be imperceptible to the ears. The Naiyāyikas[102] argue that the sense-organs can perceive the qualities of a substance only if they (sense-organs) are capable of perceiving the substance which inheres those qualities. Since the air-stream is imperceptible to the ear, its qualities, sound etc., cannot be perceived by the auditory organs.

To this, the *pūrvapakṣin* points out that, although this restriction is necessary for the ocular perception,[103] it need not be the condition for the tactile perception or auditory perception, for instance, although air is imperceptible, its quality, touch, is perceived by the tactile organ. Similarly, it can be held that, even when the air-waves are not perceived, still their quality sound can be perceived by the auditory organ. At any rate, the *pūrvapakṣin* maintains that the postulation of the phonemes and the *sphoṭa* different from the sound is futile, since the distinctive existence of the *sphoṭa* and phonemes apart from the sound-producing airmovements does not exist.

102. ATHALYE's *Tarkasaṁgraha,* 2nd ed., pp. 222-23:
103. *Ibid.*, p. 117.

109, 3-4

TR: Therefore, phonemes[104] do exist, but they are not denotative of meaning, because (their acceptance) would involve prolixity. According to the principle set forth in the *ākṛtyadhikaraṇa* (a section dealing with the universal concept), it would be appropriate to hold that the universal nature (of word) is denotative (of meaning), just as the universal nature (of meaning) is taken as the referent (of word).

NOTES: We have the recognition *sa evāyaṁ gośabdaḥ*: "This is the same word *go*". This recognition arises when a person identifies two dissimilar utterances of the same word *gauḥ* heard at different times. This notion of identity must have some common basis that appears in the two dissimilar utterances. We can say that it is the common universal nature, re-

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104. Before this, I think, a few lines are missing in the text. The reply for the acceptance of the phonemic entities and the *sphoṭa*-word apart from the sound-producing air-waves, will be the auditory perception of the phonemes and the cognition of the *sphoṭa*-word as unitary. However, KB concludes in this passage that 'therefore phonemes do exist, but they are not denotative of meaning', without giving any answer to the question raised in the previous passage. The answer is given by the *Bhūṣaṇa*, under verse 68, p. 256. Bombay.

तस्माद्यथा गकारादिप्रतीतिः तथा स्फोटप्रतीतिरपि गत्वादिरूपेणोपपन्नेति नोक्तशङ्केति भावः। The commentary *Darpaṇa*, p. 434 makes the remark: गत्वादिविशिष्टविषयकसाक्षात्कारानुपपत्तिप्रमाणसद्भावादित्यर्थः।

In the next paragraph KB deals with the topic that the phonemic entities do not render the conception of the *sphoṭa* redundant, because the *sphoṭa*-word is unitary while phonemes, which increasingly reveal the *sphoṭa*, are many.

siding in the two different utterances that causes the notion of identity. If this is accepted, it would raise another question whether the universal nature resides in the phonemes or in the word taken as a whole.

If it is maintained — in order to justify the cognition of the sameness of word — that the universal nature resides in phonemes, it would be necessary to assume as many universals as the number of phonemes exists in a word. But the simpler process would be to accept a single universal concept for the whole word.

Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa: In conformity with the principle of the *Ākṛtyadhikaraṇa*[105] enunciated in the *Mīmāṁsāśāstra*, a word always denotes primarily a qualifier i.e. the attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*), and the meaning 'qualificand' (*viśeṣya*), on the other hand, is indicated by the secondary function (*lakṣaṇā*) of words. For example, the word 'cow' primarily denotes the qualifier 'cowness' (*gotva*); the individaul cow (*viśeṣya*) is indicated by *lakṣaṇā*. Similarly, the particular word *gauḥ* is not denotative but its qualifier *gotva* (the universal concept of all the different words *gauḥ*) is. The term *gotva,* according to Sanskrit grammarians, denotes two things: It represents the common properties belonging to all the different individual cows; and it also represents the universal concept of all the varied utterances of the word *gauḥ*.

109, 4-9

TR: We have the cognition of the universal: "this is the word *hari*" (which is applicable to all the varied utterances of the word *hari*). For this, the cognition of the word *hari* should be considered the cause which represents all (the varied utter-

105. *Tantravārttika* on *Jaimini-sūtra* 1.3.33; also *Śāstradīpikā* on 1.3.10.

ances of) the word *hari*. Therefore, we must necessarily assume the special universal concept (*haritva*) as the interpretative property of it (the common word-form *hari*). It should not be argued that the (universal) conception (of the word *hari*) and its interpretative property can be dispensed with by the assumption of the sequence of phonemes, because (if it is so), the conception of the entity jar, and the universal concept jarness, would also be easily dispensed with by assuming the peculiar shape of clay moulded in a particular pattern. Therefore, the universal concept (of the word like *haritva*) must be taken as denotative, and the interpretative abstraction of it (the universal concept *haritva*) is held to be identical with it (universal concept *haritva*).

NOTES: We have the universal concept 'this is the word *hari*' (*idaṁ haripadam*) which refers to the different utterances of the word *hari* pronounced by different persons at different times. To this universal concept, the grammarians give the name *haripadatva*. Now the question arises: What is it that makes *haripadatva* represent all the individual utterances of the word *hari*? Or, to put it differently, what is the interpretative abstract property of the universal concept *haripadatva*? To this KB answers that the defining property of the universal concept *haripadatva* is not different from the universal concept *haripadatva*. What he means to say is that the name *haripadatva* or *haritva* designates both the universal concept and universality. Universality is a property which defines the character of the universal concept of objects. In other words, the defining property of the universal concept *haripadatva* is identified with the universal concept *haripadatva*. To keep these two notions apart, two different terms *haripadatva* and *haripadatvatva* are not used, because such a terminology leads to *anavasthā*: 'infinite regress'. Now the opponent argues that

the conception of a unitary word and universality can be easily dispensed with by assuming the notion of phonemic sequence. He feels that the different utterances of the word *hari* can be grouped under the single notion of the sequence *h-a-r-i,* since all the varied utterances of the word *hari* have the same phonemic sequence *h-a-r-i.* People feel the whole as one through the sameness of the arrangement of the parts. KB's reply to this argument is that the conception of the whole cannot be rendered redundant by the notion of the arrangement of the parts. If this view is applied everywhere, he claims, the conception of jarness will also be redundant, since its purpose can be served by the peculiar pattern of the arrangement of the potsherds. Actually, the size and shape are the physical properties of the object, while the conception of *jāti* is a direct way of the interpretation of such properties. *Jāti* is the abstract conception of language which refers to the common physical characteristics of the object. The conception of *jāti* cannot be easily dispensed with by assuming the properties of the object. Similarly, the conception of the word cannot be dispensed with by the physical object. Fellowing the same argument, KB concludes that the physical arrangement of the word has not communicative value. For the purposes of communication, the unitary form of the word is assumed.

Anyathāsiddha[106]: the word means superfluous cause; literally it means 'proved (to be antecedent) through another'. The term generally refers to a cause which is not necessary for the production of an effect, or which accompanies a necessary antecedent. In other words, that, which has no independent bearing on the existence or non-existence of the effect, is the superfluous cause. The

106. *Tarkāsaṁgraha,* ATHALYE's p. 194; *Siddhāntamuktāvalī,* Verses 19-22.

father of the potter invariably precedes the jar, but, since he has no independent bearing on the existence or non-existence of the jar, he is not the cause of the jar. The logicians have mentioned the five varieties of the superfluous cause. Out of these, the fifth variety — 'that which is other than the necessary invariable antecedent is considered *anyathāsiddha*' — is important and essential to prove superfluousness of cause.

109, 9-13

TR: (Objection:) Since the two (identical[107]) universal features (i.e. the same universal feature) resides in the two (words) *saraḥ, rasaḥ* and others, there would not arise cognition of difference in the (conveyed sense). To meet this objection (the author in the second half of the verse) says, "relating to the associative features" etc. Here the word *vā* means 'but'. The word *upādhi* means sequence. And that (sequence), itself is indicative of the differences in the class characters (of the words: *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ*). Thus there remains the difference in the cognition (of sequence) which causes (the difference in the auditory perception of *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ*). Therefore, (the difficulty of) unwarranted result (i.e. non-difference in the auditory perception of *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ)* does not exist. (The author of the verse) furnishes the analogy by the words "phonemes" etc. to indicate that distinctiveness (in the auditory perceptions of *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ*) is caused by *upādhi* (i.e. associative features).

NOTES: If the notion of the class character of words is based on the sameness of the phonemes which constitute the word, the words *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ* will be considered as belonging to

107. I think the reading should be *dvayor jātyoḥ samatvāt* instead of *dvayor jātyoḥ sattvāt.*

the same word-class, because their constituent phonemes are the same. Therefore, KB contends that the universal character of words does not consist merely in having identical phonemes but also in having them in the same order. To put it differently, the sameness of word takes into account the sameness of the phonetic sequence. KB says that the difference in the auditory perception of the words *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ* is *aupādhika*, since the term "difference in the sequence" refers in reality to the physical property of the articulated sound. However, the actual physical property of the uttered sound is felt to be associated with the auditory perception of the words, and it serves to distinguish one word from the other when they differ in the phonetic order of the articulated sounds.

It deserves mention in this connection that my explanation of the second half of the verse differs altogether from that of KB. My interpretation is based on Vanamālimiśra's commentary *Matonmajjana* on Bhaṭṭoji's *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntakārikā*. Vanamālimiśra's work is earlier than KB's *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra*. Vanamālimiśra[108] thinks that the second half of the verse refers to the *vyaktisphoṭa* view. The first half, according to him, maintains that the phoneme *g* pronounced in varied tones or pitches is really different. But in all the varied utterances, there is one common property *gatva* which comprises the host of varied utterances in the form of the

108. The work is not published, but its fragments are quoted by K. P. TRIVEDI here and there in his notes on the *Bhūṣaṇa*. औपाधिको वेति। अयमर्थः। येषां मते य एव नित्यः पदार्थः स एव तत्तद्ध्वन्युपहितः सन् तकारादिः उच्यते। शास्त्रान्तरसंमतं दृष्टान्तमाहुः तारेति। तादृशध्वन्युपहितः ककारादिस्तारमन्द्रादिः उच्यते। एवं नित्य एव पदार्थो विलक्षणध्वनिरूपोपाधिसंवलितः ककारादिः न तु वर्णः पदार्थान्तरम्। *Vaiyakaraṇabhūṣaṇa*, Bombay ed., p. 725.

single notion of *g-type*. This is the *jātisphoṭa* view. The second line according to Vanamālimiśra maintains that the phoneme *g* uttered by different people in different tones is the same, but it appears to be different owing to the associative features which are responsible for individual variation. The second half of the verse, thus, indicates the simplicity in the *vyakti-sphoṭa* view by treating individual differences as *aupādhika* (non-phonematic).

According to KB, the whole verse refers to the *jātisphoṭa*. Its first half suggests that the varied utterances of the word do not render the word different, provided it is revealed by the same phonemes. But there arises the difficulty that,—if the notion of the universal nature resides in the revelation of the *sphoṭa* by the same phonemes,—the word *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ* would convey the same idea, because the same phonemes enter into their formation. KB gets out of this difficulty by saying that the phonemes arranged in a particular sequence reveal the *sphoṭa,* and any change in that sequence will invariably cause a corresponding change in the *sphoṭa*. But such a sequence which is the physical character of the articulated sound cannot be attributed to the *sphoṭa* word which is ubiquitous, indivisible and permanent. To get rid of this difficulty, KB argues that, although the sequence of phonemes is the characteristic of the articulated sound which is momentary in nature, still it is felt to be associated with the revealed *sphoṭa*. It is *aupādhika*. The usual analogy is that the redness is not present in the crystal, but it appears to be present in it owing to its contact with the crimson flower. This unreal redness in the crystal also serves the purpose of differentiating one crystal from the others. In the same manner, the difference in the *sphoṭa* words *saraḥ* and *rasaḥ*, which have the same constituent sound-units, is justified by the cognizance of the sequence which appears in the *sphoṭa*

as its associative feature. In Vanamālimiśra's explanation the word *vā* in the verse becomes appropriate, because it refers to the alternative views: *jātisphoṭa* and *vyaktisphoṭa*. According to KB, it loses its significance, since both the lines refer to the same view (*jātisphoṭa*). Therefore KB remarks *vā tv arthe*[109].

109, 14-15

TR: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 70). But, since the universal nature (like *gotva*) resides in (each phoneme), the meaning would be apprehended from each (one of them). To meet this objection (the author of the verse says).

NOTES: The term *varṇajātisphoṭa* refers to a single phoneme which is constant and unaffected by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. The term *sphoṭa,* according to the later grammarians, refers to the meaning-bearing unit. Thus, if this view is accepted, each phoneme will be the smallest significant unit, and accordingly, the meaning will be understood by a listener from the individual phoneme separately, which goes against experience.

109, 16-17

TR: (*Kārikā* 70). The *sphoṭa* is declared by some as the class revealed by the various individuals[110] and what are called sounds are considered to be the individuals (of this class).

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109. *Darpaṇa*, p. 435:

वाशब्दस्य पक्षान्तरत्वभ्रमं निराकरोति । वा त्वर्थ इति । अवधारणे इत्यर्थः। भेद इति । तथा च तत्र वर्णतौल्येऽप्यानुपूर्वीवैलक्षण्येन रसत्वविशिष्टोपस्थापकतावच्छेदकजातेर्निरुक्ताव्यवहितोत्तरत्वसंबन्धेन रसविशिष्टसत्त्वादिरूपानुपूर्व्या एव व्यञ्जकतया तदभावेन न सरःपदाद्रसत्वविशिष्टबोधापत्तिः ।

110. KB takes the first line of this verse as a complete sentence. But Nāgoji Bhaṭṭa thinks that the word *kaiścit* is to be taken *with the first line* (*sphoṭavāda*, p. 99). See also J. BROUGH, "Some Indian theories of meaning", pp. 44ff.

NOTES: KB quotes Bhartṛhari's verse (1.93) to support the class-*sphoṭa* theory. For classification of *sphoṭa* into *jāti* and *vyakti,* see pp. 81-84. It deserves to be mentioned in this connection that the explanation of this verse given by the commentators on the *Vākyapadīya* altogether differs from that given by KB. According to the commentators, Bhartṛhari's statement with regard to the *jātisphoṭa* is essentially confined to the relation between *sphoṭa* and *dhvani.* To him *sphoṭa* represents a class of universal sounds, whereas *dhvani* represents a particular sound. *Sphoṭa* is a class of sounds related to the individual instances of sounds through the relation of manifester and manifested. *Sphoṭa* is always a generic representation, while *dhvani* represents particular sound-instances which are associated with the individual variations. To put it differently, the term *anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā* as used by Bhartṛhari points out that *sphoṭa* represents the universal nature of the phoneme *p* whose individual members are various utterances of the *p* sounds. The term *aneka* here does not mean more than one sound-entity like *p, b, c, d* etc. but the same sound-entity which assumes plurality when it is associated with the individual variation. The whole verse does not represent the two different views but simply states that the varied individual sounds are called *dhvanis,* whereas the universal nature of these varied sounds is considered to be the *sphoṭa.*

On the other hand, what KB means by the phrase *anekavyaktyabhivyaṅgyā* is something very different. His understanding is this: The phrase denotes 'that the various different phonetic entities like *p, a, ṭ, a* reveal the *sphoṭa* word *paṭa,* as a result of which meaning is not comprehended from each phonemic entity. In other words, each single phoneme does not manifest the entire *sphoṭa* and therefore, the individual phonemes have no direct connection with meaning. According

to KB, the first line itself forms one complete idea. He thinks that in the second line, Bhartṛhari maintains that the terms *dhvani* and *varṇa* are indistinctively used to denote the sound-entity. This view attributed to some scholars by the word *kaiścit* denies the distinction between *varṇavyakti* and *dhvani* as pointed out by other grammarians who maintain that the term *varṇavyakti* stands for the individual auditory impressions of the articulated sounds, whereas the term *dhvani* stands for the varied individual articulated sounds.

109, 18-19; 110, 1-3

TR: The universal concept (of the word) revealed by the various individual phonemes is known as the *sphoṭa* word. That is to say, (the universal *sphoṭa* word) is the conveyor of meaning as suggested by its etymological sense. By this the following view: "since the *sphoṭa* word is permanent, it would be the conveyor of all word-meanings for all the time", is discarded.

The sense (of the passage) is as follows: Although the defect mentioned above might be raised against the *varṇasphoṭa* view, still it cannot be levelled against the theories of the *padasphoṭa* and the *vākyasphoṭa*, because it is established that *jāti* (universal concept of meaning-bearing unit) resides in it (i.e. in the meaning-bearing unit) as a whole (i.e. in the unit whose parts cannot be separated from the meaning point of view), on the basis of proof which causes to infer *dharmin* (i.e. unitariness of word and sentence).

NOTES: The concept of the universal nature of the word is inferred from the fact that the word or sentence pronounced by different persons in different tones does not disturb the process of communication. Since the process of communication re-

mains unimpaired in the varied utterances of words and sentences, we must admit that the varied individual pronunciation stands irrelevant as far as the communication is concerned. To keep the process of communication intact, we must assume the universal concept of the words and sentences. The meaningful expression which may be a word or a sentence, to which meaning is attached, is considered as the *sphoṭa*. It is single and indivisible. Since the phonemes are not communicative, the grammarians do not consider that phonemes are meaningful units. In fact, they only serve to reveal the *sphoṭa* entity. Although the *sphoṭa* word is permanent, it does not convey the meaning unless it is revealed by the phonemes.

The idea of the *varṇasphoṭa* is not concerned with the meaning, but it refers to the phonematic[111] pattern of sounds instead of the phonetic pattern. The later grammarians consider that the *sphoṭa* must be necessarily meaningful; accordingly, they interpret the term *varṇasphoṭa* in the sense of stems and suffixes which are meaningful units. KB says *jāti* (i.e. the universal nature of meaningful unit) is *vyāsajjyavṛtti*[112]. In other words, the property 'meaning-bearingness' resides in a word or in a sentence as a whole, and it does not adhere to its parts (phonemes).

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111. K. K. RAJA, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

112. *Nyāyakośa*, p. 849:

व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वम् । स्वसमानाधिकरणभेदप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकत्वम् । ... यथा उभयत्वस्य व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वम् । अपेक्षाबुद्धिविशेषविषयत्वमपेक्षाबुद्धिजन्यत्वं वा । यथा द्वित्वत्रित्वादीनां व्यासज्यवृत्तित्वम् ।

The term व्यासज्यवृत्ति refers to a property which resides in a unit whose parts are inseparable so far the occurrence of that property is concerned. For further explanation, see INGALL's *Materials for the study of the Navya-Nyāya logic*, pp. 77-78.

Therefore, there is no possibility of denotation of meaning by a single phoneme. However, he admits this difficulty in the *varṇasphoṭa* view, if it refers to the phoneme as such. But to him, the *varṇasphoṭa* is not the ultimate principle, but it is only secondary. The grammarians attach real importance to the *padasphoṭa* and *vākyasphoṭa*, as they are primarily regarded as meaning-bearing units.

110, 3-5

TR: That is why some (grammarians) hold (the view) that the term *vyakti* (individual instance) stands for sounds also, because (according to them) there is no difference between phonemes and sounds. This is the meaning (of the second half of the verse). This is stated (also) in the *Kāvyaprakāśa*: "By the learned, i.e. by the grammarians, *dhvani* is a name given to *śabda* which is revealer of the *sphoṭa*, a matter of primary importance and to be considered as an object of revelation".

NOTES: It is very difficult to make an exact distinction between the use of the terms *dhvani* and *varṇa*. To the Indian thinkers, language is primarily an auditory system. No doubt the phonetic description given by the Indian grammarians, is largely confined to the places of articulation[113] and their distinctive features, but in spite of it, the articulatory system is secondary to the auditory one. Language is used to communicate our thoughts to listeners, and, accordingly, the perception of sounds by the listener's ear plays a very important role in the communication. While discussing the nature of *śabda*, Patañjali[114] remarks: "a *śabda* is perceived by the ear, grasped by the in-

113. W. S. ALLEN, *Phonetics in Ancient India*, p. 15.
114. *Mbh.* on the 1st *Śiva-sūtra*.

tellect and exhibited by the sound". Patañjali, using these three words, gives adequate description of the process of communication. Firstly, sound is revealed by the articulatory process; secondly, it is received by the listener's ear; and finally the auditory perception of sound is translated into thought. The term *dhvani*[115] refers to the articulated sound unit, while the term *varṇa* is used in the semantic texts very often to mean the sound quality received by a listener's ear. The term *varṇa*[116] used by the Indian philosophers is approximately equivalent to the modern linguistic term phoneme.[117] However, the contrast between the terms *dhvani* and *varṇa* does not represent the difference between the spoken system and the written system. Therefore, I feel it is inadequate to render the term *varṇa* as a letter. I admit that the term *varṇa* is ambiguously used to represent various meanings: sound, phoneme, quality, letter and auditory perception of sound etc. But in the context of the *sphoṭa* theory, KB has certainly not used the term *varṇa* in the sense of written symbols.[118] Nor does he use it in the sense of sounds which are perishable. Further KB points out that Bhartṛhari presents the view of some scholars by the word *kaiścit* (i.e. by some), who maintain that the terms *varṇa* and *dhvani* are indistinctively used, as they refer to the same meaning. Probably the meaning would be articulated sound.

115. See note 81.

116. W. S. ALLEN, *Ibid.*, p. 15.

117. See note 95.

118. His term *varṇapratyakṣa* clearly indicates that the term *varṇa* refers to the sound perceived auditorily.

110, 7-9

TR: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 71) What do you mean when you say 'this is universal'? (As an answer to this, the following verse) is given.

(*Kārikā* 71). Of the two elements viz. real and unreal which are embodied in every object, that which is the real (element) is (known as) the universal, while the unreal (elements) are (regarded as) the particulars.

NOTES: Helārāja[119], while commenting on this verse, remarks that the word *satya* refers to the real element which is found in all objects and is never destroyed. For example when gold is converted into rings, bracelets, earrings etc., everytime its shape is destroyed, but the substance (gold) remains the same in spite of the changes in the shapes which it has undergone. Thus the true element is gold, while the untrue element is the shape. The word 'true element' stands for *jāti*, and the untrue element refers to *vyakti* (i.e. *ākṛti*).

The term *jāti* ultimately refers to the *Brahman* which is the underlying essentiality of all objects. In the next verse[120]

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119. Helārāja on *VP. Jātisamu*, verse 32, Deccan College, p. 40: तदेव हि सत्यं यस्मिंस्तत्त्वं न विहन्यते (*Mbh.* on *Vār.* I पस्पशाह्निक) इत्यन्वयिरूपं भेदप्रत्ययेष्वबाध्यमानं सत्यं जातिः इति व्यवहृतमद्वैतिभिः। तद्यथा रुचकस्वस्तिककुण्डलादयो विकाराः परस्परोपमर्देन भवन्तः अस्थिर-प्रत्ययविषयाः सुवर्णमित्येव तु सत्यमन्वयिविज्ञानावसेयसतत्त्वम्।

120. *VP.* III.1.33,34:

संबन्धिभेदात्सत्तैव भिद्यमाना गवादिषु।
जातिरित्युच्यते तस्यां सर्वे शब्दा व्यवस्थिताः॥
तां प्रातिपदिकार्थं च धात्वर्थं च प्रचक्षते।
सा नित्या सा महानात्मतामाहुस्त्वतलादयः॥

Bhartṛhari says that the supreme existence *(mahāsattā)* which appears in multifarious forms like *go*, *aśva* and others through a variety of objects, is called *jāti*. The *jāti* is not different from existence. It is the eternal characteristic of all things, and it is ultimately denoted by the words. It is interesting to note that Bhartṛhari thinks that *jāti* is *mahāsattā* or existence that abides in objects. Such a philosophical conception of *jāti* refers to the essence of things and not to the physical characteristics of objects.

110, 10-15

TR: 'In every object' means 'in every substance'. The real element is *jāti*, and the unreal elements are individuals. The supreme reality delimited by various individuals is *jāti* (universal). This is stated by Kaiyaṭa[121] also: "The supreme essentiality (of things) associated with the unreal differentiating elements is denoted by the word *dravya*. And this supreme essence reveals itself through (the medium of) the form of words.

(Objection:) How would then (the following statement of) Kaiyaṭa be justified? "When one perceives the supreme reality,

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121. *Pradīpa* on *Mbh. on Vār* 1 *Paspaśāhnika*:

द्रव्यं हि नित्यमित्यसत्योपाध्यवच्छिन्नं ब्रह्मतत्त्वं द्रव्यशब्दवाच्यमित्यर्थः। आकृतिरिति संस्थानम्। ब्रह्मदर्शने च गोत्वादिजातेरसत्यत्वादनित्यत्वम्। आत्मैवेदं सर्वमिति श्रुतिवचनात्।

The term *dravya* according to Kaiyaṭa refers to essential and true element which is never destroyed while *vyakti refers* to changing unpermanent aspect of *dravya*. Kaiyaṭa's statement also is here based on *nitya* and *anitya* nature of *dravya* and *ākṛti* respectively.

the universal nature cowness etc. also does not exist, and therefore, it is regarded as non-eternal on the authority of the *śruti* text: "This whole (universe) is nothing but soul[122]". (Answer:) It should be understood that (i.e. the statement of Kaiyaṭa is to be explained) by adopting the alternative view: "(that the concept of *jāti*) is either nescience or a particular property which emerges from nescience".

NOTES: Now the *pūrvapakṣin* points out the contradiction between the two statements of Kaiyaṭa. In the first statement, *jāti* refers to the real element that abides in all things. *Jāti* is the essence of things, and it is equated with the *Mahāsattā*: 'supreme existence' which is one and imperishable; whereas, in the second statement, it refers to the external character of concrete objects. To this KB answers that these two statements refer to the two different approaches. The first statement equates *jāti* with the *Brahman* which appears to be manifold owing to the diversified characters of objects. The second statement refers to the *jāti* which is the manifestation of nescience *(avidyā)* that disappears when the knowledge of the ultimate truth arises in the soul. In the first statement, the word *jāti* stands for the supreme reality which never comes to an end even when the whole world is annihilated. According to the second view, *jāti* refers to the common external character of concrete objects which are unreal and are doomed to perish along with individuals which are destroyed altogether.

110, 16-18; 111, 1-9

TR: (Introduction to the *kārikā* 72) (The author of the verse) clarifies the same real element (of a thing in the following verse:)

122. Chā. 7.25.2.

(*Kārikā* 72). (The learned men) say that the word-essence which is thus being settled (as the true nature of things) is the imperishable, untainted, supreme reality. A respectful salutation to that perfect soul (is now paid).

The sense of (the verse) is as follows: The twofold creation (i.e. name and form or word and meaning) is established by *śruti* text, "let me develop name and form[123]". The true nature of the name also is the same as that of the form. While the (unreal) element (represented) in evolution is a mere display of nescience. It has been stated in the *Vākyapadīya*[124]: "In the *śāstras*[125], it is only nescience that is described under different (forms of) process. (All) the objects have a beginning. It is only the *Brahman* that is eternal (i.e. beginningless) and imperishable".

By the phrase *Brahmaiva* (the author of the verse) refers to the self-illuminating and all-other-illuminating nature of the *Brahman* which is established by the *śruti* texts: "Here (is) this self, self-illuminating[126]"; "After him, who shines, doeth everything shine[127]"; "All this (universe) illuminates with his light[128]"; and thereby suggests that the term *sphoṭa* etymolo-

123. *Ibid.*, 6.3.2.

124. *Ibid.*, 3.14.78; 2.2.37.

125. In the grammatical context the verse means that the analytical method of grammarians divides the sentences into words and words into suffixes and stems. This is artificial procedure useful for the understanding of language. Although this is unreal from the point of ultimate reality, still it enables us to arrive at the knowledge of final reality through unreal means.

126. *Bṛh.*, 4.3.9.

127. *Muṇ.*, 2.2.10, *Kaṭha.*, 5.15, *Śwet.*, 6.14.

128. *Kaṭha.*, 5.15; *Śwet*, 6.14; *Muṇḍ.*, 2.2.10.

gically signifies "(the word) from which the meaning bursts forth" (which is the same as the *Brahman*).

NOTES: The grammarians equate the term *śabda* with the *sphoṭa* which is again identical with the *Brahman*. It is also called the *śabdatattva* by the grammarians. The *śabdatattva*: 'word-essence' assumes all verbal forms and objects signified by the verbal forms. The term *sphoṭa* also represents the two aspects. If we resort to the etymological explanation, *sphuṭati artho yasmāt*: 'from which meaning bursts forth", it represents the meaning aspect. The other explanation — *sphuṭyate yo varṇaih*: "which is revealed by phonemes" — represents the verbal aspect. *Sphoṭa* is called *svaparaprakāśaka* (illuminating itself and others), as it illuminates its own verbal form as well as the meaning conveyed by it.

111, 9-10; 112, 1-5

TR: For the circulation (of the text) without any obstacles, the author states at the end (of the text) the auspicious (epilogue): 'to the perfect soul' etc.

By dedicating (to Him) the splendid (text) *Bhūṣaṇasāra* (the quintessence of the *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇa*: 'an ornament for the grammarians') I adorn Him who has the serpent Śeṣa for His ornament (i.e. Viṣṇu) who bestows innumerable rewards (on His devotees), and who is also the lord of all.

Here ends the (final chapter) *sphoṭavāda* and the text *Vaiyākaraṇabhūṣaṇasāra* composed by the venerable Kauṇḍa Bhaṭṭa, the son of Raṅgoji Bhaṭṭa, who is chief among those who are fully conversant with the science of grammar, *Mīmāṁsā* and Logic.

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